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Abstract
This thesis concerns the cryptanalysis of block ciphers and we look at two important ex-
amples: the Data Encryption Standard DES [80] and the cipher RC5 proposed by Rivest
[84]. Although these ciphers may have been superseded by recent advances, there are
lessons to be learnt in the art of cryptanalysis by studying them. The first half of our
thesis focuses on the reduced variant of DES i.e. the 8-round version. We discussed the
implementation of DES and various cryptanalytic attacks on 8-round DES such as, dif-
ferential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, Differential-Linear cryptanalysis and also the
use of multiple linear approximations in Differential-Linear cryptanalysis. By performing
these cryptanalytic attacks on a PC, we were able to gain insight into the processes/steps
involved in performing cryptanalysis and we were able to gauge the feasibility of the at-
tacks with respect to the computing power of a normal PC. We discovered a different
implementation when we used multiple linear approximations in Differential-Linear crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES which gives experimental result comparable to previously known
result based on similar attack. The second half of our thesis focuses on a comparative
study of cryptanalytic attacks on both DES and RC5 block ciphers mainly concentrating
on the use of distinguishers to determine the strength or weakness of the block cipher
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In this Chapter, we give the motivation for our research. We describe the state-of-the-art
in block cipher cryptanalysis. We also describe the contributions of this research and
present its overall structure.
1.1 Motivation
Advancement in computer technology has significantly thrusted block ciphers to the world
stage. Ever since DES (Data Encryption Standard) was first publicly adopted as an en-
cryption standard, we have been trying to improve security through the use of different
encryption algorithms while at the same time trying to find security weaknesses in these
algorithms by inventing or discovering ingenious cryptanalytic attacks. The importance of
encryption algorithms, particularly block ciphers, is more evident when we surf the Inter-
net. Safe transactions in e-commerce through the internet would not be possible without
the existence of encryption algorithms. Since the Internet is worldwide, knowledge about
encryption algorithms and security, in general, also spread throughout the world. The
global impact of block ciphers has made cryptology, the science of secure communications,
very important.
Cryptology has two main branches – cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptography is
the study of how to design algorithms that aim at providing security goals such as confi-
dentiality, authenticity, integrity and other security-related goals for data transmitted in
insecure communication channels. Confidentiality protects data from leaking to unautho-
1
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rised users. Authenticity provides assurance regarding the identity of a communicating
party, which protects against impersonation and nonrepudiation. Integrity protects data
against being modified (or at least enables modifications to be detected).
In modern cryptography, there are two types of cryptography used, i.e. secret-key (sym-
metric) cryptography and public-key (asymmetric) cryptography. In secret-key cryptog-
raphy, a single secret key is used in the encryption algorithm for encrypting or decrypting
messages; the sender encrypts a message using a secret key and the receiver uses the same
key to decrypt the message. In public-key cryptography, introduced by Diffie and Hell-
man [35] in 1976, each participating party has a pair of keys, one called the public-key and
the other called the private-key; the public-key is typically published in a trusted directory,
while the private-key is kept secret. When using a public-key encryption algorithm, the
sender uses the public-key of the receiver to encrypt the message, and the receiver uses
his/her private-key to decrypt the message.
Cryptanalysis is the study of how to evaluate or break cryptographic algorithms. It
helps in the design of more secure cryptographic algorithms because we can learn from
the weaknesses that we discover in cryptographic algorithms and so develop new designs
that avoid these weaknesses.
The block cipher is an important primitive in secret-key cryptography. The main pur-
pose of a block cipher is to provide confidentiality for data transmitted over an insecure
communication channel. A block cipher can also be used to build other secret-key crypto-
graphic primitives, such as stream ciphers, hash functions, message authentication codes
(MACs), and cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generators. Block ciphers
are also widely used as a fundamental component in public-key cryptography, informa-
tion security, network security, computer security and other security applications. It is
therefore important to investigate the security of a block cipher algorithm against various
cryptanalytic attacks.
1.2 Block Ciphers
The term “block cipher” refers to an encryption algorithm that operates on “blocks”
of data. Typically, the blocks of data are 64, 128 or 256 bits in length and they are
transformed into blocks of the same size with the use of a secret key. The block cipher
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encrypts a block of input plaintext P into a block of output ciphertext C using a secret key
k. This is typically denoted as C = ENCk(P ). The reverse process, called decryption,
uses the same secret key. This is denoted as P = DECk(C). There are two important
parameters for a block cipher, i.e. its block size, denoted by b and its key size, denoted
by κ. The block size b determines the space of all possible permutations that a block
cipher might generate. The key size κ determines the number of permutations that are
actually generated. So, for a block cipher with key size κ, there are 2κ possible keys and
each key specifies a permutation of 2b inputs. There are (2b)! different permutations on
b-bit input blocks which is approximately 2(b−1)2b , by using Stirling’s approximation. For
a typical block size b and key size κ, a block cipher only provides a tiny fraction of all
the available permutations using a highly structured method. However, we expect a good
block cipher will be able to disguise this and we expect a randomly chosen key will be
able to “select” a seemingly random permutation from among the 2(b−1)2b possibilities.
Apart from that, we also require that keys that are related in some way should yield
permutations that have no discernible relation between them. For a secure block cipher we
expect no exploitable information about the encryption process to leak. Such information
might include information about the choice of key, information about the encryption or
decryption of inputs or information about the permutations generated using different keys.
Much of the work in block ciphers can be attributed to the work of C. E. Shannon,
particularly the landmark paper [87] which introduced the idea of confusion and diffusion
for practical cipher design. These are still the most widely used principles in block cipher
design. The idea of confusion is to make the ciphertext statistics depend on the plaintext
statistics in a manner that is too complicated to be exploited by the cryptanalyst while
the concept of diffusion is to make each digit or bit of the plaintext and each digit or bit
of the secret key to influence many digits or bits of the ciphertext. Block ciphers are de-
signed to provide sufficient confusion and diffusion. It is the job of the designer to come up
with a mix of components that will help achieve the goals of providing both confusion and
diffusion. It turns out that the basic operations of substitution and permutation are partic-
ularly important in achieving these goals. Most block ciphers contain some combination of
substitution and permutation. However, the exact forms of substitution and permutation
vary greatly for different block ciphers. Substitution is often used as a way to provide
confusion within a cipher. Permutations are often used to contribute to the good diffusion
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in a cipher. The mix of substitution and permutation is an important component of most
block cipher designs. An important class of block ciphers called substitution/permutation
networks or SP-networks, consist of the repeated application of a carefully chosen substi-
tution, a carefully chosen permutation, and the addition of key material. While the user
supplies the encryption key, it is a good design principle to reuse as much of that key
material as often as possible throughout the encryption process. It is the role of the key
schedule to produce a series of round keys to each round of encryption and these round
keys are computed from the user supplied encryption key.
So far, we have only discussed the role of the cryptographer, which is to design crypto-
graphic algorithms. Now, we turn our attention to the cryptanalyst who tries to examine
what the attacker is trying to do. In the most extreme case, the cryptanalyst will want
to recover the user supplied secret key. However, the cryptanalyst may be satisfied with
much less than that. With this in mind, it is possible to establish a hierarchy of possible
attacks [60]:
1. TOTAL BREAK: The attacker recovers the user supplied key k
2. GLOBAL DEDUCTION: The attacker is able to find an algorithm A which is func-
tionally equivalent to ENCk(·) or DECk(·)
3. LOCAL DEDUCTION: The attacker can generate the ciphertext corresponding to
a previously unseen ciphertext
4. DISTINGUISHING ALGORITHM: The attacker can effectively distinguish between
two black boxes: one contains the block cipher with the randomly chosen encryption
key while the other contains a randomly chosen permutation.
An attacker achieving a total break can achieve all the other goals. These attacks have
been ordered so that achieving any given goal automatically achieves those that follow.
Conversely, if an attacker is unable to distinguish between the implementation of a block
cipher and a randomly chosen permutation then we have, in some sense, achieved an ideal
block cipher.
In 1883, Kerckhoffs (1835 - 1903) laid out six requirements for a usable field cipher [54].
These have been reinterpreted by comentators and the term Kerckhoffs’ Assumption or
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Kerckhoffs’ Principle is now used to refer to the assumption that the cryptanalyst knows
every detail of the encryption mechanism except the user-supplied secret key.
We might also assume that the cryptanalyst has access to different types of data. As
we look at attacks in more detail it will become clear that we need to specify exactly the
kind of data required in an attack. Not all kinds of data are equally useful, nor equally
available. Attacks can be classified according to the type of data that they require as given
below [62]:
1. CIPHERTEXT ONLY: The attacker intercepts the ciphertext generated by the en-
cryption algorithm. Here, the attacker will rely on some knowledge of the plaintext
source.
2. KNOWN PLAINTEXT: The attacker is able to intercept a set of n ciphertexts
c0 . . . cn−1 corresponding to some known plaintexts p0 . . . pn−1 with ci = ENCk(pi)
for 0 <= i <= n− 1.
3. CHOSEN PLAINTEXT: The attacker is able to request the encryption of a set
of n plaintexts p0 . . . pn−1 of the attackers’ choosing and intercepts the ciphertexts
ci = ENCk(pi) for 0 <= i <= n− 1.
4. ADAPTIVELY CHOSEN PLAINTEXT: The attacker obtains the encryption of new
chosen plaintext pi for i >= n in an interactive way, perhaps after seeing an original
pool of n chosen plaintext/ciphertext pairs ci = ENCk(pi) for 0 <= i <= n− 1.
5. CHOSEN AND ADAPTIVELY CHOSEN CIPHERTEXT: The attacker recovers the
decryption of ciphertexts of his/her own choosing. As in the case of chosen plaintext
attack, there is also an adaptive version.
6. RELATED KEY: Like in the chosen plaintext attack, the attacker can obtain only
the ciphertext encrypted with the help of two keys. These keys are unknown but
the relationship between these keys is known, for example, the two keys may differ
in only one single bit.
With the increase in the type of data available, the attacker has more control over the
analysis of the block cipher and can devise increasingly sophisticated attacks. However, at
the same time collecting data of a given type becomes more demanding as we move down
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the list. Many of the attacks we differentiated according to how much data is required as
well as the type of data required.
The success of different types of cryptanalysis will be measured according to the re-
sources they consume. We have already seen that the amount, and type, of data is
important. We can add some additional resources that are likely to be of interest below:
1. TIME: The time, or work effort, required to mount the attack is usually the first
thing analysts and commentators consider in a new attack. Sometimes, it is the only
requirement considered.
2. MEMORY: The amount of memory, or storage, for an attack is very important.
Sometimes the amount of memory is so great that it creates an insurmountable
bottleneck and the attack remains impractical. For example, the time to perform,
say 240 encryption operations is easier to accumulate than the memory to store 240
results.
3. DATA: We have already seen that the type of data for an attack is important, but
so is the amount of data. For instance, an attack might not require much time but
it might require an enormous amount of data. If the time required to generate the
data far exceeds normal usage patterns then the practical impact of the attack is
limited.
The data types and resources listed above are typically the most appropriate way to
quantify a cryptanalytic attack. However, when we turn to cryptographic implementation
and deployment, a whole range of new attacks that can be more powerful than classi-
cal cryptanalysis become crucial. These are attacks that allow the attacker to exploit
the leakage of physical information, for instance, the encryption time [68] or the power
consumption [69], during the implementation of an algorithm. This area is called side-
channel analysis, and the design of attacks and countermeasures is a constantly evolving
field. However, such works take us out of the scope of this thesis.
So far, we have explained what a block cipher is, what its security relies on and the
different types of analysis that can be done on it. Although there are numerous block
ciphers, we will only concentrate on several block ciphers which we have analysed in this
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 7
thesis, namely, Data Encryption Standard (DES) and RC5. The following sections give
brief descriptions about these particular block ciphers.
1.2.1 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
On May 15, 1973, the National Bureau of Standards (now known as the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology, or NIST) published a solicitation for cryptosystems
in the Federal Register [80]. This led to the ultimate adoption of the Data Encryption
Standard,or DES. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was developed at IBM, as a mod-
ification of an earlier system known as Lucifer. DES was first published in the Federal
Register of March 17, 1975. On January 15, 1977, DES was adopted as a standard for
“unclassified” applications. It was initially expected that DES would only be used as a
standard for 10 - 15 years; however, it proved to be much more durable. DES then be-
came the world’s most widely used encryption algorithm, particularly to protect financial
information [28]. DES was reviewed approximately every five years after its adoption. It
was last renewed in January 1999 but by this time, the development of its replacement,
the Advanced Encryption Standard [82, 32, 33] had already begun.
There was a lot of controversy over the use of DES as an encryption standard ever since
it was first introduced. There were two main objections over the use of DES:
1. The NSA (National Security Agency) worked with NBS (National Bureau of Stan-
dards) throughout the development of DES, evaluated the proposed DES algorithm
and recommended several changes to IBM. Specifically, IBM made changes to the
S-boxes, the nonlinear substitution transformations that are at the heart of the DES
algorithm, to improve its security. Some critics suspected that the NSA deliberately
weakened, rather than strengthened, the S-boxes, or perhaps even introduce a “trap
door” that would enable the NSA to decrypt messages encrypted by DES.
2. A commonly accepted definition of a good symmetric key algorithm, such as DES,
is that there exists no attack better than exhaustive key search in order to obtain
the key for decrypting the encrypted message. Critics argued that the 56-bit key
used in DES was too short for long term security and that the expected increase in
computational power would make the 56-bit key vulnerable to attack by exhaustive
key search [36, 50].
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As a result of the controversy over DES, research had been mainly focused on crypt-
analytic attacks which involved minimal or no exhaustive key search.
1.2.1.1 Description of DES
A detailed description of DES can be found in [80]. DES is a special type of iterated
cipher called a Feistel cipher. In a Feistel cipher, each state ui is divided into two halves
of equal length, say Li and Ri. The round function g has the following form:
g(Li−1, Ri−1,Ki) = (Li, Ri)
where
Li = Ri−1,
Ri = Li−1 ⊕ f(Ri−1,Ki) and
Ki is the i
th round key
DES is a 16-round Feistel cipher having block length of 64 bits. Basically, DES encrypts
a plaintext string x of length 64 bits using a 56-bit key, K, to obtain a ciphertext string y
of length 64 bits. Prior to the 16 rounds of encryption, there is a fixed initial permutation
IP that is applied to the plaintext. We denote
IP (x) = L0R0
After the 16 rounds of encryption, the inverse permutation IP−1 is applied to the bitstring
R16L16, yielding the ciphertext y i .e.
y = IP−1(R16L16)
Note that L16 and R16 are swapped before IP
−1 is applied. The IP and IP−1 only
permutes the bit positions. The application of IP and IP−1 has no cryptographic signif-
icance, and is often ignored when the security of DES is discussed. One round of DES
encryption is shown in Figure 1.1.
Each Li and Ri is 32 bits in length. The function f takes as input a 32-bit string (i .e.
the right half of the current state) and a round key. The 32-bit string is then expanded
to 48-bit string by and expansion mapping, E before XORing with the round key Ki





i − 1 i − 1
i i
i
Figure 1.1: One round of DES encryption
according to the key schedule. The key schedule, (K1,K2, · · · ,K16), consists of 48-bit
round keys derived from the 56-bit key, K. Each Ki is a permuted selection of bits from
K.
The function f is shown in Figure 1.2. Basically, the function f consists of a substitution
(using an S-box) followed by a fixed permutation, denoted by P .
The function f has two inputs, i .e. the 32-bit input Ri−1 and the 48-bit subkey, Ki to
produce a 32-bit output which is then XORed with Li−1 to produce Ri. In the function
f , Ri−1 is first expanded using and expansion function E thus producing a 48-bit output
E(Ri−1). By bitwise XORing E(Ri−1) with the subkey, Ki, we then produce a 48-bit
output. This 48-bit output is then divided into 8 blocks of 6 bits where each block is fed
into an S-box (There are 8 S-boxes altogether, i .e. S1, S2, · · · , S8). Each S-box receives 6
bits as input and produces 4-bit output. The S-boxes are lookup tables. Thus, the output
of the S-boxes depends on these lookup values. Altogether, the 8 S-boxes produces 32-bit
output. Finally, a permutation, P , is applied to this output of the S-boxes (to distinguish
it as all 32 bits rather than individual S-boxes) to produce the output for the function f .
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S1
Input (32 bits)
subkey (48 bits)48 bits




Figure 1.2: The DES f function
1.2.2 RC5
RC5 is a block cipher first introduced by Ron Rivest [84] in 1994. RC5 has been studied
extensively for many years ranging from differential cryptanalysis [55, 65] to timing attacks
[47]. RC5 is famous for the simplicity in coding of its encryption and decryption routines
although, the key schedule is quite complex. RC5 is also the cipher for which the AES
candidate RC6 [85] is based upon. A key feature of RC5 is the use of data-dependent
rotations.
We will give a formal description about the RC5 block cipher by giving notation that
will be used in subsequent Chapters.
1.2.2.1 Notation
To begin with, RC5 is a family of encryption algorithm determined by the parameters in
Table 1.1:
The following notations are used for Chapters related to RC5:
+ This denotes addition of words modulo 2w. The inverse operation, denoted by −, is
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Table 1.1: Parameters for RC5 encryption algorithm
Parameter Definition Allowable Values
w Word size in bits. RC5 encrypts 2-word blocks 16,32,64
r Number of rounds. 0,1,. . . ,255
b Number of 8-bit bytes(octets) in the secret key K 0,1,. . . ,255
subtraction modulo 2w
⊕ This denotes bitwise exclusive-or operation
≪ This denotes the left circular rotation of a word. For example, X≪ Y means the
left cyclic rotation of word X by Y rot positions to the left with Y rot denoting the
integer represented by the log2w least significant bits of word Y . The inverse is
the right circular rotation of word X by Y rot positions to the right is denoted by
X≫ Y
In [84], a round in RC5 consists of two equations, and in each equation, one of A or B is
modified while the other remains unchanged. Each equation is refered to as a half-round.
One half-round of RC5 is similar to a full-round in a Feistel cipher. We let L0 and R0
represent the left and right half of the plaintext input, each of length w bits. We use
the notation Lk and Rk to represent the left and right half, respectively, of the cipher
data after (k - 1)-th half-round. Also Sk represents the k-th subkey consisting of w bits
associated with (k - 1)-th half-round generated by RC5 key scheduling algorithm. We
let L2r+1 and R2r+1 represent the left and right half of the ciphertext, respectively. We
rewrite the RC5 encryption algorithm as follows:
L1 = L0 + S0
R1 = R0 + S1
for k = 2 to 2r + 1 do
Lk = Rk−1
Rk = ((Lk−1 ⊕Rk−1)≪ Rk−1) + Sk
For a binary vector x of length w, we label the bit positions from the most significant
bit to the least significant bit as w−1, . . . , 1, 0. We use x[s] to denote the s-th bit of x and
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x[s . . . t] (s ≥ t) to denote the word of length s− t+ 1 consisting of the s-th through t-th
bits of x. We use x[s, t, . . . , u] to denote x[s]⊕x[t]⊕· · ·x[u]. We let xrot = x[log2w−1 . . . 0]
which is used to determine a rotation count.
In the following Section, we will give a summary of the development and state-of-the-art
in block cipher cryptanalysis.
1.3 Development and State-of-the-art in Block Cipher Crypt-
analysis
Over the years, there have been many techniques used in block cipher cryptanalysis. These
techniques, or more commonly known as cryptanalytic attacks, are based on the attacker’s
access such as ciphertext only attack, known plaintext attack or attacker’s access to the
encryption system to generate plaintexts of chosen ciphertexts. The success of attack
can be measured using the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs or operations required to
recover the secret key either fully or partially. When the number of operations required is
less than 2n (i.e. exhaustive key search) where n is the number of bits of the secret key,
the cipher is said to be broken.
Until recently, work on block cipher cryptanalysis has been concentrated on a number
of popular block ciphers such as AES [46, 73], KASUMI [17], Serpent [10, 11, 38, 56], just
to name a few. However, a class of block ciphers known as lightweight block ciphers has
newly emerged. These are block ciphers used in applications where low power consumption
is a requirement along with hardware area constraints regarding their implementation. A
survey of the different lightweight block cipher implementations were mentioned in [40]
where DES and AES were included and compared with other block ciphers. Our discussion
about state-of-the-art in block cipher cryptanalysis will also include work on these block
ciphers.
In 1990, Biham and Shamir [4] proposed the basic differential cryptanalytic technique
based on DES, which is a chosen plaintext attack. The differential properties of DES’s
S-boxes were outlined in [76, 77]. Since then, differential cryptanalysis has been ap-
plied to various block ciphers such as RC5 [20], HIGHT [34] and PRESENT [23], Many
modifications and extensions have been proposed and analysed to improve the attacks on
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various cryptographic algorithms. Differential cryptanalysis can be extended to higher
order differential cryptanalysis, trunctated differential cryptanalysis and impossible differ-
ential cryptanalysis and so on. Although, these are related to the basic idea of differential
cryptanalysis, they are different from differential cryptanalysis. Biham [7] outlined that
differential cryptanalysis is structurally similar to linear cryptanalysis [74]. Some block
ciphers can resist differential cryptanalysis but they do not necessarily resist these types of
attacks. Generally, high-order differential cryptanalysis is effective against a cipher having
nonlinear modules with low algebraic degree and few iterative rounds. Although, for cer-
tain block ciphers, it is hardly possible to find the high probability differential. However,
if we are given the characteristics of a few bit differences, some key bits can be restored.
This is just the basic idea of truncated differential cryptanalysis. The basic idea of im-
possible differential cryptanalysis is to crack ciphers by eliminating candidate key points
which lead to a small probability check feature (this is generally zero). Lars Knudsen [61]
was the one who first proposed using truncated differential in 1994. In the same year, he
proposed higher order differential based on the concept of higher order derivatives. Eli
Biham, Alex Biryukov and Adi Shamir [9] used impossible differential to break IDEA and
Skipjack block ciphers by exploiting differentials that never occurs.
In 1993, linear cryptanalysis was developed by Matsui [74] to exploit linear approx-
imation with high probability, i.e. greater than 12 . A number of interesting variants of
linear cryptanalysis have been proposed including attacks using chosen plaintexts [63],
non-linear approximations [66, 88] and multiple linear approximations [52, 53, 22, 27].
Zero correlation is a variant of linear cryptanalysis developed by Andrey Bogdanov and
Vincent Rijmen [24] which tries to construct at least one non-trivial linear hull with no
linear trail i.e. with correlation C exactly zero. This attack is a counterpart of impossible
differential attack. To attack a cipher using integral, impossible or zero correlation attack,
details of the S-Box used is not required since it is independent of the choice of S-Box
used. Choosing another S-Box for a cipher will result in almost the same cryptanalytic
results.
After the discovery of linear and differential cryptanalysis, cryptographers started to
design ciphers which minimized both the maximum probability of differential character-
istics and the maximum correlation of linear characteristics. One of these ciphers was
SQUARE, designed by Daemen and Rijmen in 1997. However, during the analysis of a
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preliminary version of this block cipher, Knudsen discovered that it was vulnerable to a
new type of attack. This forced the designers to increase the number of rounds and the
resulting cipher was published in [31], together with the new attack, which was from then
on referred to as the ”SQUARE attack”. The SQUARE attack is not affected by specific
design choices for individual components, but relies on how these components, which are
considered as black boxes, are interconnected. Another interesting feature of the attack is
that it is not probabilistic: if the attacker does not detect the special property which the
distinguisher relies on, then he/she knows for sure that the plaintext/ciphertext pairs were
not generated by the block cipher. The general technique used in the SQUARE attack
has been given different names. Lucks [73] proposed the name saturation attack. Biryukov
and Shamir [21] treated the technique as a special case of structural cryptanalysis, and
Knudsen and Wagner [67] refered to it as integral cryptanalysis. The idea behind the
SQUARE attack is to study the behaviour of complete sets of carefully chosen plaintexts.
In order to analyse these sets, the text blocks are first split into m-bit words whose size
matches the internal structure of the cipher. The different values taken by each individ-
ual word are then treated as multisets. A multiset is a list of values, each of which can
appear multiple times, but the order of which is irrelevant. During the attack, a number
of special multisets are considered. Multiset attacks are of particular significance today
due to their applicability to RIJNDAEL. The RIJNDAEL cipher, designed by Daemen
and Rijmen in 1998 [32], is a successor of SQUARE. It was submitted to the U.S Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in response to a open call for 128-bit
block cipher. It was, together with 14 other candidates, extensively evaluated during two
years, before NIST announced in 2000 that RIJNDAEL would replace DES and become
the new AES [82]. RIJNDAEL was specifically designed to resist differential and linear
cryptanalysis. Multiset attacks have been shown to be the most effective in breaking
reduced versions of RIJNDAEL. The SQUARE attack, which was also applicable to the
RIJNDAEL structure, allowed to break six rounds out of ten. It recovered the 128-bit key
using a set of 232 special plaintexts, and it required a computational effort of 272 steps.
The work factor was later reduced to 244 by performing the calculations in a more efficient
way [43]. Ferguson et al. [43], as well as Gilbert and Minier [46], have developed more
sophisticated multiset attacks that could be applied to seven rounds.
Boomerang attack was developed by Wagner [92] in 1999, which explains that an attack
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is possible even if no differentials with high or low probability is present for the whole
cipher. It is an adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext attack in which the attacker finds
two short differentials with high probabilities instead of one whole differential with low
probability. Boomerang uses adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext for which many of the
ciphers that had been developed throughout the years cannot be attacked by boomerang
distinguishers and key recovery attack cannot be applied. This led to to the development
of its chosen plaintext variant called the Amplified attack [56]. This was later modified
by Biham, et.al. [10] and named as Rectangle Attack. In [13], Biham also outlined some
results from using boomerang and rectangle attacks.
In 1994, Martin Hellman and Susan K. Langford [70, 71] introduced the differential-
linear attack which is a mixture of both linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis.
The attack utilises a differential characteristic over part of the cipher with a probability
of 1 (for a few rounds - this probability would be much lower for the whole cipher). The
rounds immediately following the differential characteristic have a linear approximation
defined, and we expect that for each chosen plaintext pair, the probability of the linear
approximation holding for one chosen plaintext but not the other will be lower for the
correct key. Hellman and Langford have shown that this attack can recover 10 key bits
of an 8-round DES with only 512 chosen plaintexts and an 80% chance of success. The
attack was generalised by Eli Biham et al. [12] which uses differential characteristics having
probability less than 1. Apart from DES, differential-linear cryptanalysis has been applied
to FEAL [2], IDEA [25, 26, 18], Serpent [15, 38], Camellia [94], CTC2 [39, 72], SHACAL-
2 [89] and even on the stream cipher Phelix [95].
Biham [6] proposed new types of cryptanalytic attacks using related key in 1993. A
line of ciphers have been shown to have weaknesses in this attack scenario [57, 58], namely
IDEA, GOST, SAFER, Triple-DES, CAST, DES-X, TEA, etc. Widely used ciphers like
RC4 [44], KASUMI [17], AES-192 and AES-256 [19] have been broken in this attack
scenario. Lightweight block ciphers such as HIGHT [34] and PRESENT [23] are also
prone to Related Key attacks. In [64], Knudsen et al. outlined possible attacks on the
key schedule of iterated ciphers. Related Key attack can be combined with other variants
of differential cryptanalysis where knowledge of the difference in keys may allow to attack
more rounds as outlined in [16]. A cryptanalytic attack called the Slide Attack can be
viewed as a variant of a related key attack, in which a relation of the key with itself is
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exploited. Slide attacks are known plaintext or chosen plaintext attacks and thus are more
practical than related key attacks since they do not require the attacker to know relations
between different encryption keys.
Differential and Linear cryptanalysis or its variants have been applied to almost all
block ciphers developed till today. A block cipher which is resistant to one attack can be
attacked by its variants or some combinations of the variants.
The simplest approach to cryptanalysing a block cipher is exhaustive key search. The
cryptanalyst wishes to find the key k that was used with block cipher E to encrypt some
plaintext P to produce ciphertext C where C = Ek(P ). Once k is known, the cryptanalyst
can find the plaintext by decrypting the ciphertext, P = E−1k (C). A simple approach to
finding k is known as exhaustive search: the cryptanalyst tries decrypting the known
ciphertext C with each possible key in turn until the correct key k is found. In 1998,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation has actually built a hardware-based DES key search
machine called ”Deep Crack”[41]. Deep Crack, cost US$200,000 to build, consisted of
1,536 chips each capable of searching through 60 million keys per second, and required on
average, 4.5 days to recover a DES key. Recovery of the DES key was possible due to its
key size, which is 56 bits. Nowadays, block ciphers such as AES, which has variable key
sizes of 128, 192 or 256 bits, it is virtually impossible to mount an effective exhaustive key
search using current computing power since it would take billions of years to recover the
key [93].
1.4 Contributions
The following is a list of contributions which appear in this thesis:
• We managed to publish a paper titled “Multiple Linear Approximations in Differential-
Linear Cryptanalysis of 8-round DES” [78], which outlines the experimental results
that we found from applying Multiple Linear Approximations in Differential-Linear
Cryptanalysis of 8-round DES.
• We managed to propose a new test for distinguishing a block cipher from a random
permutation. This new test is modified from the SAC Test which was outlined
in [48] and we called it modSAC Test. Actually, there are 3 types of modSAC
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Test, i.e. 2-bit modSAC, 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests. We used our test
together with the SAC Test on the block ciphers DES and RC5. We also performed
these tests on AES and KASUMI block ciphers. The beauty of these modSAC Tests
is that they are fast and easy to implement in software.
1.5 Limitations of Thesis
Initially, when we started our work for this thesis, we planned to use our own implemen-
tation of an encryption algorithm to be used in applying various cryptanalysis techniques.
We managed to implement our own implementation of the DES encryption algorithm.
However, our implementation was much slower than some DES implementations so we
used the fastest DES implementation amongst those found in [86] and use it for our crypt-
analytic attacks. Important factors that are vital for any successful cryptanalytic attacks
are speed and storage resource. These factors are the main reasons restricting us from
performing successful attacks on, say, the full round DES encryption algorithm. We con-
centrated on attacking 8-round DES because we feel that attacking reduced variants of
DES would require less computing and storage resources. With current technology, the
feasibility of successful attacks increases tremendously compared to a decade ago. We
wanted to find out what kinds of cryptanalytic attacks are possible if we have only lim-
ited computing and storage resources. Our cryptanalytic attacks are only limited to Dif-
ferential Cryptanalysis, Linear Cryptanalysis, Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis, Multiple
Linear Approximations in Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis, Related Key Cryptanalysis
and our own proposed Distinguishing Attack using modified SAC Tests. As we can from
Section 1.3, there are a lot of other cryptanalytic methods that we mentioned but did
not cover in this thesis. However, the ones that are covered in this thesis like Differential
Cryptanalysis, Linear Cryptanalysis, Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis and Related Key
Cryptanalysis are popular attacks on block ciphers.
1.6 Organisation of Thesis
The block ciphers we are going to discuss in detail here are the Data Encryption Standard
(DES) and the RC5 encryption algorithms. Since we have already given brief explanations
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about DES and RC5 encryption algorithms, we will outline our own implementation of the
DES encryption algorithm in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we discuss how we implemented
differential cryptanalysis on 8-round DES. We describe the main idea of differential crypt-
analysis and the use of “characteristics” in the differential cryptanalysis of 8-round DES.
At the end of the Chapter, we give the result of performing differential cryptanalysis of
8-round DES for different number of chosen plaintexts. In Chapter 4, we discuss about
linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. In Chapter 5, we explain about differential-linear
cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. In Chapter 6, we focus on using multiple linear approxi-
mations in differential-linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. In this Chapter we are using
information from Chapters 3, 4 and 5 to perform this cryptanalysis. In performing the
different cryptanalyses in Chapters 3 through 6, we will be able to see how the differ-
ent methods work and how these methods will be integrated to produce new methods of
cryptanalysis. Also, whenever possible, we give our experimental results on performing
the different cryptanalyses done on 8-round DES. Chapter 7 discusses about how to dis-
tinguish DES from a random permutation. We introduce a well-known test, i.e. the SAC
Test, for performing the distinguishing attack on n-round DES, for n = 1 . . . 16. Also,
we introduce our own tests which are modified versions of the SAC Test which we call
2-bit modSAC Test, 4-bit modSAC Test and 8-bit modSAC Test and compare the results
from the SAC Tests with those produced from our modified tests. From these results,
we produce a Distinguishing Attack Profile for DES. Since we have outlined RC5 as an
example in Chapter 1, we discuss the linear cryptanalysis on RC5 in Chapter 8. Chapter
9 focuses on linear weak keys of RC5 and related key cryptanalysis performed on RC5. In
Chapter 10, we perform experimental tests on RC5 similar to the tests performed on DES
in Chapter 7 in order for us to produce a Distinguishing Attack Profile for RC5 so that
we can compare with the Distinguishing Attack Profile for DES. We choose RC5 as the
algorithm for comparison with DES because of its versatility in producing different RC5
configurations by changing its parameters. In particular, RC5 was chosen because the in-
put and output paramaters are similar to that of DES. In Chapter 11, we summarise our
work for this thesis and give suggestions for future work. We also added the experimental
test results from performing our proposed technique to other well known block ciphers,




In this Chapter we have written our own implementation of DES in software on a PC and
we describe the implementation in Sections 2.1 to 2.3. We discuss the implementation
issues and the solutions that we used in Section 2.4. Our initial thought of writing our
own implementation was to look into the design and practical aspects in the creation of an
encryption algorithm. We arbitrarily had chosen DES for our implementation since DES
has been extensively analysed through different attacks [8, 4, 5, 74, 75, 70, 30, 42]. After
we compared our implementation with several other implementations of DES, specifically
some implementations mentioned by Bruce Schneier in [86], we found that our implemen-
tation was much slower than existing implementations of DES. Thus, we decided to use
the fastest implementation of DES that we compared with, namely, Stuart Levy’s DES
implementation found in [86]. This implementation of DES will be used throughout our
cryptanalytic attacks on DES in this thesis. However, in this Chapter, we will still discuss
our own implementation of DES for the benefit of the reader who wants to know about
how to do software implementation of DES.
Although, it is well known that by using exhaustive key search, a DES key can be
found in less than a day [37], there are still lessons to be learned from studying and
cryptanalysing DES and its reduced round variants. In [42], the authors look at the
feasibility of using algebraic cryptanalysis on reduced round DES up to 8 rounds. In [30],
the authors used algebraic cryptanalysis on the DES’s S-boxes for reduced round variants
19
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of DES. This shows that there are still methods or techniques that can be learned from
studying DES and its reduced round variants.
We are going to concentrate on four cryptanalytic attacks on DES, namely, differential
cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis and differential-linear cryptanalysis and multiple linear
approximations with differential-linear cryptanalysis. Our emphasis is to give an overview
of these different kinds of attacks. Although advancement in computer technology has
made DES to be a thing of the past, we will be looking into the feasibility of attacks using
a normal computer. We will also look at the feasibility of using parallel programming in
attacking reduced round DES, in particular 8-round DES as well as the full 16-round DES.
2.1 Implementation of DES
Before any analysis and/or attack of a particular encryption algorithm is done, it is vital
that we first understand how the algorithm works. So, for this reason, we made our
own implementation of DES for the purpose of understanding how the algorithm works
in order for us to later understand how the different cryptanalytic attacks are done for
this particular algorithm. Henceforth, implementing cryptanalytic attacks on block cipher
algorithms in practice. In implementing the Data Encryption Standard (DES) we need to
understand that we have two tasks that we need to do. They are:
2.1 Key Scheduling
2.2 Encryption or Decryption
We must also understand that in order to achieve both these tasks we would need to
define some lookup tables and several functions/subroutines so as to help us in giving an
organised view of the whole DES implementation. We try as much as possible to follow
the original outline of the DES [80]. The first task is Key Scheduling.
2.2 Key Scheduling
We know that DES must have 56 bits of key data in order to perform the encryption or
decryption. In actual implementation, the key is usually supplied in a 64-bit block where
8 of them were not used in the actual encryption or decryption because they are parity
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 21
bits. The 56-bit key goes through a key scheduling process. This key scheduling process
eventually produces 16 subkeys of 48 bits in length, so that one subkey will be supplied
to each round of the DES encryption/decryption.
There are a set of tables that are defined for the Key scheduling algorithm of DES.
These are the permutation tables PC1 (Figure 2.1) and PC2 (Figure 2.2) and the left
circular shift table, lrot (Figure 2.3).
PC1
57 49 41 33 25 17 9
1 58 50 42 34 26 18
10 2 59 51 43 35 27
19 11 3 60 52 44 36
63 55 47 39 31 23 15
7 62 54 46 38 30 22
14 6 61 53 45 37 29
21 13 5 28 20 12 4
Figure 2.1: The permutation PC1 in the DES Key Schedule
PC2
14 17 11 24 1 5
3 28 15 6 21 10
23 19 12 4 26 8
16 7 27 20 13 2
41 52 31 37 47 55
30 40 51 45 33 48
44 49 39 56 34 53
46 42 50 36 29 32
Figure 2.2: The permutation PC2 in the DES Key Schedule
lrot
1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Figure 2.3: The left circular rotation lrot in the DES Key Schedule
In addition to these tables, we also require some subroutines or functions. We shall
now describe these subroutines in detail. They are:
GETBIT This function is used to retrieve a particular bit from an array of bits
specified by its position inside the array. The leftmost position in the
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array of bits is regarded as position 0.
SETBIT This function is used to set a value either 1 or 0 at a given position in
an array of bits.
LROTBIT This function is used to perform left circular rotation of bits on an array
of bits of a given size and given number of left shifts.
PERMUTE This function is used to permute bits in an array of bits of a given size.
Actually, the way that we permute the bits is by having a table as part
of this function’s input which indicates where the bits are to be placed.
This function is also flexible in that it can also be used as an expansion
function, i.e. it can also be used to expand, say, a 32-bit array of bits
into a 48-bit array of bits.
First, we need to generate the required subkeys is to discard all the parity bits from the
64-bit key block so that we are left with on 56-bit actual key data. Once we have discarded
the parity bits we first use the PERMUTE function to permute the 56 key bits according
to the PC1 table. These permuted bits are then separated into two blocks (we refer to
them as C0 and D0 blocks) of 28-bits. Using the LROTBIT function, we then perform
left circular shifts on each of the C0 and D0 blocks independently to produce C1 and D1
blocks, respectively. As mentioned earlier, the number of left shifts needed to be performed
here is given by the lrot table. Once we have completed these left shifts, we then use the
PERMUTE function again on the concatenated block C1D1 according to the PC2 table.
This will produce the first subkey K1. It is important to note that the subkey K1 is only
48-bits long whereas the concatenated block C1D1 is 56-bits long. This means that the
PERMUTE function in this case, actually “chooses” 48-bits from the 56-bits data. In
order to produce the other subkeys, we just need to use the LROTBIT function again on
each of the blocks C1 and D1, independently according to the next number of left shifts
given in the lrot table to produce C2 and D2 blocks respectively. Once again, we perform
the permutation on the concatenated blocks C2D2 according to the PC2 table using the
PERMUTE function thus producing the subkey K2. The process repeats until we are
able to produce 16 subkeys K1 to K16.
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2.3 Encryption or Decryption
DES is an iterated Feistel cipher so it involves the repetition of a specific round function
a certain number of times to achieve either encryption or decryption. Of course, this is
not the only task that is being performed during encryption or decryption. Let us first
outline what is required for the DES encryption or decryption process.
First of all, the required input for DES encryption or decryption is 64-bit block of plain-
text data. We then perform the initial permutation on this block before going through a
round function which is repeated for 16 times before finally performing the final permu-
tation on the block to produce the resulting ciphertext data.
Note that here we do not actually differentiate between DES encryption and DES
decryption because we know that the process in doing either encryption or decryption in
DES is basically the same. The only difference being in the key schedule. If we have the
order of the subkeys in the DES key schedule for DES encryption to be K1,K2, . . . ,K16
then the order of the subkeys in the DES key schedule for DES decryption should be
K16,K15, . . . ,K1.
Now, similar to what we have in the previous Section, we also require certain tables for
the process of encryption or decryption. These tables are as described below:
IP This is the initial permutation table which is used in performing the initial per-
mutation on the 64-bit plaintext block.
FP This is the final permutation table which is used in performing the final permu-
tation on 64-bit data block before we get the resulting 64-bit ciphertext block.
EX This is the expansion table that is used in DES’s f function for expanding a
32-bit data block into a 48-bit data block.
S This is the famous DES’s 8 S-boxes required in f function of DES.
P This is another permutation table which performs on 32-bit data and is part of
DES’s f function.
The tables above are useless without the following subroutines that actually performs
the encryption/decryption process. We managed to break up the process involved into
hierarchical tasks as outlined below:
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SUBSTITUTE This is a subroutine that is specifically used to produce output from
DES’s S-boxes. Each S-box has 6 bits of input data and 4 bits of output
data so since we have 8 S-boxes, we should have 48 bits of input data and
32 bits of output data. This is exactly what the subroutine does, i.e. it
produces a 32-bit output data from a 48-bit input data according to the
S-boxes.
F This is DES’s f function. This function incorporates the SUBSTITUTE
subroutine as well as the PERMUTE function described in the previous
Section. The PERMUTE function is used to “expand” the 32-bit input
for the F function into a 48-bit input before we XOR with the 48-bit
subkey for the particular round. Once XORed, we then input the 48-
bit result into the SUBSTITUTE function in order to obtain a 32-bit
output which is finally permuted again using the PERMUTE function
with the permutation given by the P table. For details of the F function,
please refer to Figure. 1.2.
ROUND1 This is DES’s round function which incorporates the Feistel structure as
given in Figure 1.1.
DESEORD This function stands for DES Encryption OR Decryption. We decided
to have a function which can either perform DES encryption or decryp-
tion depending upon the “flag” that is being set. If the “flag” is 1, then
we perform DES encryption, whereas if the “flag” is 0 then we perform
DES decryption. This subroutine functions as the DES algorithm where
we first perform the initial permutation using the PERMUTE function
according to the IP table. Then we perform the ROUND1 function
iteratively. This is where the difference between DES encryption and
decryption comes in. One of the input of the DESEORD function is
the key schedule (i.e. 16 subkeys K1, . . . ,K16). Each subkey is one of
the required input to the F function in each round of DES. So, the dif-
ference between encryption and decryption lies in the order of the sub-
keys. For encryption, the order of the subkeys is K1, . . . ,K16 whereas
the order of the subkeys for decryption is K16, . . . ,K1. Once we had fin-
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ished performing the ROUND1 function, we then finally perform the
PERMUTE function again using the FP table which will result in the
ciphertext/plaintext output depending upon whether we are performing
DES encryption or decryption. Besides the “flag” input in DESEORD
we also have a “round” input for which the number of rounds to be per-
formed is specified by this input. So, say, if we want to perform 16-round
DES encryption then we set “round” to 16.
Figure 2.4 shows the hierarchy of subroutines used in our implementation. We only
show some schematics about what happens in the F function but it should be clear that
we try to follow the specification from [80] in terms of naming convention and at the same
time trying to optimise speed as well. We used the GNU C Compiler Version 4.8.4
for compiling our C source code. We had used the optimisation flag ”-o3” when we
compiled our source code so that it becomes more efficient by trading off disk space for
speed. The full C source code for our DES implementation is given in Appendix A.1 &
A.2.
Besides the subroutines specified previously, we also have an additional subroutine
DESEORD1. This subroutine is basically similar to the DESEORD function; the only
difference being the initial (IP) and final permutations (FP) are removed from the DESE-
ORD1 subroutine. The reason for this is that both the initial and final permutations have
no cryptographic significance when we perform either differential or linear cryptanalysis.
2.4 Implementation Issues
The C implementation of DES was done using a desktop computer with a 12-core Intel R©
CoreTM i7 CPU X990 3.47 GHz and 12 Giga Bytes of RAM and 2 Tera Bytes of Disk
storage under the Ubuntu 14.04 LTS Linux Operating System. There had been some
difficulties in implementing DES in software since the specification in [80] is obviously
for hardware implementation. The numbering convention used in [80] is from left to
right whereas in software implementation we tend to number from right to left. This can
sometimes be confusing. Nevertheless, it is one of the first things that we deal with when
we implement any such algorithm using software. This is one of the reasons why we need
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round
f( input(32) ,  subkey(48), output(32))
permute(input(32), EX, 48)





Figure 2.4: Hierarchical View of Subroutines for DES Implementation
careful planning and organization in our implementation so that we can avoid unnecessary
problems that may arise.
We had tested our implementation on some DES test vectors and we found that our DES
implementation was accurate using the NESSIE test vectors outlined in [79]. We tested
our DES implementation and compared the performance with 3 other DES implementa-
tions mentioned in [86]. We had chosen only 3 other DES implementations because we had
software compatibility issues with the other DES implementations mentioned in [86]. The
3 implementations that we used are Stuart Levy’s (Dated April 1988), David A. Barrett’s
(Dated 4th April 1991) and Phil Karn’s (Dated 1987) DES implementations. We had
found that the number of encryptions/decryptions that can be done using our implemen-
tation for 16-round DES in one second is 9636 encryptions/decryptions. The fastest DES
implementation amongst these 4 DES implementations is Stuart Levy’s implementation
which can do 3792400 encryptions/decryptions in one second. We had used OpenMP [81]
API for parallel programming to run these 4 DES implementations on 16777216 plain-
texts using only 10 threads. The overall time for all 4 DES implementations to finish is
29 minutes and 28.9 seconds (see Figure A.3.1). Much of the time was due to our own im-
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plementation being the slowest DES implementation amongst the 4 implementations.We
found that knowledge of some bit manipulation tricks, such as using bit masking to ex-
tract certain bits, is useful in order to have a fast implementation of DES. We also found
that using memory registers can improve performance of our implementation. However,
our implementation was still not as fast the other DES implementations. In our opinion,
our DES implementation was not as fast as others in doing encryptions/decryptions was
due to much of the time spent in intercommunication between different functions within
the DES implementation and lack of optimisation based on the specific hardware that we
used.
The reason we made our own implementation of DES was because initially, we wanted to
use our own implementation of DES as a test bed for implementing different cryptanalytic
attacks such as Differential Cryptanalysis and Linear Cryptanalysis. However, since we
found a much faster DES implementation (i.e. Stuart Levy’s DES implementation), we
used this implementation for the cryptanalytic attacks on DES that we discussed in this
thesis. Although our own implementation may not be as fast as others, it is still good
for any novice in cryptography who wants to learn about implementing an encryption
algorithm in C since he/she can see clearly the synthesis of the different components that
forms the algorithm.






In this Chapter, we describe Differential Cryptanalysis with particular reference to 8-round
DES. We had used Stuart Levy’s DES implementation for Differential Cryptanalysis using
known differential characteristics. We describe this in Sections 3.4 to 3.6. We have used
this implementation to run experiments to test the time and data required for successful
cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. The DES implementation that we used is faster in doing
differential cryptanalysis than ones used by Biham and Shamir [4, 5]. Our results are
summarised in Section 3.6.
Differential cryptanalysis is a method which analyses the effect of particular differences
in plaintext pairs on the differences of the resultant ciphertext pairs. These differences
can be used to assign probabilities to the possible keys and to locate the most probable
keys. This method usually works on many pairs of plaintexts with the same particular
difference using only the resultant ciphertext pairs. Differential cryptanalysis, a chosen
plaintext attack, was invented in 1990 by Israeli researchers Eli Biham and Adi Shamir [4].
Basically, the differential cryptanalysis method searches for plaintext, ciphertext pairs
whose difference is constant, and investigates the differential behaviour of the cryptosys-
tem. For DES, the difference between two elements P1 and P2 is defined as P1⊕P2 (bitwise
28
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Table 3.1: One of DES’s S-boxes - S1
S1
E 4 D 1 2 F B 8 3 A 6 C 5 9 0 7
0 F 7 4 E 2 D 1 A 6 C B 9 5 3 8
4 1 E 8 D 6 2 B F C 9 7 3 A 5 0
F C 8 2 4 9 1 7 5 B 3 E A 0 6 D
XOR operation). We now introduce the following notation:
• P denotes plaintext, T denotes ciphertext
• (P, P ∗) is a pair of plaintexts which XOR to a specific value P ′, i .e. P ′ = P ⊕ P ∗
• (T, T ∗) is a pair of ciphertexts which XOR to a specific value T ′, i .e. T ′ = T ⊕ T ∗
• Primed values are always differential: P ′, T ′, a′, A′, etc. For example, a′ = a⊕ a∗
A cryptosystem should be a good pseudorandom number generator in order to foil key
clustering attacks, that is using the distributions of plaintexts and ciphertexts to deduce
information about the key. DES was designed so that all distributions are as uniform as
possible. For example, changing 1 bit of the plaintext or the key causes the ciphertext to
change in approximately 32 of its 64 bits in a seemingly unpredictable and random manner.
Biham and Shamir [4, 5] observed that with a fixed key, the differential behaviour of DES
does not exhibit pseudorandomness. If we fix the XOR of two plaintexts P and P ∗ at P ′
then T ′ (which is equal to T ⊕ T ∗) is not uniformly distributed.
3.1 S-box Differential Non-Uniformity
If the input to an S-box is a uniformly distributed random number, its output will be a
uniformly distributed random number. Assuming that the 56-bit key is chosen according
to a uniform probability distribution, the input to any S-box in any round will be uni-
formly distributed over all 26 (= 64) possible values. The output of any S-box in any
round therefore is also uniformly distributed over its 24 (= 16) possible values (0 to F in
hexadecimal) since each occurs 4 times in each S-box, once in every row (see Table 3.1).
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Table 3.2: S1 Partial Differential Distribution Table
Input Output y′
x′ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
00 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
01 0 0 0 6 0 2 4 4 0 10 12 4 10 6 2 4
02 0 0 0 8 0 4 4 4 0 6 8 6 12 6 4 2
03 14 4 2 2 10 6 4 2 6 4 4 0 2 2 2 0
...
0C 0 0 0 8 0 6 6 0 0 6 6 4 6 6 14 2
...
34 0 8 16 6 2 0 0 12 6 0 0 0 0 8 0 6
...
3E 4 8 2 2 2 4 4 14 4 2 0 2 0 8 4 4
3F 4 4 4 2 4 0 2 4 4 2 4 8 8 6 2 2
Consider the differential behaviour of an S-box, in which there are 642 = 4096 possible
input pairs (x, x∗). As the 6-bit quantities x, x∗, and x′ = x⊕ x∗ each vary over their 64
possible values, the 4-bit quantities y = S(x), y∗ = S(x∗), and y′ = y⊕ y∗ = S(x)⊕S(x∗)
each vary over their 16 possible values. (Note that the S function here refers to S-box
transformation). The distribution on the differential output y′ can be computed for each
of the eight S-boxes by counting the number of times each value y′ occurs as the pair (x,
x∗) varies over its 4096 possible values.
Table 3.2 shows a portion of the differential distribution table for one of DES’s S-boxes
i .e. S1. The 6-bit differential input x′ takes 64 values (00 to 3F in hexadecimal) while the
4-bit differential output y′ takes 16 values (0 to F in hexadecimal). Each row in Table 3.2
sums to 64 because each differential input x′ occurs for 64 of the 4096 (x,x∗) pairs. The
first row has zeros in all except for the first column because when x′ = x ⊕ x∗ = 0, the
inputs x and x∗ are equal. Therefore, the outputs y and y∗ are equal and y′ = y⊕ y∗ = 0.
The later rows are more interesting; for example, when x′ = 01, five of the sixteen possible
y′ values 0, 1, 2, 4, 8 occur with zero probability (i .e. never occurs) while A occurs with
probability 16/64 and 9 and C each occur with probability 10/64. This is a highly non-
uniform distribution. This differential non-uniformity is observed in all of the S-boxes
S1, S2, . . . , S8. This differential non-uniformity may be exploited in order to find the
DES key. Let us now look at a particular example which illustrates how the differential
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S1
Input (32 bits)




48 bits subkey (48 bits)
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8O O O O O O O O
I I I I I I I I
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S8S7E E E E E E E E S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8K K K K K K K K
Figure 3.1: The DES f function
pairs are used in determining possible keys for a particular S-box.
3.2 Determination of the key
Figure 3.1 is a slightly modified version of Figure 1.2 with the necessary labels which are
used in our discussion. Our example focuses on a particular S-box, i .e. S1, so Figure 3.2
shows us the parts we are interested in.
Let S1E and S1
∗
E denote two inputs to the S-box S1. Let S1
′
E = S1E ⊕ S1∗E and let
S1′O denote the output XOR from the S-box S1. Suppose that we know the two inputs to
S1 to be 01 and 35 respectively and S1′O = D . Thus, S1
′
E = 34. Then, the input XOR
S1′I is 34 regardless of the value of the key because
S1′I = S1I ⊕ S1∗I
= (S1E ⊕ S1K)⊕ (S1∗E ⊕ S1K)
= S1E ⊕ S1∗E
= S1′E









34: 06, 10, 16, 1C
22, 24, 28, 32
D: 
Figure 3.2: The S-box S1
Now only eight input pairs S1I and S1
∗
I with XOR S1
′
I = 34 produce output XOR D.
These are (S1I , S1
∗
I) = (06, 32), . . . , (32, 06). Also since
S1I = S1E ⊕ S1K
we have
S1K = S1I ⊕ S1E
and similarly
06⊕ 01 = 07, 06⊕ 35 = 33
10⊕ 01 = 11, 10⊕ 35 = 25
16⊕ 01 = 17, 16⊕ 35 = 23
1C ⊕ 01 = 1D, 1C ⊕ 35 = 29
22⊕ 01 = 23, 22⊕ 35 = 17
24⊕ 01 = 25, 24⊕ 35 = 11
28⊕ 01 = 29, 28⊕ 35 = 1D
32⊕ 01 = 33, 32⊕ 35 = 07
Thus, the possible keys are: {07, 11, 17, 1D, 23, 25, 29,33}. Furthermore, suppose we know
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two inputs to S1 as 21 and 15 which XORs to 34, and the output XOR as 3. Following
similar calculations as above, we have the possible key values to be {00, 14, 17, 20, 23,
34}. So the correct key value must appear in both these sets:
{07, 11, 1D, 23, 25, 29, 33}
{00, 14, 17, 20, 23, 34}
Intersecting these two sets, we obtain 17, 23. Thus, the key value is either 17 or 23.
In order to determine which one of these is the correct value, we would require more
input/output XORs.
The above is just an example to demonstrate how we can get the required key using a
particular S-box. We now introduce a concept which is practical for cryptanalysis of DES.
3.3 Characteristic
A Characteristic is the differential input which can be traced through several rounds. A
Characteristic usually has some probability attached to it. Two observations that we need
to consider when dealing with Characteristics:
1. The XOR of pairs is linear in the expansion E in DES’s f function i .e.
E(X)⊕ E(X∗) = E(X ⊕X∗) = E(X ′)
2. The XOR of pairs is independent of the key i .e.




SI ⊕ S∗I = SE ⊕ SK ⊕ S∗E ⊕ SK




It is much easier to explain about characteristics by giving an example. For example,
we shall consider what is called a 2-Round Characteristic. Figure 3.3 shows this Charac-
teristic. As can be seen from Figure 3.3, the differential input to function f in the first
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(00 80 82 00, 60 00 00 00)
(00 00 00 00, 60 00 00 00)
a’ = 60 00 00 00
B’ = 00 00 00 00 b’ = 00 00 00 00
A’ =  00 80 82 00
f(R, K)
f(R, K) p = 14/64
p = 1
Figure 3.3: 2-Round Characteristic
round is a′ = 60 00 00 00. The expansion E operation puts these half bytes into the middle
four bits of each S-box in order, i .e. 6 = 0110 goes to S1 and 0 = 0000 goes to S2, . . . , S8.
Since all the edge bits are zero, S1 is the only S-box receiving non-zero differential input.
S1’s differential input is 0 0110 0 = 0C while the differential inputs of S2, . . . , S8 are all
zero. Looking at S1’s differential distribution table (see Table 3.2), we find that when
x′ = 0C, the highest probability differential output y′ is E = 1110, which occurs with
probability 14/64. All the other S-boxes have x′ = 0 and y′ = 0 with probability 1. The
S-box outputs go through the permutation P before becoming the output for f(R,K). As
shown in Figure 3.3, the differential output of f(R,K) is
A′ = P (E0 00 00 00) = 00 80 82 00
A′ = 00 80 82 00 is then XORed with L′ = 00 80 82 00 to give 00 00 00 00. Thus, in the
second round all S-boxes receive their differential inputs as zero, producing the differential
outputs as zero. Finally, the output of f(R,K) in the second round is zero, giving the
differential output as depicted: (00 00 00 00, 60 00 00 00)
With the brief introduction about 2-Round Characteristic, let us now move to a topic
for which we can use the 2-Round Characteristic in a successful attack.
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 35
3.4 Implementation of Differential Cryptanalysis on 2-Round
DES
This implementation assumes that the initial (IP ) and inverse (IP−1) permutations are
removed from the DES algorithm since they are of no cryptographic significance. Below
is the algorithm used to attack 2-Round DES:
Step 1: Generate a plaintext pair (P , P ∗) such that
P ′ = P ⊕ P ∗ = 00 80 82 00 60 00 00 00
This is done by generating a random P and XORing with 00 80 82 00 60 00 00 00 to
generate P ∗.
Step 2: Given the plaintext pair (P , P ∗), generate the ciphertext pairs (T , T ∗)
Step 3: Compute T ′ = T ⊕ T ∗ and see whether it is equal to 00 00 00 00 60 00 00 00. If
it is not, the characteristic has not occurred and this pair is not used. Then, go
to Step 1 and generate a new plaintext pair. If T ′ is equal to 00 00 00 00 60 00 00 00
then the characteristic has occurred, and we know the values of A′ and B′ (refer to
Figure 3.3). Go to Step 4.
Step 4: Since S2, . . . , S8 have their differential inputs equal to zero, no information can be
gained about S2K , . . . , S8K . In the differential distribution table of S1 (Table 3.2),
we have 0C → E with probability 14/64, only 14 of 64 possible S1K values allow
a′ = 60 00 00 00
to produce
A′ = 00 80 82 00
These 14 allowable values can be determined by XORing each possible S1K with the
corresponding six bits of S1E and S1
∗
E , computing S1
′s differential output S1′O and
checking if it is equal to E. Put these 14 values of S1K in a table
Step 5: Compute the intersection of these tables. Since the correct key value must occur
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in each table, it will be in the intersection. If more than one S1K value results,
this means we do not have enough plaintext, ciphertext differential pairs to uniquely
determine S1K . Go to Step 1 and generate additional data. The number of plain-
text, ciphertext differential pairs needed is approximately equal to the inverse of the
probability of the characteristic used; in this case 64/14 ≈ 5 pairs are needed.
Step 6: At this point we have recovered the 6 bits of the key comprising S1K . Use similar
characteristics to recover the 6 bits of key which are XORed with S2 through S8’s
inputs in the first round.
Step 7: At this point we have 48 bits of the key which comprise SK , or equivalently S1K
through S8K . Find the remaining 8 bits of K by exhaustive search over the 64
possible values.
If we remove Step 3 from the algorithm above and assume that the characteristic
occurs for every pair of encipherment, the probability of this characteristic to occur is
14/64. Thus, we will be wrong for 50/64 of the pairs. The correct value of S1K need not
occur in every table and we should look for the most frequent S1K value. The correct
value occurs in 14/64 of the tables and the remaining 63 values occurs with approximately
equal (or smaller) probability.
Apart from the above characteristic, Biham and Shamir [4] have also developed some
specialised characteristics to be used in attacking specific reduced variants of DES. One
such method is known as the 3R Attack.
3.5 3R Attack
The 3R Attack [4, 5] is a method in which we can use an n-round characteristic to break an
(n + 3)-round DES. Figure 3.4 shows the 1-Round Characteristic used in the 3R Attack.
This 1-Round Characteristic is used to break 4-Round DES. Figure 3.5 shows how the
1-Round Characteristic goes through the four rounds of DES for which we can trace the
output in every round.
In Figure 3.5, we know the inputs x and x′ for all S-boxes in the last round since d and
d′ are left halves of the ciphertext T and T ′. To recover the 6-bit subkeys SiK in the last
round, we need to learn the differential outputs y′ from some S-boxes. We know the values
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f(R, K)A’ =  00 00 00 00 a’ = 00 00 00 00
(20 00 00 00, 00 00 00 00)
(00 00 00 00, 20 00 00 00)
p = 1
Figure 3.4: 1-Round Characteristic
Figure 3.5: Differential Cryptanalysis Implementation on 4-Round DES
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of d′ and D′ ⊕ B′ since we know the ciphertext pair causing this characteristic. In order
to get D′, we need to obtain B′. Note that b′ = 20 00 00 00 causes the differential inputs
to S2 through S8 in the second round to be all zeroes in their middle four bits. 2 = 0010
is input to S1’s middle four bits and the seven zeroes are inputs to S2, S3, . . . , S8. Thus
B′ have 28 zeroes in its representation; the places of the zeroes can be found by tracing
back the permutation used at the output of f(R,K). Therefore, we know 28 bits of D′.
We can now obtain 42 bits of the key using our analysis technique; the remaining 14 bits
can be obtained using exhaustive key search.
We now move to our main topic of discussion i .e. the differential cryptanalysis of
8-round DES. Biham and Shamir [4] claimed that we would need 150,000 differential pairs
for a successful attack.
3.6 Implementation of Differential Cryptanalysis on 8-Round
DES
Now, for the differential cryptanalysis of 8-Round DES, we need a 5-Round Characteristic
in order to have a successful attack [4, 5]. Figure 3.6 gives a schematic diagram of 8-Round








· 10 · 16
642
≈ 9.5× 10−5
Thus, we expect approximately 10,000 (P ,P ∗) pairs are needed per occurrence of the
characteristic. Since we cannot completely observe input and output XORs, we cannot
guarantee that the characteristic had occurred. So, we assume that the characteristic oc-
curs for every differential pair of plaintext (P ,P ∗). Statistically, we are correct in choosing
the right pair only one in 10,000 thus we need several times this number of differential
pairs for a successful attack. Here is an algorithm used to attack 8-Round DES using
differential cryptanalysis (Note: this attack assumes that the initial IP and inverse IP−1
permutations are removed from the DES algorithm):
Step 1: Generate the pair (P , P ∗) whose differential P ′ = P ⊕ P ∗ is equal to 40 5C 00
00 04 00 00 00
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Figure 3.6: 8-Round DES using 5-Round Characteristic
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Step 2: Obtain the ciphertext pair (T , T ∗)
Step 3: Assume the characteristic has occurred and compute the differential outputs
of S2, S5, S6, S7 and S8 in the eighth round using P−1(H ′) which is equal to
P−1(R′8 ⊕ 04 00 00 00)⊕ (x0xx 00 00)
Step 4: Test each of the 64 possible 6-bit subkeys K8,2 associated with S2 in the eighth
round to see which case the observed (x,x∗) to produce y′ computed for S2 in Step
3. Put those subkeys that produce y′ in a table {K8,2}. Repeat this step to produce
tables of possible subkeys {K8,5}, {K8,6}, {K8,7} and {K8,8} for S5, S6, S7 and S8
respectively.
Step 5: If any of the five tables produced in Step 4 is empty, the characteristic could
not have occurred. In this case, discard all 5 tables, return to Step 1 and try a new
differential plaintext pair.
Step 6: If each of the 5 tables is non-empty, the characteristic may have occurred. In
this case, generate all possible 30-bit portions of K8 associated with S2, S5, S6, S7,
and S8 by choosing one 6-bit value from each table. If n2, n5, n6, n7 and n8 denote
the number of 6-bit subkeys in the tables {K8,2}, {K8,5}, {K8,6}, {K8,7} and {K8,8},
then the number of 30-bit values is N = n2n5n6n7n8. Let K denote such a 30-bit
value.
Step 7: For each of the K’s generated in Step 6, increment a counter corresponding to
that value. Since a fixed number plaintext pairs are used in the cryptanalysis, the
counter having the maximum value would should give the correct subkey value.
It is claimed by Biham and Shamir that 8-round DES can be broken in less than 2
minutes on a personal computer by analysing about 214 ciphertexts [5]. We had actually
implemented the steps above in performing Differential Cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. We
summarised the experimental results of our findings at the end of this Chapter.
The steps outlined above are used in recovering 30 bits of key data. In order to recover
all 56-bit DES key (other than using exhaustive key search alone), we first need to recover
some bits using Differential Cryptanalysis or some other methods and then recover the
remaining bits using exhaustive key search. So, if we recover only 30 bits of key data, then
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we would need to find the other 26 bits using exhaustive key search. This is doable on
our desktop PC but we can still recover additional bits in order to perform exhaustive key
search which is faster to do because the search space for the key is smaller. Biham and
Shamir[4] had provided some additional steps to recover additional key bits, i.e. 18 extra
bits. This means that we can perform exhaustive key search to find just 8 extra bits.
According to [4], once we had obtained the 30 key bits (subkey bits from K8) using
the previous steps, we can calculate the values of 20 bits of H and H∗ (refer Figure 3.6)
for each pair and thus 20 bits of g and g∗ (by g′ = H ′ ⊕ R′). There is a dependence of
the g bits and the subkey bits of K7 at the seventh round on the known and unknown
subkey bits of K8 at the eighth round. The expected value of G
′ is known by the formula
G′ = f ′ ⊕ h′. We can now look for the 18 missing bits of K8 by exhaustive key search of
218 possibilities for every pair. Thus we know H, H∗ and g, g∗ and 40 bits of K7. For
each pair, we check that the expected value of G′ holds. For the correct value of those 18
key bits the expected G′ holds for almost all the right pairs. This is how we recover the
extra 18 bits of K8. Once we recovered these bits, we can perform exhaustive key search
on the other 8 key bits.
We had decided to follow the method outlined by D.R. Stinson in [90] for our practical
implementation of Differential Cryptanalysis of DES. The method employed in [90] is
similar to the outlined steps above where we search possible key bits for the S boxes
S2, S5, S6, S7 and S8.
We decided to employ the method used in [4] to recover all 48 bits of K8. Basically,
the method in [4] is the outlined steps above to recover 30 bits from 5 S boxes and using
these recovered bits, we then try to recover an extra 18 bits from the other 3 S boxes.
From our experimental result based on the steps outlined in [4, 5], we discovered that
we can break 8-round DES in less than 1 second with reasonable percentage of success.
Tables 3.3 shows the experimental result given different number of chosen plaintexts. The
result is based on 100 trials for each different number of chosen plaintexts used and we
give the percentage of successful recovery of 56 key bits. We had used MD5 [83] hash
algorithm to generate the plaintexts used for our experiment.
As we can see from table 3.3, we can break 8-round DES in less than 1 second which
is faster than the one done by Biham and Shamir in [4, 5]. However, Biham and Shamir’s
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estimate of using 150000 chosen plaintext pairs for 100% successful recovery of key is lower
than our estimated 220000 chosen plaintext pair for 100% successful key recovery. In our
opinion, this may be due to the difference in the generator that was used in producing
plaintext pairs. Figures F.1.1 - F.1.10 in Appendix F of this thesis, give snapshots of the
number of successful attacks and the time taken for Differential Cryptanalysis of 8-round
DES with the specific amount of chosen plaintext pairs as given in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Percentage of Successful Key Recovery
Number of Chosen Plaintexts 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000 140000 160000 180000 200000 220000
Percentage of Success 13% 37% 62% 73% 83% 90% 95% 99% 99% 100%
Average time taken 0.24s 0.35s 0.46s 0.57s 0.69s 0.80s 0.91s 1.03s 1.14s 1.25s




In this Chapter we describe Linear Cryptanalysis. We have successfully implemented
linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. Linear cryptanalysis does not recover the 56 bits of
key. It only provides a key ranking of possible keys. Increase in the number of known
plaintexts used for linear cryptanalysis will ”promote” the correct key bits to the top rank
in the key ranking list. Once we have the suggested key bits, we then use exhaustive key
search to obtain the rest of the key bits. We used parallel programming to implement the
exhaustive key search to obtain the rest of the key bis. We discuss implementation issues
and the results of our experiments in Section 4.5.
Linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack and was introduced by Matsui [74, 75].
The principle behind linear cryptanalysis is to find linear approximations to the non-linear
S boxes, then use these linear expressions to construct a linear path through the Feistel
structure of DES, so that the result will be a linear expression for DES that relates the
plaintext, ciphertext and key.
In linear cryptanalysis, we omit the initial (IP) and final (FP) permutations of the
DES algorithm because they have no cryptographic significance whatsoever. We employ
similar notations used in [74, 75] as follows:
• P : The 64-bit plaintext
• C : The corresponding 64-bit ciphertext
43
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• PL : The left 32-bit of P
• PR : The right 32-bit of P
• CL : The left 32-bit of C
• CR : The right 32-bit of C
• Xi : The 32-bit intermediate value in the i-th round f function
• Ki : The 48-bit subkey in the i-th round
• F (Xi,Ki) : The i-th round f function
• A[i] : The i-th bit of A
• A[i, j . . . , k] : A[i]⊕A[j]⊕, . . . ,⊕A[k]
Note that, the right most bit of each symbol above is refered to as the zero-th (lowest)
bit. The first thing that we need to do for linear cryptanalysis is to find a suitable
linear approximation to the DES algorithm before applying the known plaintext attack
algorithm. The following is an outline of how we are able to obtain linear approximations
to the DES algorithm:
1. Find linear approximations to the S-boxes that relates a subset of the S-box inputs
to a subset of its outputs. We find the probability of each approximation holding
true.
2. Extend the approximations to DES’s f function, and thus formulate linear expression
for each approximation.
3. Construct a linear path, which is an approximation of the DES algorithm, by com-
pounding linear expressions for DES’s f function. We can calculate the probability
for the DES approximation from the probabilities of the S box approximations.
4. Calculate the number of plaintexts required to obtain the value of the DES linear
approximation expression. The number of plaintexts depends on the probability that
the DES approximation holds, as well as our required degree of success.
We will discuss these steps in greater detail next.
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4.1 Linear Approximation of S boxes
The S-boxes are the only nonlinear elements of DES. Therefore, good linear approximations
for the S-boxes can extend to linear approximations for the DES algorithm as a whole.
The measure of S-box linearity which Matsui uses is the number of times the XOR of
certain input bits to an S-box is equal to the XOR of certain output bits. We can define
this measure more formally as given in [74]
Definition 4.1.1. For given S-box Sa (a= 1,2,. . . ,8), 1 ≤ α ≤ 63 and 1 ≤ β ≤ 15, we
define NSa(α, β) as the number of times out of 64 input patterns of Sa, such that an
XORed value of the input bits masked by α coincides with an XORed vlaue of the output
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where the symbol # denotes the number of input patterns and the symbol • denotes a
bitwise AND operation.
When NSa(α, β) is not equal to 32, we may say that there is a correlation between the
input and the output bits of Sa. The probability that the linear approximation expression
associated with the pair (α, β) holds is NSn(α, β)/64. For example, NS6(16, 7) = 18,
therefore the probability that input bit 4 (value 16, “001000” in 6-bit binary) coincides
with the output bits 0, 1 and 2 (value 7, “0111” in 4-bit binary) is 18/64 = 0.28125.
Testing all S-boxes with all values of α and β reveals the best approximation (i.e. the
one where |NSn(α, β)− 32| is maximal) comes from NS5(16, 15) = 12 with probability of
occurrence of 12/64 = 0.1875.
We can now derive a linear expression representing one round of the DES algorithm(i.e. a
linear expression for DES’s f function). To find the linear expression we note that the
input bit(s) from the subkey must be in the same position as the input bit(s) of the data
block after the expansion E in the f function, and that the output bit(s) are permuted
through the P permutation of the f function.
For NS5(16, 15), we obtain the one-round linear approximation:
X[15]⊕ F (X,K)[7, 18, 24, 29] = K[22] (4.1.2)







[7, 18, 24, 29]













Figure 4.1: 3-round DES cipher
where X is the input block, K is the round subkey, and F (X,K) is the output data
block from DES’s f function. This one round expression holds with the same probability
as the linear approximation from which it was derived, i.e. equation (4.1.2) holds with
probability 0.1875 for random X and fixed subkey K.
4.2 n-round Linear Approximations
In the previous Section, we were able to obtain a one-round linear approximation. In order
to extend the linear approximation to more than one round, we need to compound such
linear expressions. Let us look at a particular example. Figure 4.1 shows a 3-round DES
with the appropriate approximations and the respective probabilities being displayed in
the figure. We want to find a linear approximation to the 3-round DES cipher.
As we can see, in the first round, we have PR, the right half of the plaintext P enters
DES’s f function so we have the following expression:
F (PR,K1)[7, 18, 24, 29] ≡ PL[7, 18, 24, 29]⊕X2[7, 18, 24, 29], (4.2.1)
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where X2 is the data block as it enters DES’s f function in the second round. Substituting
equation (4.2.1) into equation (4.1.2), we obtain the linear approximation to the first
round:
PR[15]⊕ PL[7, 18, 24, 29]⊕X2[7, 18, 24, 29] = K1[22]. (4.2.2)
Similarly, we apply the linear approximation (4.1.2) to the final round:
CR[15]⊕ CL[7, 18, 24, 29]⊕X2[7, 18, 24, 29] = K3[22], (4.2.3)
where CR and CL are the right and left halves of the ciphertext C respectively. If we
add equations (4.2.2) and (4.2.3), we will be able to cancel the unknown X2 term giving
a linear approximation to 3-round DES cipher:
PR[15]⊕ PL[7, 18, 24, 29]⊕ CR[15]⊕ CL[7, 18, 24, 29] = K1[22]⊕K3[22]. (4.2.4)
The probability that equation (4.2.4) holds for random plaintext P and its correspond-
ing ciphertext C is (12/64)2 + (1 − 12/64)2 = 0.6953. This is because it will hold if and
only if either both one-round approximations hold, or if neither hold. The probability
can also be obtained using equation (4.2.5) given by Piling Up Lemma (Lemma 4.2.1) by
Matsui [74]
Lemma 4.2.1 (Piling Up Lemma). Let Xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be independent random variables
whose values are 0 with probability pi or 1 with probability 1 − pi. Then the probability




(pi − 1/2). (4.2.5)
Matsui also estimated the success rate of the algorithm and the number of plaintexts
required to achieve a particular degree of success. The success rate is based on the maxi-
mum likelihood method and is derived by approximating binary distribution with normal
distribution. Table 4.1 shows the relationship between the number of plaintext N and the
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success rate.
Table 4.1: Success rate of linear cryptanalysis (Algorithm 4.2.1)
N 14 |p− 1/2|−2 12 |p− 1/2|−2 |p− 1/2|−2 2|p− 1/2|−2
Success rate 84.1% 92.1% 97.7% 99.8%
We need |p − 1/2|−2 plaintexts to achieve a success rate of 97.7%, i.e. N = |0.6953 −
1/2|−2 ≈ 27 plaintexts. We use algorithm 4.2.1 to recover the value of the linear approxi-
mation (equation (4.2.4)) and hence, obtain a linear expression for a key bit.
Algorithm 4.2.1 (Linear Cryptanalysis of 1 key bit).
1. Initialize counter T = 0
2. For each plaintext Pi and the corresponding ciphertext Ci, where 0 ≤ i < N , do the
following:
• Let t be the evaluation of the left hand side of the DES linear approximation,
for example, evaluate the left hand side of equation (4.2.4):
t← PR[15]⊕ PL[7, 18, 24, 29]⊕ CR[15]⊕ CL[7, 18, 24, 29].
• If t = 0, increment counter T
3. If the probability of the DES linear approximation is greater than 1/2 (for example,
p = 0.6953):
• If T > N/2 then guess that the value of the right hand side of the DES lin-
ear approximation is 0, for example, the right hand side of equation (4.2.4):
K1[22]⊕K3[22] = 0
• If T ≤ N/2 then guess that the value of the right hand side of the DES lin-
ear approximation is 1, for example, the right hand side of equation (4.2.4):
K1[22]⊕K3[22] = 1
4. If the probability of DES linear approximation is less than 1/2:
• If T > N/2 then guess that the value of the right hand side of the DES linear
approximation is 1
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Table 4.2: Percentage of Success for obtaining 1 key bit using Algorithm 4.2.1
N 6 13 26 52
Percentage of Success 82.8% 93.5% 97.1% 99.3%
Average time taken 0.012s 0.016s 0.022s 0.034s
• If T ≤ N/2 then guess that the value of the right hand side of the DES linear
approximation is 0
The success rate of the above algorithm increases when N or |p− 1/2| increases. The
value of the linear equation for the key bit would be used in a reduced exhaustive key
search algorithm. Table 4.2 shows the experimental result of obtaining one key bit on
3-round DES using 1000 trials with 1000 random keys.
As can be seen from Table 4.2, the experimental result roughly equals the theoretical
result of Table 4.1. Having recovered a linear expression for one key bit, we would have
only 55 key bits to search. For linear expressions for a larger number of rounds (except
for 5- and 11-round DES), in order to obtain the best (“best” here means having optimal
probability), we would build the DES linear approximation using different S-box approx-
imations (in our 3-round DES example, we used the same approximation for the first and
final rounds, thus making the construction symmetrical). Matsui gives a table of the best
linear approximation expressions for DES up to 20 rounds which was found by computer
search [74].
We can use the symmetry of DES to obtain another linear expression for a key bit,
with little additional overhead. In instances where the n-round DES linear approximation
construction is not symmetrical (i.e. we do not use an S-box approximation in round
(n− i+ 1) if it is used in the ith round) we can run algorithm 4.2.1 again, swapping the
roles of the plaintext and ciphertext. The result would be the value of the “reverse” key
linear equation, which is similar to the original expression, except that all subkeys Ki are
replaced with Kn−i+1. For fast implementation, we do not actually run the algorithm
twice; it would be more efficient to use two counters T and U , one for each expression, in
the data analysis phase of the algorithm.
The next Section describes another approach in using linear approximations.
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 50
4.3 (n− 1)-round Linear Approximations
Previously, we had a basic algorithm to recover one key bit using a linear approximation.
An improvement on this basic algorithm, i.e. recovering more than one key bit, would
be to use a linear expression that holds for n-rounds with the probability of an (n − 1)-
round approximation. The only way to construct such an expression is to apply the DES
linear approximation expression to the first n − 1 rounds only, and leave the final round
unapproximated. The final (non-linear) round will be part of the resulting expression, but
we will show how to deal with this with an example for 8-round DES.
From [74], the best linear expression for 8-round DES, using the best 7-round linear
approximation (holding with probability 0.5 + 1.95× 2−10) is:
PL[7, 18, 24]⊕ PR[12, 16]⊕ CL[15]⊕ CR[7, 18, 24, 29]⊕ F (CR,K8)[15]
= K1[19, 23]⊕K3[22]⊕K4[44]⊕K5[22]⊕K7[22].
(4.3.1)
Note that we are only interested in one bit of the term involving the F function (DES’s f
function), i.e. bit 15. The value of this bit will be determined by one S-box, and hence will
be affected by only six subkey bits. So although equation (4.3.1) contains 48-bit subkey
K8, we need to try only possibilities for the six subkey bits that influence F (CR,K8)[15],
namely, K8[47], . . .K8[42].
Thus we require counters Ui for each possible value for the 6 subkey bits, and proceed
with the linear cryptanalysis algorithm. We expect the maximum likelihood method to
reveal which of the 26 = 64 possible results is the correct one. Not only will we obtain the
linear expression for a key bit (the right hand side of the DES linear approximation), but
we also find out the value of the 6 subkey bits. Thus we should recover a total of 7 key
bits (including a linear expression for a key bit).
Note that, in equation (4.3.1), we need only 7 bits of information from the plain-
text/ciphertext. These 7 text bits include a one bit result of an XOR of plaintext and
ciphertext bits, and six bit input to the S-boxes. Since we shall need to evaluate part of
DES’s f function, (denoted by F ) in order to calculate the left hand side of equation (4.3.1),
it is efficient to separate the data collection and data analysis into two distinct phases; the
first phase we call data collection phase which is to collect the text bits from each plain-
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text/ciphertext pair and the second phase we call key counting phase which is to procees
the collected data from the first phase. By “collecting” the text bits, it suffices to incre-
ment a counter, Ux, for each plaintext/ciphertext (where x is a 7-bit string representing
the 7 text bits extracted from the plaintext/ciphertext pairs). For example, we may store
the value of
PL[7, 18, 24]⊕ PR[12, 16]⊕ CL[15]⊕ CR[7, 18, 24, 29],
into the MSB (Most Significant Bit) of x, and the six bits
CR[0], CR[31], . . . CR[27]
into 6 LSBs (Least Significant Bits) of x, then increment Ux.
Algorithm 4.3.1.
1. Data Counting Phase:
Initialize Ti, where 0 ≤ i < 128 to zero.
2. For each plaintext Pi and the corresponding ciphertext Ci, where 0 ≤ i < N , do the
following:
• Let t hold the text bits used in the left hand side of the DES linear approxima-
tion equation. For example from equation (4.3.1):
t ← (PL[7, 18, 24]⊕ PR[12, 16]⊕ CL[15]⊕ CR[7, 18, 24, 29],
CR[0], CR[31], CR[30], CR[29], CR[28], CR[27])
• Increment Tt.
3. Key Counting Phase:
For each s ∈ Z62, do the following:
• Initialize Us to zero.
• For each t ∈ Z72, let Us = Us + Tt if the left hand side of the DES linear
approximation, with F (relevant six bits of t, s) for the final round, is zero.
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For example, from equation (4.3.1): if
t[6]⊕ F ((t[5], t[4], t[3], t[2], t[1], t[0]), (s[5], s[4], s[3], s[2], s[1], s[0]))[15] = 0,
then let Us = Us + Tt. Note that F (X,K)[15] ≡ S1(X ⊕K)[2].
4. Let Umax be the maximum Ui counter, and let Umin be the minimum Ui counter.
5. If the probability of the DES linear approximation is greater than 1/2 (for example,
p = 0.5 + 1.95× 2−10):
• If |Umax−N/2| > |Umin−N/2| then guess that the value of the right hand side
of the DES linear approximation is 0 and the 6 key bits affecting F (X,K) in the
last round are given by max, for example, the right hand side of equation (4.3.1):
K1[19, 23]⊕K3[22]⊕K4[44]⊕K5[22]⊕K7[22] = 0, and max represents the six
bits entering S1 in the last round.
• If |Umax−N/2| < |Umin−N/2| then guess that the value of the right hand side
of the DES linear approximation is 1 and the 6 key bits affecting F (X,K) in the
last round are given by min, for example, the right hand side of equation (4.3.1):
K1[19, 23]⊕K3[22]⊕K4[44]⊕K5[22]⊕K7[22] = 1, and min represents the six
bits entering S1 in the last round.
6. If the probability of DES linear approximation is less than 1/2:
• If |Umax−N/2| > |Umin−N/2| then guess that the value of the right hand side
of the DES linear approximation is 1 and the 6 key bits affecting F (X,K) in
the last round are given by max.
• If |Umax−N/2| < |Umin−N/2| then guess that the value of the right hand side
of the DES linear approximation is 0 and the 6 key bits affecting F (X,K) in
the last round are given by min.
The complexity of the data counting phase is O(N) and the complexity of the key
counting phase is O(213). The complexity of the key counting phase can be reduced to
O(212) modifying Step 3. in Algorithm 4.3.1 with the following:
3a. For each s ∈ Z62, do the following:
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• Initialize Us to zero.
• For each tl ∈ Z62 (tl are the 6 LSBs of t and t[6] is the MSB of t), let Us =
Us + T(t[6]∗26)+tl if F (six bits of tl, s) for the final round, is t[6].
For example, from equation (4.3.1): if
F ((tl[5], tl[4], tl[3], tl[2], tl[1], tl[0]), (s[5], s[4], s[3], s[2], s[1], s[0]))[15] = 0,
i.e. if t[6] = 0, then let Us = Us + Ttl . Otherwise, if
F ((tl[5], tl[4], tl[3], tl[2], tl[1], tl[0]), (s[5], s[4], s[3], s[2], s[1], s[0]))[15] = 1,
i.e. if t[6] = 1, then let Us = Us + T26+tl .
Matsui [74] estimated that for a success rate of 97%, we need around 220 known plain-
texts. This estimate was based on calculation for the success rate in recovering 1-bit key
as outlined in [74]. Using Algorithm 4.3.1, we recover 7 key bits (including one linear
expression for a key bit), but we can also recover another 7 key bits because of the sym-
metry of DES by applying the 7-round linear approximation to the second to final rounds,
and include F (PR,K1)[15] to recover K
1
1 = (K1[47], . . .K1[42]). So running the algorithm
twice will be able to recover 14 key bits. The remaining 42 key bits can be recovered by
reduced exhaustive key search.
Another improvement of this approximation is given in the next Section.
4.4 (n− 2)-round Linear Approximations
In [75], Matsui made an improvement on the (n− 1)-round linear approximation by sug-
gesting that the linear approximation cover the (n− 2) ‘middle’ rounds of the cipher, and
to use counters for the other two rounds.
This attack will recover one linear expression for a key bit, six bits of the subkey applied
in the first round, and six bits of the subkey applied in the final round: a total of 13 key
bits. The algorithm can be applied in “reverse” (provided that the linear approximation
is not symmetrical) to recover another 13 key bits, so that we have at total of 24 key bits
plus two linear expressions for 2 key bits. The remaining (56− 26) = 30 bits can be found
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by reduced exhaustive key search.
The n-round DES linear approximation is base don the best approximation of (n− 2)-
round DES. Thus, we will need much less known plaintexts to achieve a high success rate
than the n-round and (n − 1)-round algorithms. The best 6-round linear approximation
for 8-round DES is
PL[7, 18, 24]⊕ CL[15]⊕ CR[7, 18, 24, 29]
⊕F (PR,K1)[7, 18, 24]⊕ F (CR,K8)[15]
= K3[22]⊕K4[44]⊕K5[22]⊕K7[22].
(4.4.1)
Equation (4.4.1) holds with probability 1/2− 1.95× 2−9.
The following algorithm 4.4.1 gives the steps involved in performing linear cryptanalysis
of DES using (n− 2)-round linear approximation.
Algorithm 4.4.1.
1. Data Counting Phase:
Initialize Ti, where 0 ≤ i < 213 to zero.
2. For each plaintext Pi and the corresponding ciphertext Ci, where 0 ≤ i < N , do the
following:
• Let t hold the text bits used in the left hand side of the DES linear approxima-
tion equation. For example from equation (4.4.1):
t ← (PL[7, 18, 24]⊕ CL[15]⊕ CR[7, 18, 24, 29],
PR[16], PR[15], PR[14], PR[13], PR[12], PR[11],
CR[0], CR[31], CR[30], CR[29], CR[28], CR[27])
• Increment Tt.
3. Key Counting Phase:
For each s ∈ Z122 , do the following:
• Initialize Us to zero.
• For each tl ∈ Z122 (tl are the 6 LSBs of t and t[12] is the MSB of t), let Us =
Us + T(t[12]∗212)+tl if
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F (six MSB bits of tl, six MSB bits of s)⊕
F (six LSB bits of tl, six LSB bits of s) for the final round, is t[12].
For example, from equation (4.4.1): if
F ((tl[11], tl[10], tl[9], tl[8], tl[7], tl[6]), (s[11], s[10], s[9], s[8], s[7], s[6]))[7, 18, 24]⊕
F ((tl[5], tl[4], tl[3], tl[2], tl[1], tl[0]), (s[5], s[4], s[3], s[2], s[1], s[0]))[15] = 0,
i.e. if t[12] = 0, then let Us = Us + Ttl . Otherwise, if
F ((tl[11], tl[10], tl[9], tl[8], tl[7], tl[6]), (s[11], s[10], s[9], s[8], s[7], s[6]))[7, 18, 24]⊕
F ((tl[5], tl[4], tl[3], tl[2], tl[1], tl[0]), (s[5], s[4], s[3], s[2], s[1], s[0]))[15] = 1,
i.e. if t[12] = 1, then let Us = Us + T212+tl .
Note that F (X,K)[15] ≡ S1(X ⊕K)[2] and F (X,K)[7, 18, 24] ≡ S5(X ⊕K)[1, 2, 3]
4. Let Umax be the maximum Ui counter, and let Umin be the minimum Ui counter.
5. If the probability of the DES linear approximation is greater than 1/2:
• If |Umax−N/2| > |Umin−N/2| then guess that the value of the right hand side
of the DES linear approximation is 0 and the 12 key bits affecting F (X,K) in
the first and last rounds are given by max, for example, the right hand side of
equation (4.4.1): K3[22] ⊕ K4[44] ⊕ K5[22] ⊕ K7[22] = 0, and max represents
the twelve bits entering S1 and S5 in the first and last rounds.
• If |Umax−N/2| < |Umin−N/2| then guess that the value of the right hand side
of the DES linear approximation is 1 and the 12 key bits affecting F (X,K) in
the first and last rounds are given by min, for example, the right hand side of
equation (4.4.1): K3[22] ⊕ K4[44] ⊕ K5[22] ⊕ K7[22] = 1, and min represents
the twelve bits entering S1 and S5 in the first and last rounds.
6. If the probability of DES linear approximation is less than 1/2:
• If |Umax−N/2| > |Umin−N/2| then guess that the value of the right hand side
of the DES linear approximation is 1 and the 12 key bits affecting F (X,K) in
the first and last rounds are given by max.
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• If |Umax−N/2| < |Umin−N/2| then guess that the value of the right hand side
of the DES linear approximation is 0 and the 12 key bits affecting F (X,K) in
the first and last rounds are given by min.
As we can see from the algorithm above, we only need some modification on the previ-
ous algorithm 4.3.1 to be able to perform linear cryptanalysis using (n − 2)-round linear
approximation. Instead of having a total of 128 text counters Ti, we have 2
13 = 8192
text counters and instead of having a total of 64 key counters Uj , we have 2
12 = 4096 key
counters. The complexity of the above algorithm is O(N) +O(224)
Let us now move on to issues on our implementation of linear cryptanalysis of 8-round
DES.
4.5 Implementation Issues
We managed to successfully have a practical implementation of linear cryptanalysis of
3-round DES in finding 1 key bit. In the linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES, we man-
aged to have practical implementations for linear cryptanalysis using (n− 1)-round linear
approximation expression and also the (n−2)-round linear approximation expression. Pre-
viously, we mentioned the complexity of the linear cryptanalysis attack is O(N) +O(212)
when we use (n− 1)-round linear approximation expression and O(N) +O(224) when we
use (n − 2)-round linear approximation expression. The linear cryptanalysis attack on
8-round DES was fully implemented to recover all 56-bit key. If we use (n − 1)-round
linear approximation expression for our attack, we would only be able to recover 7 key
bits including one bit for the linear expression involving key bits. Table 4.3 shows the
percentage of success in recovering 7 key bits for 100 trials. It is also possible to recover
an extra 7 bits, if we employ the method mentioned in Section 3 above, i.e. to apply the
same (n−1)-round linear approximation expression to round 2 to round 8 of 8-round DES.
But, it still leaves 56 − 14 = 42 key bits to find using reduced exhaustive key search. It
is possible to do exhaustive key search in finding the rest of the 42 bit keys but since the
DES implementation can do 3792400 encryptions/decryptions in 1 second with parallel
programming using 10 threads, we estimated that it would take (242/3792400) = 1159700
seconds or around 13 days to search for the correct key. However, if we use (n− 2)-round
linear approximation expression for linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES, we would be able
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Table 4.3: Percentage of Success for obtaining 7 key bit using Algorithm 4.3.1 (100 trials)
N 262144 524288 1048576 2097152
Percentage of Success 56% 75% 85% 100%
Average position of successful attack in key list 10 4 1 1
Average time taken 2.06s 4.14s 8.24s 16.51s
Table 4.4: Percentage of Success for obtaining 23 key bit using Algorithm 4.4.1 (100 trials)
N 262144 524288 1048576 2097152
Percentage of Success 49% 93% 100% 100%
Average position of successful attack in key list 4 1 1 1
Average time taken 2.66s 4.82s 9.13s 17.66s
to recover 13 key bits including one key bit for the linear expression involving key bits.
Applying (n−2)-round linear approximation expression in “reverse” would recover an ad-
ditional 13 key bits. So in total we have 26 recovered bits. This leaves us with 56−26 = 30
bits to search for. If we use exhaustive key search, we would be searching 230 key space
for rest of the bits. An additional problem is that the 26 key bits that were recovered
were not all distinct key bits because 3 of them are the same due to DES key scheduling
process. So we would be able to recover only 23 key bits altogether and we would need
to do exhaustive key search on the other 33 key bits. We managed to find the correct
key with parallel programming using 10 threads. Recovering the 23 key bits using linear
cryptanalysis only takes less than 20 seconds and it takes around 4 minutes to retrieve
the rest of the key bits. Table 4.4 shows the percentage of success in recovering 23 key
bits for 100 trials. In Table 4.4, the average time taken excludes the time taken for doing





In this Chapter we discuss our implementation of differential-linear cryptanalysis. Al-
though this attack recovers fewer key bits it has the advantage that it requires less data.
We were able to run experiments to determine the success rate and show that with fewer
than 1000 texts the key bits are found in a matter of seconds.
Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack which combines both
Differential and Linear cryptanalysis. It was introduced by Susan Langford et.al in [70].
Since its introduction, differential-linear cryptanalysis has been applied to other block
ciphers such as FEAL [2], IDEA [25, 26, 18], Serpent [15, 38], Camellia [94], CTC2 [39, 72]
and SHACAL-2 [89]. With this method, the amount of chosen plaintexts needed to do
cryptanalysis was drastically reduced.
Before we move on further in discussing about the topic of differential-linear cryptanal-
ysis, we should first outline the notation that is going to be used in this Chapter.
• The numbering of plaintext, ciphertext and the bits of intermediate results (Ln, Rn)
are numbered from 0 to 63 reading from right to left. This numbering is similar to
the one specified in the previous Chapter about linear cryptanalysis.
• Input to an S-box is taken as with Matsui’s notation as (x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0)
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• A[i] represents the ith bit of A
• A[i, j, . . . , k] = A[i]⊕A[j]⊕ . . .⊕A[k]
For differential-linear cryptanalysis, similar to both differential and linear cryptanalysis,
we shall ignore the initial (IP) and final (FP) permutations as they have no cryptographic
significance in a chosen or known plaintext attack. In this Chapter, we refer (L0, R0), the
64-bits after IP as the plaintext and (Ln, Rn), the 64-bit before FP as the ciphertext.
Lastly, any primed values from here onwards refer to differentials.
Now, let us move on the Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis on 8-round DES to give a
general idea of how the attack works.
5.1 Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of 8-round DES
Figure 5.1 shows Differential-Linear attack on 8-round DES. This attack combines a dif-
ferential characteristic with a linear parity relation. By a technique given in the next
Section, we can complement bits 29 and/or 30 of L1 and keep the other 62 bits of (L1, R1)
unchanged. The key observation in this attack is that this behaviour in (L1, R1) leaves
many bits of (L4, R4) unchanged. In particular the input bits to Matsui’s best 3-round
parity relation (bits 7, 18, 24 and 29 of L4 and bit 15 of R4) never change, so that the
parity of the output bits (bits 7, 18, 24 and 29 of L7 and bit 15 of R7) is unchanged with
probability r = p2 + q2 = 0.576 where p = 0.695 is the probability of Matsui’s parity
relation holding once, and q = 1 − p. The probability is p2 + q2 because Matsui’s parity
relation must hold, or fail, twice: once for the reference (see next Section for details) and
once for the plaintext which toggles only bits 29 and/or 30 in round 1.
Figure 5.2 shows why the differential characteristic holds going from (L1, R1) to (L4, R4).
Because R′1 = 0, the output of F (R,K) in round 2 must also be 0 differentially. Thus,
R′2 = L′1 and R′2 has bits 29 and/or 30 toggled. These two bits affect only the input of




4 and bits 7, 18,
24 and 29 are not outputs of S1, these bits will be unchanged in L
′
4. Further, because
of expansion E, the four outputs of S1 affect the inputs of six S-boxes in round 4. Two
S-boxes will therefore be unchanged, namely S1 and S7. Bit 15 of R
′
4 is the output of S1
so it will remain unchanged.
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Inputs to parity relation are unchanged with p = 1
Matsui’s best 3−round parity relation
3 rounds
L  [7, 18, 24, 29] R  [15]
L  : Toggle bits 29 and/or 301 1R  : No change
4 4
Output of parity relation is unchanged with p= 0.576
R   [7, 18, 24, 29] L  [15]7 7
Bit 15 is an
output from S1
L  8 R   [15]8
F(R,  K)
Search K      (6 bits)8, 1
Figure 5.1: Differential-Linear attack on 8-round DES




L  : Complement bits 29 and/or 30 R  : No change
no change
Only bits 29 










Figure 5.2: Differential Characteristic for Differential-Linear Attack
As Figure 5.1 shows, the parity invariance to be observed occurs in round 7 with
probability 0.576. Using Matsui’s method, we decipher the two ciphertexts (L8, R8) and
(L∗8, R∗8) backwards through one round to get the output bits of the parity relation: bits 7,
18, 24 and 29 of R7, and bit 15 of L7. Bits 7, 18, 24 and 29 are known because R7 = L8,
the left half of the ciphertext. Only bit 15 of L7 must be computed. This computation
only involves only S1 in round 8, so we can test the 6-bit subkey K8,1. When the correct
value of K8,1 is used, we expect to observe parity invariance 57.6% of the time; when an
incorrect value is used, the data produced is more random and we expect the observed
parity invariance closer to 50% of the time.
Based on Matsui’s rule of thumb [74, 75], we would require approximately 8/(r− 0.5)2
observations, where r is the probability of observing a parity relation. So, we expect that
the differential-linear attack would require about 1400 pairs of chosen plaintexts.
Let us now move on to describing how the actual differential-linear attack is done.
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F(R, K)
0L  : 16 possible values
S1’s outputs
R  : No change1
Search K      (6 bits)1, 1
1L  : Toggle bits 29 and/or 30
0R  : Toggle bits 29 and/or 30
Figure 5.3: First round of 8-round Differential-Linear Attack
5.2 Differential-Linear Attack Setup
Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis requires that we have plaintext pairs which we can toggle
only certain bits. The first thing we need to do is to choose any reference plaintext and
let P (0) through P (63) be the 64 plaintexts obtained by varying bits 1, 9, 15 and 23 of
L0 and bits 29 and 30 of R0. We shall refer P (0) through P (63) as a plaintext structure.
The bits 1, 9, 15 and 23 correspond to the four outputs of S1 , and bits 29 and 30 of R0
become bits 29 and 30 of L1, the bits to be toggled.
Bits 29 and 30 are the middle input bits to S1. Since these bits are the only bits that
can change in R0 , only the outputs of S1 can change in round 1, as shown in Figure 5.3.
Because we included all 16 possibilities for these bits in the plaintext structure, if we
knew the 6-bit subkey K1,1, for each of the 64 P (i)’s we could choose three other P (j)’s
which had the desired toggling in round 1. One P (j) would toggle bit 29, one would toggle
bit 30, and one would toggle both bits 29 and 30. The 64 chosen plaintexts might seem
to produce 64 × 3 = 192 differential pairs, but only half of them, or 96 pairs,are distinct
because (P (i), P (j)) and (P (j), P (i)) are the same pair. All the 96 distinct pairs in a
plaintext structure could be used to help determine K8,1 if K1,1 were known. Since we do
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not know K1,1, we search over all values of K1,1 and K8,1
Two of the bits of K1,1 are also part of K8,1, so there are only 10 distinct bits and 1024
possible subkeys to search over. Since each plaintext structure of 64 plaintexts produces 96
differential pairs and 1400 pairs are required by Matsui’s rule of thumb, the differential-
linear attack should work with approximately 64/96 × 1400 = 900 chosen plaintexts.
Langford [70] specified that 512 chosen plaintexts would produce 80% success rate and
768 chosen plaintexts would produce 95% success rate in obtaining the 10 bits of key in
K1,1 and K8,1. These two attacks use 8 and 12 plaintext structures of 64 chosen plaintexts
respectively.
5.3 Obtaining Additional Key Bits
In the previous Section, we had shown how we can obtain 10 key bits using Differential-
Linear attack. However, DES has a 56-bit key. So, this still leaves 46 more bits to find
which is still considerably large if we use exhaustive key search to find them.
In order to recover additional key bits, we can use other lower probability 3-round
parity relations in rounds 5 to 7, replacing Matsui’s optimal 3-round parity relation. For
example, bits 5, 11, 17 and 27 of L4 and bit 1 of R4 in round 4 also remain unchanged
when bits 29 and/or 30 of L1 are toggled. We can therefore use the relation
(L4[5, 11, 17, 27]⊕R4[1])⊕ (R7[5, 11, 17, 27]⊕ L7[3]) = 0. (5.3.1)
Differentially, equation 5.3.1 holds with probability 0.527, instead of 0.576 for Matsui’s
optimal relation. Using this parity relation requires searching over K1,1 and K8,6 instead
of K1,1 and K8,1, therefore recovering the six additional bits of K8,6.
5.4 Dependence Issues
The Differential-Linear attack on 8-round DES appears at first, to be a major improvement
to Linear Cryptanalysis but according to [71], these two attacks are are actually equivalent,
i.e. the amount of text required for the Differential part in Differential-Linear attack is
equivalent to the ones required in Linear Cryptanalysis.According to [71], if Tk represent
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the count for a particular candidate subkey,
∑
i P (i) represents the count obtained from a
standard linear attack and N is the total number of known plaintexts used in linear part










Further, because Tk is monotonic in abs(
∑
i P (i)− N2 ), the subkey which generates the
maximum value for abs(
∑
i P (i)− N2 ) in the standard linear attack will also generate the
minimum value of Tk in the differential style attack. Thus, the two attacks choose the
same subkeys. For further information on this, we refer you to [71]. We had adjusted the
count Tk in our implementation accordingly. The differential attack (in Differential-Linear
Cryptanalysis) initially appears superior to the standard attack because of a neglected
assumption that the plaintext pairs are independent for which they are actually not.
In [71], another cryptanalysis was performed on 8-round DES also took into account,
the dependence of plaintext pairs. Surprisingly, the results obtained were similar to the
simplified cryptanalysis on 8-round DES which neglects dependence of pairs.
5.5 Implementation Issues
We were able to successfully implement the Differential-Linear attack on 8-round DES
following the outlined steps given in Section 5.2. However, the amount of key material
that were recovered from this attack is less than that obtained either by Differential or
Linear Cryptanalysis. The advantage against both attacks (i.e. Differential and Linear
Cryptanalysis) is that the amount of required plaintexts are drastically reduced. Using
Differential-Linear attack, we were able to recover only 10 key bits instead of 12 key bits
because two of the recovered key bits are the same. In the previous Section, we can
recover an additional 6 key bits, which gives us 16 recovered bits in total. This still leaves
us 56− 16 = 40 key bits to search for. As we had mentioned in the previous Chapter, it is
However, we decided to test the performance on the percentage of success in obtaining
the 10 key bits. Table 5.1 shows the results of our experiment with 100 trials on each of
the given number of chosen plaintexts.
We did look at recovering 16-bit key and found that the results were similar to table 5.1.
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Table 5.1: Percentage of Success for 10-bit Key Recovery
Number of Chosen Plaintexts 64 128 256 512 768
Percentage of Success 77.7% 97.2% 100% 100% 100%
Average Position in List 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00







In this Chapter we discuss the extension of differential-linear cryptanalysis to multiple
linear approximations. We use an alternative method of generating plaintexts in our
implementation.
Multiple Linear Approximations in Linear Cryptanalysis was introduced by Burton S.
Kaliski Jr. and M.J.B. Robshaw [52] as an enhancement of Linear Cryptanalysis intro-
duced by Matsui [74]. We know that in Linear Cryptanalysis we can use a single linear
approximation to recover certain key bits of ciphers like DES, for instance. In addition
to this, linear cryptanalysis also recovers parity bits of the key. Normally, the best linear
approximation is used in linear cryptanalysis. Kaliski and Robshaw [52] first introduced
the idea of using more than one linear approximation in linear cryptanalysis in 1994. The
advantage of using multiple linear approximations rather than a single one is the increase
in success rate without having to increase the number of known plaintexts.
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In Differential-Linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES, there are two parts to the crypt-
analysis i.e. the differential cryptanalysis part and the linear cryptanalysis part. In this
thesis, we are concentrating on improving the linear cryptanalysis part. Details of differential-
linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES can be found in [71].
Differential-Linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES uses Matsui’s optimal 3-round ap-
proximation in the linear part of the cryptanalysis. In this thesis, we are investigating
the feasibility of using multiple 3-round linear approximations to decrease the number of
required plaintexts.
Now, let us discuss about the different linear approximations that we can use in im-
proving differential-linear cryptanalysis
6.1 Multiple Linear Approximations
Firstly, note that the ith round DES subkey Ki is divided into 6-bit blocks so that Ki,j
refers to the jth block of the subkey Ki (reading from left to right). Si refers to the i
th S
box of DES. Also, Ki[j] refers to the j
th bit of the subkey Ki where the rightmost bit of
Ki is Ki[0].
The linear cryptanalysis part of the differential linear cryptanalysis relied on bits that
are unchanged after going through the differential part of the cryptanalysis. The linear
cryptanalysis part begins from round 5 to round 7. Figure 5.1 shows the setup used in
differential-linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. After going through the 3-round differ-
ential characteristic, we are left with several bits which are unchanged. These bits are
the ones that are used in the linear cryptanalysis part of differential-linear cryptanalysis.
Figure 5.2 shows how a differential characteristic is used to produce unchanged bits to be
used in linear cryptanalysis.
In Figure 5.2, we see that bits 7, 18, 24 and 29 of L4 and bit 15 of R4 are unchanged.
These are not the only bits which are unchanged. Along with these bits, we also have bits
0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30 and 31 of L4
and bits 0, 1, 9, 10, 20, 23 and 25 of R4 unchanged, using the differential characteristic
in Figure 5.2. We need to construct parity relations having different biases in order to
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improve the existing Matsui’s optimal parity relation
(L4[7, 18, 24, 29]⊕R4[15])⊕ (L7[15]⊕R7[7, 18, 24, 29]) = 0
which has a bias of  = 1.95× 10−1 (by Matsui’s Piling Up Lemma). Let us look at parity
relations involving these unchanged bits. The parity relations that are used involving these
bits are of the form:
(L4[V ]⊕R4[W ])⊕ (L7[X]⊕R7[Y ]) = 0 (6.1.1)
with bias  (using Matsui’s Piling Up Lemma) where V , W , X, Y and  and the cumu-
lative sum of squares of the bias  are given in Table 6.1. We can see that the 3 linear
approximations in Table 6.1 are amongst the best linear approximations that we can use
in differential-linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. The main idea is to search for several
correct key bits used in 8-round DES encryption. In order to do this, we need to know
which DES’s S boxes are involved. The values of X in Table 6.1 indicate which key bits
we can search for. In Table 6.1, only the first and second linear approximations involve
the same S box,i.e. S1, because bit 15 and bit 1 (in column X in Table 6.1) are output
bits from S1. This means that we can search for the 8-round DES subkey, K8,1 using these
two approximations. Although by using these two approximations we can recover only the
same key bits, the advantage is that we are able to reduce the number of required chosen
plaintext pairs. The third linear approximation in Table 6.1 involves S6 so that we can
search for the subkey, K8,6. Altogether we should be able to recover a total of 12 key bits
from using these 3 linear approximations. However, in order to use these approximations,
equation 6.1.1 needs to be satisfied for each of the linear approximations. Equation 6.1.1
depends on the XOR (exclusive or) of certain key bit values. Parity relations need to be
satified for all the linear approximations in Table 6.1. The parity relation for the first
linear approximation is K5[22] ⊕ K7[22] = 0. For the second linear approximation, the
parity relation is K5[2]⊕K7[2] = 0. In the third linear approximation, we notice that the
 value in Table 6.1 is negative so the parity relation is K5[2] ⊕K7[4] ⊕ 1 = 0. As K5[2]
is involved in both the second and third linear approximations, there are only 5 key bits
involved in these parity relations.
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Table 6.1: Values of V , W , X, Y and  for K8,1 and K8,6 key search
No. V W X Y  Cumulative
∑
2
1 7,18,24,29 15 15 7,18,24,29 1.95× 10−1 3.80× 10−2
2 5,11,17,27 1 1 5,11,17,27 9.58× 10−2 4.72× 10−2
3 5,11,17,27 1 3 5,11,17,27 −1.10× 10−1 5.93× 10−2
6.2 Implementation
In [70, 71], we see that a plaintext structure was used in order to generate the chosen
plaintext pairs required for differential-linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. We decided
not to use any plaintext structure in our experiment. Figure 6.1 shows how we generate
the required chosen plaintext pairs in the first round of 8-round DES. For each plaintext,
say P , we get another plaintext, say P ′, with bits 29 and/or 30 in the right half of P ′
toggled and the bits 1, 9, 15 and 23 of the left half of P ′ changed. Note that each half of
P or P ′ is 32 bits in length starting from bit 0 to bit 31 with bit 0 being the rightmost
bit. The right halves of P and P ′ goes into the F function of the first round of DES
together with the first 48 bit subkey of the 8-round DES key, K, to produce a differential
output, say ∆. We use this ∆ to produce the left half of P ′ by XORing ∆ with the left
half of P . Thus, we finally XOR the left halves of P and P ′ with the two respective
outputs of function F to produce a differential output of zero, which is required for the
next stage in differential-linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES as previously mentioned. In
this first round, we are also able to search for the correct 6-bit subkey K1,1. Altogether,
we should be able to recover the correct key bits of K1,1, K8,1 and K8,6 using this setup
and using multiple linear approximations for differential-linear cryptanalysis of 8-round
DES. However, since we have 2 key bits which are duplicated in K1,1 and K8,1, we are
only able to recover a total of 16 key bits. When we use multiple linear approximations for
differential-linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES, the result obtained is a just key ranking
of all possible keys. Increase in the number of chosen plaintext pairs used will ”promote”
the correct key bits to the top rank in the key ranking list.
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F(R, K)
R  : No change1
Search K      (6 bits)1, 1
1L  : Toggle bits 29 and/or 30
0R  : Toggle bits 29 and/or 300L  : Differential
Differential
Figure 6.1: First round in Differential-Linear Attack of 8-round DES
6.3 Prediction
According to Matsui’s rule of thumb, if we use only the single optimal linear approxi-
mation for the linear part of the differential-linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES, we can
estimate the number of plaintext pairs required with a very high percentage of success
using the expression 8/(r − 12)2 where r = 12 + 22 and  is the bias for the optimal lin-
ear approximation. So, as the bias  = 1.95 × 10−1 for the first linear approximation in
Table 6.1, we predict that the number of plaintext pairs required is about 1384 pairs. By
multiplying our initial estimate of required plaintext pairs using the single linear approxi-
mation, i.e. 1384 pairs, with the square of the bias of using the first linear approximation
and then dividing it with the cumulative sum of squares of the bias using the first two
linear approximations in Table 6.1, i.e. 3.80×10
−2
4.72×10−2 × 1384, we estimate that we can reduce
the plaintext pair requirement to about 1115 plaintext pairs without reducing the per-
centage of success. Similarly, if we use all the three linear approximations in Table 6.1, we
predict that we would require about 887 plaintext pairs by using the same formula given
above except we divide with the cumulative sum of squares of the bias using three linear
approximations instead of dividing with the cumulative sum of squares of the bias using




Table 6.2 gives the result of our implementation in using multiple linear approximations
in differential-linear cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. The result is based on performing 100
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Table 6.2: Recovery of 16 key bits using Multiple Linear Approximations in Differential-
Linear Cryptanalysis of 8-round DES
No. of plaintext pairs used 1384 1115 887
Percentage of success 100% 100% 100%
Average position in key ranking list 1.00 1.00 1.00
trials using 100 random keys (with certain key bits set to specific values as previously
described above). Table 6.2 indicates the position of the correct key bits out of 65536
possible key bit positions. As we can see from Table 6.2, the result that we obtained
conformed to the prediction that we had previously made.
6.5 Issues Regarding Multiple Linear Approximations
In Section 6.1, we had used three linear approximations to perform our cryptanalysis. In
fact, there are four linear approximations that we can actually use but we opted not to use
the fourth one because it would be unweildy for a normal PC since we would be searching
a keyspace of 228 for the correct key bits. If we use only three linear approximations as
we had done in this Chapter, we would be searching a keyspace of only 216.
In Section 6.2, we had used an implementation which does not require the use of any
plaintext structures because with plaintext structures we are restricted to only multiples
of 64 plaintext pairs whereas without it, we do not have any such restriction. On the other
hand, using plaintext structures takes advantage of using a particular pair and generating
the other remaining pairs from it. Whereas in our implementation, we just generate any
plaintext pair and modify it accordingly and then move on to generating the next plaintext
pair and so on until the required number of plaintext pairs has been reached. Regardless,
the main idea in this Chapter is that we are able to use a different implementation which
we can use to predict the plaintext pair requirements.
We have now finished our discussion about the cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. In the






In this Chapter, we discuss several statistical tests that have been applied to DES. The
purpose of these statistical tests was to determine whether we can actually distinguish
between the ciphertext output of a block cipher and a random permutation. Our tests
rely on ciphertexts produced from various rounds of DES, from 1-round to the full 16-
round version. We want to determine how many ciphertexts are required in order to make
this distinction. We also want to determine, in the case of block ciphers, the number
of rounds required in order for the ciphertexts to be indistinguishable from a random
permutation. These statistical tests were based on the Strict Avalanche Criterion which
will be explained in the next Section.
7.1 The Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) Test
The Strict Avalanche Criterion was originally presented in [45] in 1990, as a generalisation
of the avalanche effect. It was devised for measuring the amount of non-linearity of
substitution boxes, a vital component of many block ciphers.
The avalanche effect tries to reflect the idea of high-nonlinearity. If we make a small
change in the input, it produces a huge change in the output with high probability. In
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mathematical terms,
∀x, y |H(x, y) = 1 Average(H(F (x), F (y))) = n
2
(7.1.1)
where F is the function to be tested and H(x, y) refers to the hamming distance/weight
between x and y.
If F is to have the avalanche effect, the Hamming distance between outputs of a random
input vector and one generated by randomly flipping one of the bits, should be n/2 on
average. This means, a minimum change in the input (one bit only) produces, on average,
a maximum output change (half of the bits).
This becomes our basis for using this statistical test is to realize the concept of in-
dependence of the output from the input. The ideal function F will resemble a perfect
random function where inputs and outputs are statistically unrelated. Any such function
would have perfect avalanche effect.
Moreover, we used the Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) as a property that implies the
avalanche effect, and this can be described mathematically as,
∀x, y |H(x, y) = 1 H(F (x), F (y)) ≈ B(n, 1
2
) (7.1.2)
where B is the binomial distribution.
Given this notion that we produce a distribution of the output data that closely relates
to another distribution (in this case, the Binomial distribution), we can use the χ-square
goodness-of-fit test.
The following pseudocode describes the SAC statistical test that we used. If a function
F passes this test, then it means that F has the SAC property.
1. While (No._of_input_vectors < Total_No._of_input_vectors)
{
1.1 Randomly generate an input vector V;
1.2 Randomly choose a position p in V;
1.3 Flip the contents of the position p in V to get V’;
1.4 Calculate h the hamming distance between F(V) and F(V’) and
increment the number in the array observed_value at index h
(observed_value[h]);
};
2. Compute the Chi-squre statistic t over the results stored in
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observed_value[h]
3. Perform a hypothesis constrast to test if the observed distribution
(the t value) is consistent with the expected probability distribution,
i.e. Binomial(n,0.5), where n is the length of the output of F
In addition to this, we also want to test whether the F function can generate random
numbers. If F is a random permutation, the recurrence relation:
I0 = IV
In+1 = F (In)
where I0 = IV is the intial vector, must produce a sequence (I1, I2, I3, . . . ) of random
numbers. This sequence of random numbers can be seen as a stream of random bits that
could be used to generate V and p in the SAC test described above. This technique is
called autofeeding. Any result statistically distinguishable from the expected will prove
that the F function has no SAC property or is not a good random number generator. The
SAC test and the SAC test with autofeeding was first introduced in [48]. In [48], the SAC
test and the SAC test with autofeeding was performed on reduced rounds of the TEA
block cipher. In this thesis, we performed these statistical tests on DES.
As an enhancement to the SAC tests described above, we had modified the SAC test
to form a new test which will be explained in the following Section.
7.2 Modified Strict Avalanche Criterion (modSAC) Test
The test that we describe here is based on the SAC test explained earlier. While the
SAC test uses the avalanche effect to measure the change in the hamming distance of the
input string against the hamming distance of the output string, our modified SAC test
uses the avalanche effect to see the consequence of the change in the hamming distance of
the input strings to the specific n-bit substrings of the output strings, where n = 2, 4, 8.
The reason we refer to the input and output as strings is because we normally represent
them as strings of numbers, in particular, binary numbers, especially, when we consider
the function F as a block cipher algorithm such as DES which uses 64 bits as input and
produces 64 bits as output. Our modified test is a more localized test as it looks at
substrings of limited lengths. Moreover it is a more refined test as we consider individual
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strings of these lengths resulting from an XOR rather than their weight (corresponding to
a Hamming distance).
The function F would produce two output strings F (x) and F (y) from the input strings
x and y respectively. We then divide these output strings into n-bit substrings which we
represent as F (x[n]) and F (y[n]). When we XOR F (x[n]) with F (y[n]), the result would
be an n-bit substring (represented as an integer i between 0 and 2n−1). In the ideal case,
for each value i, the probability that i occurs is uniform and given as 1/2n. We describe
mathematically as:
∀x, y |H(x, y) = 1 P ((F (x[n])⊕F (y[n])) = i) = 1
2n
, for i = 02, . . . , (2
n−1)2 (7.2.1)
where x[n] and y[n] represent the n-bit substrings of x and y respectively.
The following pseudocode describes the modSAC test that we used. If a function F
passed this test, then it also means that F has the modSAC property.
1. While (No._of_input_vectors < Total_No._of_input_vectors)
{
1.1 Randomly generate an input vector V;
1.2 Randomly choose a position p in V;
1.3 Flip the contents of the position p in V to get V’;
1.4 For (i = 0; i < 2^n; i++)
{
1.4.1 Search for i in binary form (length n),
in the output from XORing F(V[n]) with F(V’[n])
and increment the number in the array
observed_value at index i (observed_value[i]), if found;
};
};
2. Compute the Chi-squre statistic t over the results stored in
observed_value[i]
3. Perform a hypothesis constrast to test if the observed distribution
(the t value) is consistent with the expected discrete uniform
probability distribution where each of the i values has probability 1/n.
As in the previous Section, we also test whether the F function can generate random
numbers. The autofeeding technique that was described previously would also be used in
our modSAC test.
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7.3 Rationale of Experimental Tests
Hernandez et al. [48, 29] used the SAC Test and SAC Test with Autofeeding on reduced
round TEA encryption algorithm. Strict Avalanche Criterion is a good measure of non-
linearity in encryption algorithms. However, it was mentioned that the SAC test has not
been proven independent from other classical randomness tests [49]. Although, this is also
true for other classical randomness tests as well. Regardless, we decided to use the same
SAC Test and SAC Test with Autofeeding together with our modified SAC Tests, i.e. 2-
bit modSAC, 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests with/without Autofeeding, on two
different encryption algorithms (i.e. DES and RC5). DES and RC5 are popular yet old
and outdated as compared with other new encryption algorithms. We still wanted to do
our experimental tests on these two algorithms because of their similar use of Substitution-
Permutation Network and Feistel-like structure. As DES uses only 64-bit (56 data bits +
8 parity bits) block as input and 64-bit block as output, we chose RC5-32 to compare with
DES because RC5-32 uses 64-bit block as input and 64-bit block as output. Our aim was
also to produce complete Distinguishing Attack Profiles for DES and RC5-32 based on
our experimental tests. As far as we know, the SAC Tests with/without Autofeeding had
only been performed on reduced round TEA by Hernandez, et. al. [48]. We performed
these tests on both DES and RC5-32 and also compared the results from these tests with
our modified experimental tests.
We had used a maximum of 224 plaintext pairs for each experimental test. This is
the limit that we had set due to time constraints because as we double the number of
plaintext pairs, the computation time also doubles or triples. With 8 experimental tests
(each 10 trials) for each round of the encryption algorithm, this was a very challenging task
for us. This was the reason we had included our results for all rounds of each encryption
algorithm. Having the Distinguishing Attack Profiles for DES and RC5 would enable us to
gauge the strength of these encryption algorithms and make comparisons as to empirically
judge whether one encryption algorithm is stronger than the other based on just the output
ciphertexts produced by each algorithm. The tests with Autofeeding would enable us to
have a high degree of confidence as to how many rounds would be sufficient to make the
output ciphertexts indistinguishable from a random permutation.
In the next Section, we summarise the results of the SAC tests we have applied and in
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Table 7.1: Distinguishing Attack Profile of DES
DES
Rounds










































































































6 to 16 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Figs.B.41-128
the following Section give details of these results for the SAC with/without Autofeeding
and modSAC with/without Autofeeding tests performed on different numbers of rounds
of DES.
7.4 Summary of Experimental Results on DES
In this Section, we summarise the results that we obtained from the various tests that we
had performed for n-round DES, n = 1 . . . 16.
Note that in Table 7.1, the number inside the braces indicates the minimum amount
of ciphertext pairs where it begins to fail the specific test. From Table 7.1, we can see
that n-round DES failed the experimental tests (either with or without Autofeeding) for
n < 6. This means that the experimental tests were only able to distinguish between
uniform random distribution and the observed distribution for reduced rounds of DES.
We compared the results from using the original SAC Test with our 3 different modSAC
Tests, i.e. 2-bit modSAC, 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests.
For 1-round DES, we see that the results (with or without Autofeeding) of using the
SAC Test is comparable to results of using 2-bit modSAC and 4-bit modSAC Tests but
8-bit modSAC Test requires twice the amount of ciphertext pairs to get the same results as
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the SAC Test. For 2-round DES, we obtained similar results as with our tests on 1-round
DES. For 3-round DES, 2-bit modSAC and 4-bit modSAC Tests performed better than
the SAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests (either with or without Autofeeding). For 4-round DES,
2-bit modSAC and 4-bit modSAC Tests were able to distinguish the observed distribution
from uniform random distribution by using only an eighth of the amount of ciphertext
pairs used by the SAC Test. Even 8-bit modSAC Test was able to do the same by using
only a quarter of the amount of ciphertext used by the SAC Test. For 5-round DES, the
SAC Test required at least 216 ciphertext pairs (for either with or without Autofeeding)
to distinguish from uniform random distribution. 2-bit modSAC Test was able to do this
by just an eighth of the amount of ciphertext pairs used by the SAC Test, while 4-bit
modSAC Test required a quarter of the amount of ciphertext used by the SAC Test and
8-bit modSAC Test required half the amount of ciphertext pairs used by SAC Test.
As we can see, 2-bit modSAC Test’s performance in making the distinction between
our observed distribution and uniform random distribution is similar and in some cases,
better than that of the SAC Test. 4-bit modSAC Test’s performance in distinguishing
from uniform random distribution is similar to 2-bit modSAC Test’s performance but
slightly poor performance for 4 & 5 rounds of DES. As compared with the SAC Test,
4-bit modSAC Test gave better performance. Even 8-bit modSAC Test’s performance
was better than the SAC Test in 4 or 5 rounds of DES. For 1 and 2 rounds of DES, the
performance of the SAC Test was better than 8-bit modSAC Test. This maybe caused
by the fact that the number of ciphertext pairs required by 8-bit modSAC Test were not
sufficient to make the distinction between the observed distribution and uniform random
distribution.
The tests with Autofeeding try to find out whether a particular encryption algorithm
can be used to generate pseudorandom ciphertext output as we feed the ciphertext back
into the encryption algorithm to get another ciphertext output. This process continues
until we have generated the desired amount of ciphertext outputs. The tests were designed
to find out how the input plaintext influences or affects the output ciphertext in terms of
measuring its avalanche effect. We see that the tests with Autofeeding gave us the same
results as that of the tests without Autofeeding. This tells us that it takes a bit of time for
DES to produce the desired ciphertext outputs because we only started to see an increase in
the number of ciphertext pairs when the number of rounds for DES is 3 or more. DES with
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rounds greater than 5 passed all the tests with and without Autofeeding. For tests without
Autofeeding, this means that n-round DES for n = 6 . . . 16, were able to produce ciphertext
outputs indistinguishable from random outputs. For tests with Autofeeding, this means
that n-round DES for n = 6 . . . 16 can generate ciphertext outputs indinguishable from
random outputs.
7.5 Detail of Experimental Results on on DES
In this Section, we describe the experimental setup that was used to perform our various
tests on various rounds of DES. Basically, there are four tests that are being performed,
namely,
i SAC Test
ii SAC Test with Autofeeding
iii modSAC Test for n-bit substrings, where n = 2, 4, 8
iv modSAC Test with Autofeeding for n-bit substrings, where n = 2, 4, 8
Input data sets for these tests are plaintexts and keys. The output data sets are
ciphertexts. The plaintexts and keys are generated random data. The number of plaintexts
generated range from 27 to 224. 10 trials would be performed for each test, i.e. each test
would be used on 10 different input data sets and we used these data sets for each number
of rounds of the cryptographic algorithm. For the case of DES, we started off testing 1
round and gradually increased the number of rounds until finally we tested on the full
16-rounds. The results are displayed graphically according to the number of ciphertext
pairs being used (see Appendix B). We subdivided the graphs into four parts according
to the number of ciphertexts used. Part (a) ranges from 27 to 211 ciphertext pairs. Part
(b) is from 212 to 216 ciphertext pairs. Part (c) ranges from 217 to 220 ciphertext pairs
and part (d) is from 221 up to 224 ciphertext pairs. We note that for a plaintext P and
a key K, we will produce a ciphertext C but we will also produce a ciphertext C ′ from
plaintext P ′ and and the same key K. The hamming distance between P and P ′ is 1 and
P ′ is produced by randomly choosing and toggling one bit position of P . In the case of
tests with Autofeeding, we generated a random key, K and a random plaintext, P . We
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then generate another plaintext P ′ from P so that the hamming distance between P and
P ′ is 1 and P ′ is produced by randomly choosing and toggling one bit position of P . P
and K would be fed to DES to produce ciphertext C. Similarly, P ′ and K would be fed
to DES to produce ciphertext C ′. For Autofeeding, these ciphertexts would become the
next plaintext inputs to be fed into DES to produce another set of new ciphertexts. This
cycle repeats until the required number of ciphertexts is reached.
7.5.1 Tests on DES
As we had mentioned previously, we performed four tests. We will start by displaying the
results from the SAC Test and the modSAC Test for n-bit substrings, where n = 2, 4, 8.
This is then followed by the results for the SAC Test with Autofeeding and modSAC Test
with Autofeeding for n-bit substrings, where n = 2, 4, 8.
7.5.1.1 SAC Test





















1 63 0.005 95.649 106.414 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.1
2 63 0.005 95.649 104.782 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.9
3 63 0.005 95.649 118.065 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.17
4 63 0.005 95.649 205.087 1024(i .e. 210) Fail Fig.B.25
5 63 0.005 95.649 127.569 65536(i .e. 216) Fail Fig.B.33
6 63 0.005 95.649 57.2137 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.41
7 63 0.005 95.649 38.6085 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.49
8 63 0.005 95.649 42.0026 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.57
9 63 0.005 95.649 38.836 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.65
10 63 0.005 95.649 39.3879 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.73
11 63 0.005 95.649 36.4323 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.81
12 63 0.005 95.649 37.5238 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.89
13 63 0.005 95.649 33.4853 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.97
14 63 0.005 95.649 36.4978 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.105
15 63 0.005 95.649 40.2178 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.113
16 63 0.005 95.649 37.337 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.121
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As we can see from the table above, DES failed the SAC test for rounds 1 to 5 only. The
p-value that we used is 0.005 which is a standard statistical significance level value for χ2
test. The number of ciphertext pairs needed to distinguish from a random permutation
is 128 pairs for 1-Round DES and increases to 65536 for 5-round DES. 6-Round DES
and higher round DES, pass the SAC test. 95.649 is the χ2 test threshold value when
the degrees of freedom is 63(64 − 1) and the p-value as stated previously. For 6-Round
DES and higher round DES, we did not find the experimental χ2 test value exceeding or
approaching towards this threshold value for 16777216 ciphertext pairs.
7.5.1.2 modSAC Test for 2-bit substring






















1 3 0.005 12.838 9528.44 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.2
2 3 0.005 12.838 4685.03 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.10
3 3 0.005 12.838 1111.74 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.18
4 3 0.005 12.838 62.4072 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.26
5 3 0.005 12.838 13.084 8192(i .e. 213) Fail Fig.B.34
6 3 0.005 12.838 8.39007 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.42
7 3 0.005 12.838 2.98366 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.50
8 3 0.005 12.838 3.6796 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.58
9 3 0.005 12.838 4.45962 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.66
10 3 0.005 12.838 3.21198 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.74
11 3 0.005 12.838 3.93367 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.82
12 3 0.005 12.838 2.5603 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.90
13 3 0.005 12.838 2.87226 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.98
14 3 0.005 12.838 3.32912 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.106
15 3 0.005 12.838 3.7441 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.114
16 3 0.005 12.838 2.77292 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.122
In the above table, only 1- to 5-Round DES fail the modSAC test for 2-bit substring.
Similarly, we use a p-value of 0.005 for the significance level for the χ2 test. The number
of ciphertext pairs needed to distinguish from a random permutation using this test is the
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same for 1-Round DES up to and including 4-round DES. Then it suddenly increase to
8192 for 5-round DES. 6-Round DES and higher round DES, pass the modSAC test for 2-
bit substring. 12.838 is the χ2 test threshold value when the degrees of freedom is 3(4−1)
and the p-value as stated previously. For 6-Round DES and higher round DES, we did
not find the experimental χ2 test value exceeding or approaching towards this threshold
value for 16777216 ciphertext pairs.
7.5.1.3 modSAC Test for 4-bit substring






















1 15 0.005 32.801 20714.6 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.3
2 15 0.005 32.801 7860.59 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.11
3 15 0.005 32.801 1387.03 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.19
4 15 0.005 32.801 75.8984 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.27
5 15 0.005 32.801 33.287 16384(i .e. 214) Fail Fig.B.35
6 15 0.005 32.801 20.9423 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.43
7 15 0.005 32.801 15.9754 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.51
8 15 0.005 32.801 17.1252 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.59
9 15 0.005 32.801 16.7073 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.67
10 15 0.005 32.801 13.3849 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.75
11 15 0.005 32.801 13.7027 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.83
12 15 0.005 32.801 14.9797 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.91
13 15 0.005 32.801 16.7239 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.99
14 15 0.005 32.801 15.8471 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.107
15 15 0.005 32.801 16.5728 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.115
16 15 0.005 32.801 13.7929 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.123
The results that we obtain in the above table are very similar to the results that we get
for the modSAC test for 2-bit substring. We can see from the above table that only 1- to
5-round DES fail the modSAC test for 4-bit substring. The number of ciphertext pairs
needed to distinguish from a random permutation using this test is the same for 1-Round
DES up to and including 4-round DES. Then it suddenly increase to 16384 for 5-round
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DES. 6-Round DES and higher round DES, pass the modSAC test for 4-bit substring.
32.801 is the χ2 test threshold value when the degrees of freedom is 15(16 − 1) and the
p-value as stated previously. For 6-Round DES and higher round DES, we did not find
the experimental χ2 test value exceeding or approaching towards this threshold value for
16777216 ciphertext pairs. Thus these higher round DES pass our modSAC test for 4-bit
substring.
7.5.1.4 modSAC Test for 8-bit substring






















1 255 0.005 316.919 262303 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.4
2 255 0.005 316.919 61001.2 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.12
3 255 0.005 316.919 5563.32 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.20
4 255 0.005 316.919 469.775 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.28
5 255 0.005 316.919 322.231 32768(i .e. 215) Fail Fig.B.36
6 255 0.005 316.919 268.857 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.44
7 255 0.005 316.919 259.604 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.52
8 255 0.005 316.919 253.888 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.60
9 255 0.005 316.919 250.482 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.68
10 255 0.005 316.919 242.394 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.76
11 255 0.005 316.919 255.995 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.84
12 255 0.005 316.919 258.378 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.92
13 255 0.005 316.919 251.967 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.100
14 255 0.005 316.919 258.105 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.108
15 255 0.005 316.919 255.948 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.116
16 255 0.005 316.919 257.17 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.124
From the table above, we see that 1-Round DES fail the modSAC test for 8-bit substring.
The number of ciphertext pairs sufficient for distinguishing 1-Round DES from a random
permutation is 256 pairs. 256 pairs of ciphertexts is also sufficient for distinguishing
2-Round DES, 3-Round DES and 4-Round DES, from a random permutation. For 5-
Round DES, the number of ciphertext pairs needed to make this distinction is at least
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32768. 316.919 is the χ2 test threshold value when the degrees of freedom is 255(256− 1)
with a p-value of 0.005. For 6-Round DES and higher round DES, we did not find the
experimental χ2 test value exceeding or approaching towards this threshold value for
16777216 ciphertext pairs. Thus these higher round DES pass our modSAC test for 8-bit
substring.
7.5.1.5 SAC Test with Autofeeding





















1 63 0.005 95.649 106.414 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.5
2 63 0.005 95.649 103.945 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.13
3 63 0.005 95.649 117.894 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.21
4 63 0.005 95.649 173.923 1024(i .e. 210) Fail Fig.B.29
5 63 0.005 95.649 124.843 65536(i .e. 216) Fail Fig.B.37
6 63 0.005 95.649 60.1454 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.45
7 63 0.005 95.649 36.197 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.53
8 63 0.005 95.649 38.8928 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.61
9 63 0.005 95.649 42.1217 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.69
10 63 0.005 95.649 41.3929 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.77
11 63 0.005 95.649 38.821 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.85
12 63 0.005 95.649 40.3234 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.93
13 63 0.005 95.649 40.9324 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.101
14 63 0.005 95.649 39.6288 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.109
15 63 0.005 95.649 40.2927 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.117
16 63 0.005 95.649 40.9511 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.125
When we perform the SAC Test with Autofeeding, we do not see any difference in the
results as compared to the SAC test results in Table 7.2 in terms of the number of required
ciphertext pairs. However, the experimental χ2 values in the above table are different from
those obtained in Table 7.2 with the exception of 1-Round DES. Only 1- to 5-round DES
fail the SAC test with Autofeeding. 6-round DES and higher round DES pass the SAC
test with Autofeeding. This means that these higher round DES are able to generate
ciphertext outputs indistinguishable from random outputs.
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7.5.1.6 modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 2-bit substring






















1 3 0.005 12.838 9533.39 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.6
2 3 0.005 12.838 4708.12 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.14
3 3 0.005 12.838 1110.32 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.22
4 3 0.005 12.838 72.8266 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.30
5 3 0.005 12.838 15.3479 8192(i .e. 213) Fail Fig.B.38
6 3 0.005 12.838 8.46687 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.46
7 3 0.005 12.838 2.13801 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.54
8 3 0.005 12.838 4.41917 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.62
9 3 0.005 12.838 2.1929 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.70
10 3 0.005 12.838 2.03053 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.78
11 3 0.005 12.838 3.01876 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.86
12 3 0.005 12.838 2.95697 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.94
13 3 0.005 12.838 3.30985 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.102
14 3 0.005 12.838 2.34561 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.110
15 3 0.005 12.838 2.28238 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.118
16 3 0.005 12.838 2.25921 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.126
As we can see from the table above, the number of ciphertext pairs required to distinguish
generated outputs from 1-Round DES from random outputs is 128 pairs. The same number
of ciphertext pairs is also sufficient for distinguishing generated outputs from 2-Round
DES, 3-Round DES and 4-Round DES from random outputs. For 5-Round DES, the
number is slightly higher, that is, 8192 pairs. This means that 1- to 5-Round DES fail the
modSAC test for 2-bit substring. However, 6-Round DES and higher round DES pass this
test. This means that these higher round DES are able to generate ciphertext outputs
indistinguishable from random outputs.
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 86
7.5.1.7 modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 4-bit substring






















1 15 0.005 32.801 20803.8 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.7
2 15 0.005 32.801 7992 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.15
3 15 0.005 32.801 1415.82 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.23
4 15 0.005 32.801 91.0266 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.B.31
5 15 0.005 32.801 40.8635 16384(i .e. 214) Fail Fig.B.39
6 15 0.005 32.801 21.5484 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.47
7 15 0.005 32.801 14.9609 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.55
8 15 0.005 32.801 17.1044 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.63
9 15 0.005 32.801 15.636 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.71
10 15 0.005 32.801 14.1291 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.79
11 15 0.005 32.801 14.9727 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.87
12 15 0.005 32.801 15.5705 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.95
13 15 0.005 32.801 13.5526 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.103
14 15 0.005 32.801 15.7968 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.111
15 15 0.005 32.801 13.5228 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.119
16 15 0.005 32.801 14.5736 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.127
As given in Table 7.8 above, for 1- to 4-Round DES, we have number of ciphertext pairs re-
quired to distinguish generated outputs of these reduced round DES from random outputs
is 128 pairs. 5-Round DES requires 16384 ciphertext pairs to make the same distinction.
Thus, 1- to 5-Round DES fail the modSAC test for 4-bit substring with Autofeeding.
6-Round DES and higher round DES pass this test.
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7.5.1.8 modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 8-bit substring






















1 255 0.005 316.919 264916 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.8
2 255 0.005 316.919 61335.7 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.16
3 255 0.005 316.919 5590.48 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.24
4 255 0.005 316.919 435.25 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.B.32
5 255 0.005 316.919 319.34 32768(i .e. 215) Fail Fig.B.40
6 255 0.005 316.919 255.665 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.48
7 255 0.005 316.919 262.091 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.56
8 255 0.005 316.919 257.935 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.64
9 255 0.005 316.919 262.077 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.72
10 255 0.005 316.919 250.389 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.80
11 255 0.005 316.919 268.339 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.88
12 255 0.005 316.919 250.452 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.96
13 255 0.005 316.919 254.044 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.104
14 255 0.005 316.919 242.371 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.112
15 255 0.005 316.919 248.262 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.120
16 255 0.005 316.919 251.998 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.B.128
The results that we obtained in the above table is similar to those results given in the
previous tables. However, the number of required ciphertext pairs is slightly higher than
those in the previous tables. 1- to 4-Round DES require 256 pairs of ciphertext to distiguish
generated outputs of these reduced round DES from random outputs. 5-Round DES
requires 32768 ciphertext pairs to make the same distinction. Thus, 1- to 5-Round DES
fail the modSAC test for 8-bit substring with Autofeeding. 6-Round DES and higher




In order to do linear cryptanalysis of RC5, we need to look at how we can find linear
approximations for a half-round for RC5.
8.1 Linear approximations for a half-round
According to Kaliski and Yin in [55], finding linear approximations for a half-round of
RC5 involves the following equation:
Ri = ((Li−1 ⊕Ri−1)≪ Ri−1) + Si (8.1.1)
We need to decompose the equation (8.1.1) into three equations, each of which involves
only a single primitive operation. We can then consider possible linear approximations for
each of these equations. Equation (8.1.1) can be rewritten as the following three equations
:
X = Li−1 ⊕Ri−1 (8.1.2)
Y = X≪ Ri−1 (8.1.3)
Ri = Y + Si (8.1.4)
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For equation (8.1.2), we see that there are numerous linear approximations holding
with bias 1/2 (i.e. having probability 1 or 0). In particular, all approximations involving
the same bits of X, Li−1 and Ri−1. All other approximations have bias 0.
The linear approximations for equation (8.1.3) can be divided into two types depending
on whether bits of Ri−1 are involved. First, we consider approximations in which no bits of
Ri−1 are involved. Any such approximation involving just one bit of X and Y holds with
probability 1/2 + 1/2w, since for one rotation amount, the bits are guaranteed to be equal
and for the other w−1 amounts, the bits are equal with probability 1/2. Next, we consider
approximations where some bits of Ri−1 are involved. Some of these approximations have
non-zero bias. For example,
Y [0] = X[0]⊕Ri−1[0] (8.1.5)
holds with probability 1/2 + 1/2w, since when the rotation amount is zero, Ri−1[0] = 0
and both (8.1.3) and (8.1.5) yield Y [0] = X[0], and when the amount is otherwise, the
equation (8.1.5) holds with probability 1/2. Note that a linear approximation will have
bias zero if any bit Ri−1[s] where s ≥ log2w is involved.
For equation (8.1.4), the best linear approximation is the following:
Ri[0] = Y [0] + Si[0] (8.1.6)
which holds with probability 1. All other approximations do not have bias 1/2 and their
biases are dependent on the key.
Since in the first half-round of RC5 we have only the + operation, then we have both
approximations
L1[0] = L0[0]⊕ S0[0] and R1[0] = R0[0]⊕ S1[0]
hold with probability 1. We will denote these as C and D, respectively.
Based on our discussion above, we can now construct many possible linear approxi-
mations for a half-round of RC5 by joining the approximations for the three operations
involved. For example, by joining X[0] = Li−1[0] ⊕ Ri−1[0], approximation (8.1.5) and
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approximation (8.1.6), we obtain the following approximation for a half-round:
Ri[0] = Li−1[0]⊕ Si[0]
which holds with probability 1/2 + 1/2w. We will denote it as E.
Since Li = Ri−1 in a half-round of RC5, there are many approximations which involve
the same bits of Li and Ri−1 and hold with probability 1. The trivial approximation
Li[0] = Ri−1[0]
which we will denote as -, can be alternated with approximation E.
Once we have determined the possible linear approximations for a half-round of RC5
then we can do linear cryptanalysis of RC5.
8.2 Linear Cryptanalysis of RC5
The basic idea of linear cryptanalysis is to find expressions consisting of combinations of
bits of the plaintext, the ciphertext and key bits which holds with probability p 6= 1/2.
With the assumption that each round in the cipher is independent, Kaliski and Yin [55]
determine the most likely linear approximation by concatenating the half-round linear
approximations C,D,- and E. The resulting (r-1) round approximation L2r[0] ⊕ R0[0] =
S1[0] ⊕ S3[0] ⊕ . . . ⊕ S2r−1[0] can then be used to attack the r-round cipher. The bias of
L2r ⊕R0 can be found using the Piling Up Lemma [74]. In [55], it is stated that the bias
r−1 is equal to 1/(2wr−1).
In recovering one bit of S2r+1 i.e. the final subkey used in RC5 encryption, Kaliski and
Yin stated that the number of plaintexts, N , required is estimated to be the inverse square
of the bias r−1. Since we have w bits in the final subkey S2r+1, then the number of known
plaintexts required is given by the following:
N = w · 2r−1 (8.2.1)
Since we can repeatedly use the same plaintexts, Kaliski and Yin stated that we can
recover the other subkeys without requiring any additional plaintexts. For RC5 r-round
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cipher with nominal parameters i.e. w = 32 and b = 2r + 2, linear cryptanalysis would
require 237 plaintexts for r = 4, 247 plaintexts for r = 5 and 257 plaintexts for r = 6.
Kaliski and Yin [55] had also outlined the algorithm to perform linear cryptanalysis of
RC5. For convenience, we present the algorithm again.
The algorithm is as follows:
1. Compute S2r+1[0]. We observe that for plaintext/ciphertext pairs such that L2r+1
modw = 1, one of the following two approximations is perfect i.e. either having bias
1/2 or −1/2:
L2r[0] = L2r+1[0]⊕R2r+1[1] if S2r+1[0] = 0
L2r[0] = L2r+1[0]⊕R2r+1[1]⊕R2r+1[0] if S2r+1[0] = 1
The first approximation has zero bias if S2r+1[0] = 1 and the second approximation
has zero bias if S2r+1[0] = 0. To compute S2r+1[0], we obtain N known plain-
text/ciphertext pairs such that L2r+1 mod w = 1 and consider the two quantities
R0[0]⊕ (L2r+1[0]⊕R2r+1[1]) and R0[0]⊕ (L2r+1[0]⊕R2r+1[1]⊕R2r+1[0]). Let U0 be
the number of plaintexts such that the first quantity is zero and U1 be the number
of plaintexts such that the second quantity is zero. If |U0 −N/2| ≥ |U1 −N/2|, we
predict S2r+1[0] = 0; otherwise, we predict S2r+1[0] = 1.
2. Compute T , i.e. the value of S1[0] ⊕ S3 ⊕ · · · §2r−1[0], given S2r+1[0]. We observe
that for plaintext/ciphertext pairs such that L2r+1 mod w = 0, the approximation
L2r[0] = L2r+1[0]⊕R2r+1[0]⊕ S2r+1[0]
holds with probability 1 and the right-hand side is known. To compute T, we obtain
N known plaintext/ciphertext pairs such that L2r+1 mod w = 0. Let U be the
number of plaintexts such that
R0[0]⊕ (L2r+1[0]⊕R2r+1[0]⊕ S2r+1[0])
is zero. If U ≥ N/2, we predict T = 0; otherwise, we predict T = 1.
3. For s = 1, . . . , w − 1, compute S2r+1[s] given T and S2r+1[s − 1 . . . 0]. For a given
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plaintext/ciphertext pair, let y = R2r+1 − S2r+1 and let carry(s) denote the carry
out from y[s− 1 . . . 0] + S2r+1[s− 1 . . . 0]. We observe that for plaintext/ciphertext
pairs such that L2r+1 mod w = s, the approximation
L2r[0] = L2r+1[0]⊕R2r+1[s]⊕ S2r+1[s]⊕ carry(s)
holds with probability 1. To compute S2r+1[s], we obtainN known plaintext/ciphertext
pairs such that L2r+1 mod w = s. Let U be the number such that
(R0[0]⊕ T )⊕ (L2r+1[0]⊕R2r+1[s]⊕ carry(s))
is zero. If U ≥ N/2, we predict S2r+1[s] = 0; otherwise, we predict S2r+1[s] = 1.
8.3 Further Results on Linear Cryptanalysis of RC5
Selc¸uk [91] had pointed out that if we had used the linear cryptanalysis method by Kaliski
and Yin [55] we described earlier, we would not be able to get the expected success rate
(i.e. 95-99%) and surprisingly the success rate did not improve when the amount of data
used was increased. In [91], Selc¸uk suggested that there were some hidden assumptions
which caused the high success rate which led him to develop different linear cryptanalytic
attacks on RC5 to recover the round key S2r+1. The linear approximation R0[0]⊕L2r[0] =
S1[0]⊕S3[0]⊕· · ·⊕S2r−1[0] (used by Kaliski and Yin) was modified so that the actual value
of L2r[0] was used. The actual value of L2r[0] refers to (R2r+1−S2r+1)[ρ]⊕L2r+1 where ρ
denotes L2r+1 mod w. So the approximation becomes R0[0]⊕(R2r+1−S2r+1)[ρ]⊕L2r+1 =
S1[0]⊕ S3[0]⊕ · · · ⊕ S2r−1[0]. Note that, when we substitute a wrong value s for S2r+1 in
this approximation, the bias is not zero. It was also explained that if we were to change
one bit in the round key S2r+1, the bias would also change in the opposite direction.
This makes it harder to recover the round key since we would require large amounts of
plaintext/ciphertext pairs to obtain a high success rate. We will not explain the method by
Selc¸uk any further because we had found another linear cryptanalysis method (introduced
by Borst, Preneel and Vandewalle in [27]) which is better at recovering the round key of
RC5. This is the method that we will be discussing next.
As with the linear cryptanalysis method used by Kaliski and Yin, we need to firstly
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rewrite RC5 algorithm as a series of equations which involve only primitive operations as
follows:
L1 = L0 + S0 (8.3.1)
R1 = R0 + S1 (8.3.2)
Ui = Li ⊕Ri (8.3.3)
Vi = Ui≪ Ri (8.3.4)
Ri+1 = Vi + Si+1 (8.3.5)
Li+1 = Ri (8.3.6)
for i = 1, . . . , 2r. We then find the linear approximations for XOR, data-dependent rota-
tion and addition for the above equations. In order to do that, we look at one bit of each
term of the equation. If A = B ⊕ C, then we have w approximations
A[i] = B[i]⊕ C[i], δ = 2−1 (8.3.7)
for i ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1}. δ is called the deviation and |δ| =  refers to the bias of the linear
approximation. If D = E≪ F , then
D[i] = E[j]⊕ F [k]⊕ (i− j)[k], δ = 2−log2w−1 (8.3.8)
for i, j ∈ {0, . . . , w− 1} and k ∈ {0, . . . , log2w− 1}. Using equations (8.3.7) and (8.3.8) to
pass through the XOR and rotation in RC5 we get the following equations:
Ui[j] = Li[j]⊕Ri[j], δ = 2−1 (8.3.9)
Vi[k] = Ui[j]⊕Ri[j]⊕ (k − j)[j], δ = 2−log2w−1 (8.3.10)
Chaining equations (8.3.9) and (8.3.10), we get the following:
Vi[k] = Li[j]⊕ (k − j)[j], δ = 2−log2w−1 (8.3.11)
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Finally, if we have G = H + S where S is fixed, then
G[0] = H[0]⊕ S[0], δ = 2−1 (8.3.12)
G[i] = H[i]⊕ S[i], δ = 2−1 − 2−iSi (8.3.13)
for i ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1}. Here Sx = Smod 2x+1 i.e. the x least significant bits (LSB) of S.
So, depending on the round key S, the bias of (8.3.13) can vary between 0 and 1/2. On
average, the bias is 1/4.
Using approximations (8.3.7), (8.3.8) and (8.3.12) we can derive the following iterative
approximation for one round of RC5:
Li[0]⊕ Si+1[0] = Li+2[0], (i ≥ 1), δ = 2−log2w−1 (8.3.14)




Si+1+2j = Li+2l[0], (i ≥ 1) (8.3.15)
According to the Piling Up Lemma [74, 75], this approximation would have deviation δ =
2l−12(−log2w−1)l = 2−l log2w−1 if the chained approximations are independent. According
to Borst, Preneel and Vandewalle [27], the Piling Up Lemma gives a good estimate for the
average bias for RC5.
The linear cryptanalysis used in [27] is different from the one used previously since it
uses linear hulls. A linear hull is the set of chains of linear equations over (a part of) the
cipher that produce the same linear equation. The following describes a linear hull for an
approximation of two rounds (from i to i + 3) of RC5 given in (8.3.20). Using (8.3.7),
(8.3.8), (8.3.12) and (8.3.13), the following collections of log2w approximations for two
rounds can be derived. For j ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1},
Li[j]⊕ (k − j)[j]⊕ Si+1[k] = Li+2[k], δ = δj,k (8.3.16)
for k = 0, . . . , log2w−1. Similarly, for the next two rounds also log2w approximations can
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be derived. For l ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1},
Li+2[k]⊕ (l − k)[k]⊕ Si+3[l] = Li+4[l], δ = δk,l (8.3.17)
for k = 0, . . . , log2w − 1. Therefore, we can chain the log2w pairs of (8.3.16) and (8.3.17)
to obtain the two round approximation
Li[j]⊕ Si+1[k]⊕ Si+3[l]⊕ (k − j)[j]⊕ (l − k)[k] = Li+4[l], δ = δj,k,l (8.3.18)
Using the Piling Up Lemma, we get (for the bias)
δj,k,l =

2−2log2w−1 k = 0, l = 0
2−2log2w−1(1− 2−k+1Sk−1i+1 ) k 6= 0, l = 0
2−2log2w−1(1− 2−l+1Sl−1i+3) k = 0, l 6= 0
2−2log2w−1(1− 2−k+1Sk−1i+1 )(1− 2−l+1Sl−1i+3) k 6= 0, l 6= 0
(8.3.19)
It is clear that from (8.3.19) that the deviation is key dependent i.e. dependent on the
log2w − 1 LSB’s of Si+1 and Si+3 but due to the linear hull effect, this key dependency
is negligible. Note that for each of the triples j, k, l the term Cj,k,l = Si+1[k] ⊕ Si+3[l] ⊕
(k − j)[j] ⊕ (l − k)[k] is constant, either 0 or 1. This constant actually determines the
sign of the deviation of the following approximation, which can be derived from (8.3.18)
by leaving out Cj,k,l.
Li[j] = Li+4[l], δ = δ˜j,l (8.3.20)








where Vj,l = {k ∈ 0, . . . , log2w − 1|Cj,k,l = 0}
We can extend approximation (8.3.20) to hold for r subsequent rounds. In this way we
get the following approximation for r rounds.
Li[j] = Li+2r[l], δ = δ˜j,l, (8.3.22)
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where i, j, l ∈ {0, . . . , w − 1}.
We have established equations in order for us to use the linear attack used in [27]. In
the next Section, we will explain this linear attack and will give some experimental results
that we get from performing the attack on reduced round RC5.
8.4 Experimental Results on Linear Cryptanalysis of RC5
The linear attack that we have implemented uses the approximation (8.3.22). To attack
r rounds of RC5 we use the fact that each linear path that is part of the hull given by
(8.3.22) is a chain of r 1-round approximations. We split the approximation into two
parts. The first contains key addition and the first round. This gives us the following
log2w approximations. Each is the first part of a set of linear approximations that is
contained in the linear hull of (8.3.22).
L0[0] = L3[k] (8.4.1)
for k = 0, . . . , log2w − 1. The remainder of the whole approximation can be specified by
the following log2w approximations, each beginning with a different bit of L3:
L3[k] = L2r+1[0] (8.4.2)
for k = 0, . . . , log2w − 1. When for a certain plaintext encryption the intermediate value
R1 modw = k where k ∈ {0, . . . , log2w−1}, then (8.4.1) behaves in the deviation direction.
Hence, if (8.4.2) also behaves in the deviation direction then the whole approximation
behaves in that direction. On the other hand, if R1 modw /∈ {0, . . . , log2w − 1} then
the probability that the whole approximation behaves in the deviation direction is much
lower. In the linear attack, we want to check every text to determine whether one of the
approximations that correspond to (8.4.2) was followed. Since we have no information
about any intermediate values, we do not have a criterion that always holds. Instead a
function is derived which is expected to give higher values when one of the approximations
was followed. Hence this function will have higher values for encryptions where R1 modw ∈
{0, 1, . . . , log2w − 1} than for other R1 values. As R1 modw = (R0 − S1) modw and R0
is known we can guess S1 modw from this. This function is called the non-uniformity
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function.
The non-uniformity function ν computes non-uniformity values for a given set of corre-
sponding plaintext/ciphertext pairs. This set is divided into w subsets, each set contains
plaintexts with the same R0 modw-value. For each set a non-uniformity value can be
computed. If we were to know the value of R2r−1 modw it would be possible to compute
log2w bits of S2r+1 or two possible values for those bits from the ciphertexts using the
following:
S2r+1 = R2r+1 − (R2r−1 ⊕ L2r+1)≪ L2r+1, (8.4.3)
since the values of R2r+1 and L2r+1 are known from the ciphertexts. We will use S〈n〉 to
denote the log2w-bit string, given by the bits (n+ log2w−1) modw, . . . , (n+1) modw, n of
S. The value of L2r+1 mod w determines for which log2w bits of S2r+1 can be computed,
i.e. S〈L2r+1 modw〉. If L2r+1 modw = 0 then the log2w LSB’s can be computed. When
L2r+1 modw 6= 0 we can compute two values for S〈L2r+1 modw〉. Since we do not know
the value of R2r−1 modw or even which value would be the most probable, we make a
similar computation for a value which we denote as S′ instead of trying to compute log2w
bits of S2r+1. This value is computed by taking R2r−1 modw = 0 in (8.4.3) so we have
S′ = R2r+1 − (L2r+1≪ L2r+1). (8.4.4)
Due to the non-uniform distribution of R2r−1 modw itis expected that the distribu-
tion of S′〈·〉-values will be more non-uniform for encryptions where the approximation
was followed than for others. So, for the attack we use a counter array A(i, j, k) for
i, j, k = 0, . . . , w−1, where each i corresponds to a possible value of R0 modw, each j cor-
responds to a possible value of L2r+1 modw and each k corresponds to a possible value of
S′〈L2r+1 modw〉. For each text we check if the approximation holds. If it holds, we change
the counter array as follows. If L2r+1 modw = 0, we increase A(R0 modw,L2r+1 modw, v)
by 2, where v is the suggested S′〈L2r+1 modw〉-value. If L2r+1 modw 6= 0, we increase
A(R0 modw,L2r+1 modw, v0) and A(R0 modw,L2r+1 modw, v1) by 1, where v0 and v1
are the suggested values. If the approximation does not hold, we decrease the specified
array entries accordingly. Each (R0 modw,L2r+1 modw)-combination gives a distribution
of S′〈·〉-values. It was discovered in [27] that values of R1 modw ∈ {0, . . . , log2w−1} gives
the most non-uniform distributions. In order to measure the non-uniformity we check for
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all w bits of S′ based on the S′〈·〉-values, we count the number of times 0 is suggested
and also the number of times 1 is suggested and take the difference of these two amounts.
For each R0 modw we take the sum over all possible L2r+1 modw of the absolute values










A(r0, l2r+1 + x, v)−
∑
v:v[x]=1
A(r0, l2r+1 + x, v)| (8.4.5)
where all indices of A are taken modulo w. The w values derived in this way are called
the non-uniformity values. It is expected that the sum of log2w non-uniformity values
will be maximal for the values corresponding to texts with R1 modw ∈ {0, . . . , log2w−1}.
Finally, we guess the value of S1 modw accordingly. Below is a summary of the algorithm
for performing the linear attack on RC5.
1. Acquire n known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (P0, C0), . . . , (Pn−1, Cn−1)
2. Initialize a counter array A(i, j, k)← 0 for i, j, k = 0, . . . , w − 1
3. Fore each plaintext/ciphertext pair do:
• If L2r+1 modw = 0 then
(a) Compute S′〈0〉-guess v
(b) If L0[0] = L2r+1[0] then A(R0, L2r+1, v)← A(R0, L2r+1, v) + 2.
If L0[0] = L2r+1[0]⊕ 1 then A(R0, L2r+1, v)← A(R0, L2r+1, v)− 2.
• If L2r+1 modw 6= 0 then
(a) Compute S′〈L2r+1 modw〉-guesses v0 and v1.
(b) If L0[0] = L2r+1[0] then A(R0, L2r+1, v0) ← A(R0, L2r+1, v0) + 1 and
A(R0, L2r+1, v1)← A(R0, L2r+1, v1) + 1
If L0[0] 6= L2r+1[0] then A(R0, L2r+1, v0) ← A(R0, L2r+1, v0) − 1 and
A(R0, L2r+1, v1)← A(R0, L2r+1, v1)− 1
4. Compute w non-uniformity values ν(i) according to (8.4.5), where i corresponds to
a value of R0 modw.
5. Find the value x ∈ {0, . . . , w− 1} for which ∑log2w−1i=0 |ν((x+ i) modw)| is maximal.
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6. Guess S1 modw = w − x.
We have implemented our attack on RC5-32. The results are given in Table 8.1. We
have done tests only up to 4 rounds. We only did up to 4 rounds due to the increase in
the amount of texts required is growing exponentially with increase in number of rounds
of RC5 for reasonable success rate as estimated in Table 8.2. We have used 100 different
keys for our results. Note that we performed these attacks for RC5-32 only.
Table 8.1: Experimental results of the linear attack on RC5-32









The results confirm the results found in [27] for the same number of known plaintexts
used. According to [27], we could estimate the number of plaintexts required to perform
the linear attack and use it also for RC5-64. Table 8.2 shows the expected number of
plaintexts required for the attack as given in [27].
Table 8.2: Expected number of plaintexts required for a known plaintext attack on r(≥ 2)
rounds of RC5-32 or RC5-64






In this Chapter, we are going to discuss a different type of cryptanalysis which is called
Related Key Cryptanalysis. Unlike the different cryptanalyses described in the previous
Chapters, related key cryptanalysis assumes that the attacker learns the encryption of
certain plaintexts under the original unknown key K, but also under some derived key
K ′ = f(K). In a chosen related key attack, the attacker specifies how the key is to
be changed; known related key attacks are those where the key difference is known, but
cannot be chosen by the attacker. The attacker knows or chooses the relationship between
keys, not the actual key values. Before we describe further about this cryptanalysis, we
would like to mention about linearly weak keys of RC5. It may seem that this topic has
nothing to do with related key cryptanalysis but it is important for our discussion on the
cryptanalysis that we are going to do.
9.1 Linearly Weak Keys of RC5
Linearly weak keys of RC5 were first discovered by Heys in [51]. Heys described the
existence of these keys through modification of the linear cryptanalysis method that was
used by Kaliski and Yin in [55]. This method was described in the previous Chapter.
Heys outlined that the algorithm for the linear attack by Kaliski and Yin can be modified
by considering that one of w2 possible pairs of values of the log2w least significant bits
100
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3 and a linear attack for an r-round
cipher can now be based on an (r - 2)-round approximation of L2r[0] = R3[0] = S3[0]. The
resulting bias of the (r - 2)-round approximation is significantly larger than the bias of an
(r - 1)-round approximation which does not use fixed values for Lrot0 and R
rot
0 .
Heys found that when we fix the inputs to Lrot0 and R
rot
0 such that R
rot
1 = 0 and




3 . If we then assume that S
rot
3 = 0 (this happens
with probability 1/w assuming that the key schedule generates reasonably pseudo-random
subkeys) then Rrot3 = 0, L
rot




4 . If we extend this argument so that
Sroti = 0 for 3 ≤ i ≤ 2(r − 1), then Lrot2r = Rrot2r−1 = Srot2r−1 for all input plaintexts with the
correct values of Lrot0 and R
rot
0 . In such cases, the bias of the approximation L2r[0] = 0 is
1/2. This class of extremely weak keys are labelled as WKr−1 since it trivializes the first
r−1 rounds of the cipher and requires 2(r−1)−2 subkeys to have the log2w least significant
bits equal to zero. Assuming that the subkey values are random and independent, the
probability of this weak key occurring is given by the product of the probabilities that
the partial subkey at each round is 0. Therefore, the probability P (WKr−1) = 1/(w2r−4).
So, if we have a 12-round RC5, the probability that the selected key is in WKr−1 class is
2−100.
We can generalize the argument by defining weak keys denoted as WKm for 1 ≤ m ≤
r− 1, where Sroti = 0 for all i, where 3 ≤ i ≤ 2m. The probability that a key in the WKm





In [51], Heys had assumed that we would be able to reduce the number of plain-
text/ciphertext pairs required in linear cryptanalysis of RC5 based on the results obtained
by the algorithm made by Kaliski and Yin. This means that the result obtained in [51] is
no longer applicable to the linear attack method used by Borst, Preneel and Vandewalle
which we had described in the previous Chapter. However, we are going to use a method
of that utilizes these linearly weak keys to obtain the subkeys of RC5.
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9.2 Related Key Cryptanalysis
The idea of the related key attack is that the attacker knows (or chooses) a relation between
several keys (up to 256 in some recent attacks) and is given access to encryption functions
with such related keys. The goal of the attacker is to find the keys themselves. The first
attacks of this type were developed independently by Biham [6] and Knudsen [59], and
the notion of a related key attack was defined by Biham [6].
The relation between the keys can be an arbitrary bijective function R (or even a family
of such functions) chosen (or known) in advance by the adversary [3]. In the simplest form
of this attack, this relation is just an XOR with a constant: K2 = K1 ⊕ C, where the
constant C is chosen by the adversary. This type of relation allows the adversary to
trace the propagation of XOR differences induced by the key difference C through the
key schedule of the cipher. However, more complex forms of this attack allow other
(possibly nonlinear) relations between the keys. For example, [6] uses rotational relations
K2 = ROL(K1) and the attack on AES-256 [19] uses XOR relations between the subkeys
K2 = F
−1(F (K1 ⊕ C) = RC(K1).
In this Section, we are looking at Related Key Cryptanalysis as applied to RC5. Let us
first consider an r-round RC5 cipher. We have S0, . . . , S2r+1 to denote the 2r+ 2 subkeys
for the r-round cipher. We also denote Srot0 , . . . , S
rot
2r+1 as the log2w least significant bits
(LSB) of S0, . . . , S2r+1 respectively. Assume that we had used a linearly weak key in our
r-round cipher such that Sroti = 0 for i ≤ i ≤ 2r − 1. Next, let us consider a (r-1)-round
RC5 cipher. We then have a set of 2r subkeys denoted as S∗0 , . . . , S∗2r. Similarly, for this set
of subkeys we have S∗rot0 , . . . , S∗rot2r as the log2w least significant bits (LSB) of S∗0 , . . . , S∗2r
respectively. Since we are assuming that we know the relationship between two set of
subkeys then let us have the following relationship for the subkeys.
S∗rot0 = Srot0 + Srot2 ,
S∗rot1 = Srot1 + Srot3 ,
S∗roti = S
rot
i+2 (2 ≤ i < 2r)
(9.2.1)
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As Srot3 is zero, we can simplify (9.2.1) further into
S∗rot0 = Srot0 + Srot2 ,
S∗rot1 = Srot1 ,
S∗roti = S
rot
i+2 (2 ≤ i < 2r)
(9.2.2)
In the previous Chapter we described linear cryptanalysis and gave some experimental
results on performing this attack on RC5. So, we can estimate the number of plain-
text/ciphertext pairs required to perform linear cryptanalysis on RC5. Say, for an r(≥ 3)-
round RC5-32 we require N plaintext/ciphertext pairs for a 90% success rate to perform
the linear cryptanalysis described in [27], then for an (r-1)-round RC5-32 we would reduce
the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs by a factor of 64 so N/64 would be needed to
obtain the same success rate.
In terms of practicality, it would be possible to obtain parameters like the number of
rounds (r) used in RC5 block cipher since only the subkeys are unknown. If we choose
the subkey relationships as given by (9.2.2) then we would be able to perform linear
cryptanalysis on an (r-1)-round RC5 instead of an r-round RC5. This would be done
by changing a parameter of RC5, namely, the number of rounds. Once that is done,
we would then obtain plaintext/ciphertext pairs based on this reduced RC5 in order to
perform linear cryptanalysis.
However, this attack would only be possible if the key used in the r-round RC5 block
cipher is a weak key. Table 9.1 gives an estimate on the number of plaintext/ciphertext
pairs required if we had used the method we had described here. This estimate is based
on the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs required when we use linear cryptanalysis
method by Borst, Preneel and Vandewalle in [27].
Table 9.1: Expected number of plaintexts required for related key attack on r(≥ 3) rounds
of RC5-32 or RC5-64







In this Chapter, we discuss several statistical tests that has been applied to RC5 similar
to the tests performed on DES in Chapter 7. We wanted to compare the results that
we obtained for DES with that of RC5 in this Chapter. We wanted to find out whether
DES and RC5 have the same or similar Distinguishing Attack Profile. By adjusting the
parameters of RC5 to match that of DES in terms of block size, outputs from both
algorithms are supposed to be indistiguishable from each other as well as from a random
permutation. By looking at the Distinguishing Attack Profile, we wanted to be able to
recognise which algorithm we are using. Our tests rely on ciphertexts produced from
various rounds of RC5, from 1-round to the full 12-round version. We want to determine
how many ciphertexts are required to distinguish between the ciphertext output of a block
cipher and a random permutation. We also want to determine the number of rounds
required in order for the ciphertexts to be indistinguishable from a random permutation.
These tests are done because we want to make a comparison to the results that we got for
DES in Chapter 7. We want to see how different or similar those results are as compared
to another block cipher algorithm. We chose RC5 for this purpose due to the flexibility
of setting the block size. Therefore, we chose RC5 with word size 32 bits which would be
able to encrypt a plaintext block of size 64 bits since DES also encrypts a plaintext block
104
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Table 10.1: Distinguishing Attack Profile for RC5
RC5
Rounds

















































































Pass Pass Pass Pass Figs.C.33-40
6 to 12 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Figs.C.41-96
of 64 bits.
We start off by giving a summary of the experimental results performed on RC5 and
then give details on the experimental test results on RC5.
10.1 Summary of Experimental Results on RC5
In this Section, we summarise the results that we obtained from the various tests that we
had performed for n-round RC5, n = 1 . . . 12.
Note that in the Table 10.1, the number inside the braces indicates the minimum
amount of ciphertext pairs where it began to fail the specific test. For tests without
Autofeeding, from Table 10.1, we can see that n-round RC5 failed the experimental tests
when n < 6. For tests with Autofeeding, Table 10.1 shows that n-round RC5 failed the
experimental tests when n < 3.
We look at experimental tests without Autofeeding first. For 1-round RC5, we see that
the minimum amount of ciphertext pairs needed to sufficiently distinguish from a random
permutation is 28 for the SAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests while we needed half that amount
for 2-bit modSAC and 4-bit modSAC Tests. For 2-round RC5, the minimum amount of
ciphertext pairs needed to sufficiently distinguish from a random permutation is 29 for the
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SAC Test, while the amount of ciphertext pairs required remains the same as with 1-round
RC5 for 2-bit modSAC, 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests. For 3-round RC5, the
minimum amount of ciphertext pairs required had increased 4 times from 29 for the SAC
Test while for the other tests, the amount of ciphertext pairs required remained the same
as what we have for 1-round RC5 and 2-round RC5. For 4-round RC5, the amount of
ciphertext pairs required again increased 16 times that of what we have for 3-round RC5
while for 2-bit modSAC, 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit modSAC tests, we only required half
this amount. For 5-round RC5, the number of ciphertext pairs needed is the same for the
SAC, 2-bit modSAC and 4-bit modSAC Tests. For 8-bit modSAC Test, it needed twice
this amount.
For n-round RC5 where 1 < n < 5, the performance in distiguishing our observed
distribution from uniform random distribution of 2-bit modSAC, 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit
modSAC Tests were better than the SAC Test. For 1-round RC5, the performance of SAC
Test is comparable with that of 8-bit modSAC Test’s performance. However, for 5-round
RC5, the performance of the SAC Test is comparable with that of 2-bit modSAC and 4-bit
modSAC Tests and better than that of 8-bit modSAC Test.
Next, we look at experimental tests with Autofeeding. For 1-round RC5, we see that the
amount of ciphertext pairs needed to sufficiently distinguish from a random permutation is
220 for the SAC Test while for 2-bit modSAC Test, the amount of ciphertext pairs needed is
one sixteenth this amount whereas for 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests, the amount
of ciphertext pairs required is one thirty-second of 220. For 2-round RC5, the amount of
ciphertext pairs needed is 224 for the SAC Test while 2-bit modSAC Test required half this
amount whereas for 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests, the amount of ciphertext
pairs required is a quarter of 224. In terms of performance in sufficiently distinguishing
from a random permutation, for both 1-round RC5 and 2-round RC5, 2-bit modSAC, 4-bit
modSAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests were better than that of the SAC Test.
10.2 Detail of Experimental Results on RC5
In this Section, we describe the experimental setup that was used to perform our various
tests on various number of rounds of RC5. Basically, there are four tests that are being
performed, namely,
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i SAC Test
ii SAC Test with Autofeeding
iii modSAC Test for n-bit substrings, where n = 2, 4, 8
iv modSAC Test with Autofeeding for n-bit substrings, where n = 2, 4, 8
The SAC tests and modSAC tests performed on RC5 are similar tests performed on
DES in the previous Chapter. Input data sets for these tests are plaintexts and keys. The
output data sets are ciphertexts. The plaintexts and keys are generated random data. The
number of plaintexts generated range from 27 to 224. 10 trials would be performed for each
test, i.e. each test would be used on 10 different input data sets and we used these data
sets for each number of rounds of the cryptographic algorithm. For the case of RC5, we
started off testing 1 round and gradually increased the number of rounds until finally we
tested on the full 12-rounds. The results are displayed graphically according to the number
of ciphertext pairs being used (see Appendix C). We subdivided the graphs into four parts
according to the number of ciphertexts used. Part (a) ranges from 27 to 211 ciphertext
pairs. Part (b) is from 212 to 216 ciphertext pairs. Part (c) ranges from 217 to 220 ciphertext
pairs and part (d) is from 221 up to 224 ciphertext pairs. We note that for a plaintext P
and a key K, we will produce a ciphertext C but we will also produce a ciphertext C ′
from plaintext P ′ and and the same key K. The hamming distance between P and P ′ is 1
and P ′ is produced by randomly choosing and toggling one bit position of P . In the case
of tests with Autofeeding, we generated a random key, K and a random plaintext, P . We
then generate another plaintext P ′ from P so that the hamming distance between P and
P ′ is 1 and P ′ is produced by randomly choosing and toggling one bit position of P . P
and K would be fed to RC5 to produce ciphertext C. Similarly, P ′ and K would be fed to
RC5 to produce ciphertext C ′. For Autofeeding, these ciphertexts would become the next
plaintext inputs to be fed into RC5 to produce another set of new ciphertexts. This cycle
repeats until the required number of ciphertexts is reached. The tests were performed on
RC5 with parameters w = 32,r = 1 . . . 12 and b = 16. This means that the word size, w is
32 bits and and the number of bytes b used for the secret key is 16.
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10.2.1 Tests on RC5
As we mentioned previously, we performed four tests. We will start by displaying the
results from the SAC Test and the modSAC Test for n-bit substrings, where n = 2, 4, 8.
This is then followed the results for the SAC Test with Autofeeding and modSAC Test
with Autofeeding for n-bit substrings, where n = 2, 4, 8.
10.2.1.1 SAC Test





















1 63 0.005 95.649 198.727 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.C.1
2 63 0.005 95.649 139.311 512(i .e. 29) Fail Fig.C.9
3 63 0.005 95.649 120.516 2048(i .e. 211) Fail Fig.C.17
4 63 0.005 95.649 127.294 32768(i .e. 215) Fail Fig.C.25
5 63 0.005 95.649 118.886 1048576(i .e. 220) Fail Fig.C.33
6 63 0.005 95.649 58.1954 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.41
7 63 0.005 95.649 34.3148 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.49
8 63 0.005 95.649 40.34 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.57
9 63 0.005 95.649 41.7892 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.65
10 63 0.005 95.649 35.1084 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.73
11 63 0.005 95.649 43.924 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.81
12 63 0.005 95.649 34.805 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.89
As we can see from the table above that 1- to 5-Round RC5 fail the SAC test. The p-value
that we used is 0.005 which is a standard statistical significance level value for χ2 test.
The number of ciphertext pairs needed to distinguish from a random permutation is 256
pairs for 1-Round RC5. The number of pairs increases to 512 pairs for 2-Round RC5,
then 2048 pairs for 3-Round RC5, 32768 pairs for 4-Round RC5 and finally 1048576 pairs
for 5-Round RC5. 95.649 is the χ2 test threshold value when the degrees of freedom is
63(64 − 1) and the p-value as stated previously. For 6-Round RC5 or higher, we did not
find the experimental χ2 test value exceeding or approaching towards this threshold value
for 16777216 ciphertext pairs. So, 6-Round RC5 or higher pass the SAC test.
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10.2.1.2 modSAC Test for 2-bit substring






















1 3 0.005 12.838 5676.07 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.C.2
2 3 0.005 12.838 858.937 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.C.10
3 3 0.005 12.838 30.4125 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.C.18
4 3 0.005 12.838 34.7027 16384(i .e. 214) Fail Fig.C.26
5 3 0.005 12.838 13.0495 1048576(i .e. 220) Fail Fig.C.34
6 3 0.005 12.838 3.86949 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.42
7 3 0.005 12.838 3.70583 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.50
8 3 0.005 12.838 3.20419 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.58
9 3 0.005 12.838 2.86368 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.66
10 3 0.005 12.838 3.47462 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.74
11 3 0.005 12.838 3.82949 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.82
12 3 0.005 12.838 4.98504 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.90
In the above table, only 1- to 5-Round RC5 fail the modSAC test for 2-bit substring.
Similarly, we use a p-value of 0.005 for the significance level for the χ2 test. The number
of ciphertext pairs needed to distinguish from a random permutation using this test is the
same for 1-Round RC5 up to and including 3-round RC5. Then it suddenly increase to
16384 for 4-round RC5 and further increase to 1048576 for 5-Round RC5. 6-Round RC5
or higher, pass the modSAC test for 2-bit substring. 12.838 is the χ2 test threshold value
when the degrees of freedom is 3(4−1) and the p-value as stated previously. For 6-Round
RC5 or higher, we did not find the experimental χ2 test value exceeding or approaching
towards this threshold value for 16777216 ciphertext pairs
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10.2.1.3 modSAC Test for 4-bit substring






















1 15 0.005 32.801 12792.2 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.C.3
2 15 0.005 32.801 1804.78 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.C.11
3 15 0.005 32.801 70.9734 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.C.19
4 15 0.005 32.801 66.0697 16384(i .e. 214) Fail Fig.C.27
5 15 0.005 32.801 34.1705 1048576(i .e. 220) Fail Fig.C.35
6 15 0.005 32.801 16.5666 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.43
7 15 0.005 32.801 16.5852 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.51
8 15 0.005 32.801 13.1851 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.59
9 15 0.005 32.801 17.4684 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.67
10 15 0.005 32.801 17.8568 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.75
11 15 0.005 32.801 16.778 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.83
12 15 0.005 32.801 17.7279 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.91
The results that we obtain in the above table are very similar to the results that we get
for the modSAC test for 2-bit substring. We can see from the above table that only 1-
to 5-round RC5 fail the modSAC test for 4-bit substring. The number of ciphertext pairs
needed to distinguish from a random permutation using this test is the same for 1-Round
RC5 up to and including 3-round RC5. Then it suddenly increase to 16384 for 4-round
RC5 and further increase to 1048576 for 5-Round RC5. 6-Round RC5 or higher, pass the
modSAC test for 4-bit substring. 32.801 is the χ2 test threshold value when the degrees
of freedom is 15(16−1) and the p-value as stated previously. For 6-Round RC5 or higher,
we did not find the experimental χ2 test value exceeding or approaching towards this
threshold value for 16777216 ciphertext pairs. Thus these higher round RC5 pass our
modSAC test for 4-bit substring.
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10.2.1.4 modSAC Test for 8-bit substring






















1 255 0.005 316.919 155011 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.C.4
2 255 0.005 316.919 15503 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.C.12
3 255 0.005 316.919 550.175 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.C.20
4 255 0.005 316.919 418.723 16384(i .e. 214) Fail Fig.C.28
5 255 0.005 316.919 350.417 2097152(i .e. 221) Fail Fig.C.36
6 255 0.005 316.919 254.535 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.44
7 255 0.005 316.919 253.653 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.52
8 255 0.005 316.919 246.877 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.60
9 255 0.005 316.919 266.301 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.68
10 255 0.005 316.919 247.419 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.76
11 255 0.005 316.919 254.829 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.84
12 255 0.005 316.919 253.275 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.92
From the table above, we see that 1-Round RC5 fail the modSAC test for 8-bit substring.
The number of ciphertext pairs sufficient for distinguishing 1-Round RC5 from a random
permutation is 256 pairs. 256 pairs of ciphertexts is also sufficient for distinguishing 2-
Round RC5 and 3-Round RC5, from a random permutation. For 4-Round RC5, the
number of ciphertext pairs needed to make this distinction is 16384 and for 5-Round RC5,
at least 2097152 pairs is required. 316.919 is the χ2 test threshold value when the degrees
of freedom is 255(256 − 1) with a p-value of 0.005. For 6-Round RC5 or higher, we did
not find the experimental χ2 test value exceeding or approaching towards this threshold
value for 16777216 ciphertext pairs. Thus these higher round RC5 pass our modSAC test
for 8-bit substring.
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10.2.1.5 SAC Test with Autofeeding


















1 63 0.005 95.649 119.201 1048576(i .e. 220) Fail Fig.C.5
2 63 0.005 95.649 50.1576 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.13
3 63 0.005 95.649 39.3954 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.21
4 63 0.005 95.649 38.4581 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.29
5 63 0.005 95.649 35.8877 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.37
6 63 0.005 95.649 38.3948 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.45
7 63 0.005 95.649 38.0321 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.53
8 63 0.005 95.649 36.8354 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.61
9 63 0.005 95.649 34.3999 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.69
10 63 0.005 95.649 40.2835 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.77
11 63 0.005 95.649 35.7596 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.85
12 63 0.005 95.649 39.0038 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.93
When we perform the SAC Test with Autofeeding, we see a difference in the results as
compared to the SAC test results in Table 10.2 in terms of the number of rounds where
RC5 fail the test and also the number of required ciphertext pairs. Only 1-Round RC5 fails
the SAC Test with Autofeeding. The number of ciphertext pairs required to distinguish
the ciphertext outputs of 1-Round RC5 from random outputs is 1048576. 2-Round RC5
or higher pass the test. This means that these higher round RC5 are able to generate
ciphertext outputs indistinguishable from random outputs.
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10.2.1.6 modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 2-bit substring






















1 3 0.005 12.838 14.0934 65536(i .e. 216) Fail Fig.C.6
2 3 0.005 12.838 17.4723 8388608(i .e. 223) Fail Fig.C.14
3 3 0.005 12.838 4.11861 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.22
4 3 0.005 12.838 2.039 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.30
5 3 0.005 12.838 3.84587 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.38
6 3 0.005 12.838 1.79948 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.46
7 3 0.005 12.838 2.38491 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.54
8 3 0.005 12.838 3.2513 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.62
9 3 0.005 12.838 2.12019 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.70
10 3 0.005 12.838 4.74951 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.78
11 3 0.005 12.838 3.02097 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.86
12 3 0.005 12.838 1.78175 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.94
As we can see from the table above, our modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 2-bit sub-
string is slightly better than the SAC Test with Autofeeding in Table 10.6 in terms of
distinguishing the generated ciphertext outputs from random outputs. The SAC Test
with Autofeeding is only able to distinguish the generated outputs of 1-Round RC5 from
random outputs whereas our modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 2-bit substring is able
to do this distinction for 1-Round RC5 and 2-Round RC5. The number of ciphertext
pairs required for 1-Round RC5 to make this distinction is 65536 and for 2-Round RC5 is
8388608. 3-Round RC5 or higher pass the test. This means that these higher round RC5
are able to generate ciphertext outputs indistiguishable from random outputs.
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10.2.1.7 modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 4-bit substring






















1 15 0.005 32.801 35.2929 32768(i .e. 215) Fail Fig.C.7
2 15 0.005 32.801 50.3696 4194304(i .e. 222) Fail Fig.C.15
3 15 0.005 32.801 18.1037 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.23
4 15 0.005 32.801 13.3448 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.31
5 15 0.005 32.801 16.8036 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.39
6 15 0.005 32.801 10.9897 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.47
7 15 0.005 32.801 13.859 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.55
8 15 0.005 32.801 15.0436 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.63
9 15 0.005 32.801 14.6511 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.71
10 15 0.005 32.801 16.449 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.79
11 15 0.005 32.801 16.7118 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.87
12 15 0.005 32.801 15.9253 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.95
From the table above, our modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 4-bit substring produce
slightly better result than our modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 2-bit substring in Ta-
ble 10.7 in terms of the number of ciphertext pairs needed to distinguish generated cipher-
text outputs from random outputs. 1-Round RC5 requires only 32768 pairs instead of
65536 pairs and 2-Round RC5 requires 4194304 pairs instead of 8388608 pairs. However,
the number of rounds which fail the modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 4-bit substring
is the same as for the modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 2-bit substring. Only 1-Round
RC5 and 2-Round RC5 fail this test. 3-Round RC5 or higher, pass the test.
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10.2.1.8 modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 8-bit substring






















1 255 0.005 316.919 323.907 32768(i .e. 215) Fail Fig.C.8
2 255 0.005 316.919 329.563 4194304(i .e. 222) Fail Fig.C.16
3 255 0.005 316.919 247.718 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.24
4 255 0.005 316.919 241.326 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.32
5 255 0.005 316.919 256.238 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.40
6 255 0.005 316.919 254.54 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.48
7 255 0.005 316.919 260.008 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.56
8 255 0.005 316.919 258.011 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.64
9 255 0.005 316.919 253.176 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.72
10 255 0.005 316.919 264.841 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.80
11 255 0.005 316.919 246.527 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.88
12 255 0.005 316.919 259.5 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.C.96
The results that we have in the table above for the modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 8-bit
substring is similar to the result obtained from our modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 4-
bit substring in Table 10.8 in terms of the number of ciphertext pairs needed to distinguish
ciphertext outputs from random outputs. 1-Round RC5 requires 32768 ciphertext pairs
to make this distinction and 2-Round RC5 requires 4194304 ciphertext pairs. This means
only 1-Round RC5 and 2-Round RC5 fail the modSAC Test with Autofeeding for 8-bit
substring. 3-Round RC5 or higher, pass this test. This means that these higher round
RC5 are able to generate ciphertext outputs indistiguishable from random outputs.
Chapter 11
CONCLUSION
There have been major developments in cryptanalysis of block ciphers. We were given the
chance to investigate one of the oldest and most enduring block ciphers, i.e. DES. We were
able to do a software implementation of DES, though not as optimised as some other im-
plementations. We were successful in implementing Differential Cryptanalysis of 8-round
DES with the retrieval of all 56-bit key. We were also able to do Linear Cryptanalysis and
Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of 8-round DES. We were also successful in implement-
ing our modified version when using multiple linear approximations in Differential-linear
cryptanalysis of 8-round DES and gave some experimental results of our attack. We would
like to mention that our thesis does not give the complete picture of all kinds of crypt-
analysis that can be done on DES, in particular, 8-round DES. There are some other
methods [42, 30] that may be used against 8-round DES but we feel that the methods
that we had used in this thesis fairly covers the different kinds of cryptanalysis that can
be done on 8-round DES.
The latter half of this thesis covers our contribution in the statistical cryptanalysis field.
In particular we develop new tests based on the Strict Avalanche Criterion which are used
in Distinguishing Attack. We have used a well-known test, the SAC Test, and modified it
to produce our own tests called 2-bit modSAC, 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit modSAC Tests.
These tests (without Autofeeding) were designed to find out at what stage, in terms
of number of rounds and number of ciphertext pairs required, the ciphertext outputs
produced were indistinguishable from a random permutation.
In addition to that, we also performed the SAC Test as well as our modified tests with
116
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 117
Autofeeding to make a comparison with our new tests. Again these tests were devised to
find out at what stage, in terms of number of rounds and number of ciphertext pairs re-
quired, we can generate ciphertext outputs indistinguishable from a random permutation.
Thus, we produced a Distinguishing Attack Profile for DES as given in Table 7.1 in
Chapter 7. In Chapter 10, we had performed the same tests as in Chapter 7 but on the
RC5 algorithm. We also produced a Distinguishing Attack Profile for RC5 as given in
Table 10.1. We found that for tests with Autofeeding, only 1-round RC5 and 2-round
RC5 failed the tests (see Table 10.1). Whereas, for tests without Autofeeding, n-round
RC5 where n < 6, failed the tests. This is unlike the results that we obtained for n-round
DES using tests with Autofeeding and without Autofeeding. Both tests with and without
Autofeeding failed only for n-round DES where n < 6.
For the case of the tests with Autofeeding, this shows that RC5 is faster than DES
in generating ciphertexts indistinguishable from a random permutation. For the case of
the tests without Autofeeding, the amount of ciphertext pairs required where RC5 began
to fail the tests grows more rapidly than what we have for DES. However, both RC5
and DES began to pass all tests without Autofeeding from 6 rounds onwards. From both
Table 7.1 and Table 10.1, we also compared the performance, in terms of distiguishing from
a random permutation, of SAC Test with our modified Tests, either with Autofeeding or
without Autofeeding.
Generally, for the case of Tests without Autofeeding, the performance of our modified
tests, in particular, 2-bit modSAC Test and 4-bit modSAC Test are better than that of
the SAC Test. For the case of Tests with Autofeeding, the performance of our modified
tests are still better than that of the SAC Test as well.
We had fairly covered, to some extent, a range of cryptanalysis attacks/methods in-
volving block ciphers, in particular DES. As a comparative study, we subjected RC5 to
the same distinguishers that we had used for testing DES so that we can empirically judge
the effectiveness of the distinguishers in attacking another block cipher algorithm similar
in configuration to DES. Our techniques have successfully differentiated between DES and
RC5.
We had also implemented our proposed technique on two well known block ciphers,
i.e. AES [32, 33, 82] and KASUMI [1]. In the following Section we give a summary of our
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experimental results on both block ciphers.
11.1 Distinguishing Block Ciphers from a Random Permu-
tation
11.1.1 AES
We had performed our proposed technique on AES-128. Table 11.1 gives a summary of the
experimental results that we obtained for 1-round AES-128 till the full 10-round AES-128.
Table 11.1: Distinguishing Attack Profile of AES
AES
Rounds








































































4 to 10 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Figs.D.25-80
From Table 11.1, we can see that n-round AES-128 failed the experimental tests when
n < 4 for tests with and without Autofeeding. If we look at the experimental test results
for tests without Autofeeding, we see that the minimum amount of ciphertext pairs needed
to sufficiently distinguish from a random permutation is 28 for the SAC Test and half that
amount for 2-bit modSAC, 4-bit modSAC and 8-bit modSAC tests. These are for 1-round
and 2-round AES-128 only. For 3-round AES-128, we would require 216 ciphertext pairs
for the SAC Test, 212 for both 2-bit modSAC and 4-bit modSAC Tests, and 210 for 8-bit
modSAC Test to distinguish from a random permutation. Surprisingly, these are also the
same results we obtained for the experimental tests with Autofeeding, for n-round AES-
128 where n < 4. We expected the results to be higher than the results we obtained from
the experimental tests without Autofeeding. For 4- to 10-round AES-128, the block cipher
passed the tests. Figure D.1 to Figure D.80 in Appendix D, give the graphical results for
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 119
all experimental tests done for the various rounds of AES-128. Table D.1 to Table D.8
give the details of experimental tests according to the different test categories i.e. SAC
Test without Autofeeding, 2-bit modSAC Test without Autofeeding and so on.
11.1.2 KASUMI
We had also performed our proposed technique on KASUMI. Table 11.2 gives a summary
of the experimental results that we obtained for 1-round KASUMI till the full 8-round
KASUMI.
Table 11.2: Distinguishing Attack Profile of KASUMI
KASUMI
Rounds























































3 to 8 Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass Figs.E.17-64
From Table 11.2, we see that only n-round KASUMI where n < 3 failed the experi-
mental tests. For both tests without Autofeeding and with Autofeeding, we have similar
results. In fact, the results are the same for both 1-round KASUMI and 2-round KASUMI.
We see that the minimum amount of ciphertext pairs need to sufficiently distinguish from
a random permutation is 29 for the SAC Test either with Autofeeding or without Aut-
ofeeding. We needed 27 ciphertext pairs for 2-bit modSAC Test either with Autofeeding
or without Autofeeding. This is also the amount required by 4-bit modSAC Test similarly,
with Autofeeding or without Autofeeding. We required twice as much for 8-bit modSAC
Test either with Autofeeding or without Autofeeding. For n-round KASUMI where n > 2,
the cryptographic algorithm passed the experimental tests. Figure E.1 to Figure E.64
in Appendix E, give the graphical results for all experimental tests done for the various
rounds of KASUMI. Table E.1 to Table E.8 give the details of experimental tests according
to the different test categories.
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 120
11.2 Future Work
The modSAC tests that we proposed are fast and easy to implement in software. They are
not meant to replace the already established SAC test. On the contrary, the modSAC tests
can complement the existing SAC test. One thing that is obvious from the experimental
results that we got when testing block ciphers is that, the tests are only able to detect
reduced round versions of the block ciphers. By using the modSAC tests, we managed to
reduce the minimum required ciphertext pairs by a factor of 2 or 4 or 8 etc. We believe
that we can extend these modSAC tests further by incorporating other techniques so that
it can be used to distinguish the full version of the block cipher algorithm. In Section 1
above, we demonstrated that the modSAC tests can be applied to other block ciphers,
not just DES and RC5. We believe that the modSAC tests can also be used for other
primitives such as stream ciphers, hash functions and pseudorandom number generators.
We believe that further development in this area of research can enhance our knowledge
and understanding of block cipher cryptanalysis.
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A C Source Code for DES Implementation
A.1 des.h
/*********************************************************







getbit - this function is used to extract a particular
bit from "bits" given by the bit position "pos"
**********************************************************/
char getbit(const unsigned char *bits, int pos);
/*********************************************************
setbit - this function is used to set a particular bit
at position "pos" in "bits" to a particular value
"state". Normally, "state" is either 0 or 1
**********************************************************/
void setbit(unsigned char *bits, int pos, int state);
/*********************************************************
bitxor - this function is used to perform bit xoring of
"bits1" and "bits2" and store the result in
"bitsx". The number of bits to be xored is given
by "size"
**********************************************************/
void bitxor(const unsigned char *bits1, const unsigned char *bits2,
unsigned char *bitsx, int size);
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/*********************************************************
lrotbit - This function is used to perform the left
cicular rotation of "bits"of size "size". The
number of left rotations is given by "count".
**********************************************************/
void lrotbit(unsigned char *bits, int size, int count);
/*********************************************************
permute - This function is used to permute "bits"
according to the function "mapping". "n" gives
the size of "bits".
**********************************************************/
void permute(unsigned char *bits, const char *mapping, int n);
/*********************************************************
substitute - This function is the non linear substitution
function in function F
**********************************************************/
void substitute(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out);
/*********************************************************
f - This is the function which incorporates the
substitution permutation network for DES
**********************************************************/
void f(unsigned char input[4], unsigned char subkey[6],
unsigned char output[4]);
/*********************************************************
round1 - This is the round function which incorporates the
F function. The input consists of the left and
right halves (each 32 bits) of the input, namely,
"left" and "right". "nleft" and "nright" are the
input for the next round. "subkey" gives the
subkey used in each round.
**********************************************************/
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void round1(unsigned char *left, unsigned char *right, unsigned char *nleft,
unsigned char *nright, unsigned char *subkey);
/*********************************************************
keyschedule - This function is used to generate the 48-bit
subkeys for each round of DES. The
keyschedule is stored in "ks" and generated
from 64-bit "key"
**********************************************************/
void keyschedule(unsigned char key[8], unsigned char ks[16][6]);
/*********************************************************
deseord - This function is used to perform the DES
encryption or decryption depending on "yn". If
"yn" is 1, we perform encryption and if "yn" is
0 then we perform decryption. "p" is the 64-bit
plaintext, "key" is 64-bit key and "out" is
64-bit output/ciphertext. "rnd" is the number of
rounds for encryption/decryption.
**********************************************************/
void deseord(unsigned char p[8], unsigned char key[8],
unsigned char out[8], int rnd, int yn);
/*********************************************************
deseord1 - This function is the same as the function
deseord above with the removal of initial and
final permutations removed for differential
cryptanalysis
**********************************************************/
void deseord1(unsigned char p[8], unsigned char key[8],
unsigned char out[8], int rnd, int yn);
A.2 des.c
/*********************************************************
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des.c - this is C implementation of DES. We need to
compile this file using gcc -o3 -c des.c to
obtain des.o file so that we can use in other
files.
**********************************************************/
/* start of tables */
/*********************************************************
ip - Initial Permutation (IP) table on 64 bit input
(This will be ignored in differential cryptanalysis)
**********************************************************/
char ip[64] = { 58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2,
60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,
62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6,
64, 56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,
57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1,
59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,
61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5,
63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7 };
/*********************************************************
fp - Final Permutation (FP) table on 64 bit input.
(This is also ignored in differential cryptanalysis)
**********************************************************/
char fp[64] = { 40, 8, 48, 16, 56, 24, 64, 32,
39, 7, 47, 15, 55, 23, 63, 31,
38, 6, 46, 14, 54, 22, 62, 30,
37, 5, 45, 13, 53, 21, 61, 29,
36, 4, 44, 12, 52, 20, 60, 28,
35, 3, 43, 11, 51, 19, 59, 27,
34, 2, 42, 10, 50, 18, 58, 26,
33, 1, 41, 9, 49, 17, 57, 25 };
/*********************************************************
ex - Expansion table to expand 32 bit input into 48 bit
output in the F function
**********************************************************/
char ex[48] = { 32, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 131
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,
12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 1 };
/*********************************************************
s - The famous s-boxes (8 of them i.e. S1 to S8) in the
function F.
**********************************************************/
char s[8][4][16] = {
{{ 14, 4, 13, 1, 2, 15, 11, 8, 3, 10, 6, 12, 5, 9, 0, 7 },
{ 0, 15, 7, 4, 14, 2, 13, 1, 10, 6, 12, 11, 9, 5, 3, 8 },
{ 4, 1, 14, 8, 13, 6, 2, 11, 15, 12, 9, 7, 3, 10, 5, 0 },
{ 15, 12, 8, 2, 4, 9, 1, 7, 5, 11, 3, 14, 10, 0, 6, 13 }},
{{ 15, 1, 8, 14, 6, 11, 3, 4, 9, 7, 2, 13, 12, 0, 5, 10 },
{ 3, 13, 4, 7, 15, 2, 8, 14, 12, 0, 1, 10, 6, 9, 11, 5 },
{ 0, 14, 7, 11, 10, 4, 13, 1, 5, 8, 12, 6, 9, 3, 2, 15 },
{ 13, 8, 10, 1, 3, 15, 4, 2, 11, 6, 7, 12, 0, 5, 14, 9 }},
{{ 10, 0, 9, 14, 6, 3, 15, 5, 1, 13, 12, 7, 11, 4, 2, 8 },
{ 13, 7, 0, 9, 3, 4, 6, 10, 2, 8, 5, 14, 12, 11, 15, 1 },
{ 13, 6, 4, 9, 8, 15, 3, 0, 11, 1, 2, 12, 5, 10, 14, 7 },
{ 1, 10, 13, 0, 6, 9, 8, 7, 4, 15, 14, 3, 11, 5, 2, 12 }},
{{ 7, 13, 14, 3, 0, 6, 9, 10, 1, 2, 8, 5, 11, 12, 4, 15 },
{ 13, 8, 11, 5, 6, 15, 0, 3, 4, 7, 2, 12, 1, 10, 14, 9 },
{ 10, 6, 9, 0, 12, 11, 7, 13, 15, 1, 3, 14, 5, 2, 8, 4 },
{ 3, 15, 0, 6, 10, 1, 13, 8, 9, 4, 5, 11, 12, 7, 2, 14 }},
{{ 2, 12, 4, 1, 7, 10, 11, 6, 8, 5, 3, 15, 13, 0, 14, 9 },
{ 14, 11, 2, 12, 4, 7, 13, 1, 5, 0, 15, 10, 3, 9, 8, 6 },
{ 4, 2, 1, 11, 10, 13, 7, 8, 15, 9, 12, 5, 6, 3, 0, 14 },
{ 11, 8, 12, 7, 1, 14, 2, 13, 6, 15, 0, 9, 10, 4, 5, 3 }},
{{ 12, 1, 10, 15, 9, 2, 6, 8, 0, 13, 3, 4, 14, 7, 5, 11 },
{ 10, 15, 4, 2, 7, 12, 9, 5, 6, 1, 13, 14, 0, 11, 3, 8 },
{ 9, 14, 15, 5, 2, 8, 12, 3, 7, 0, 4, 10, 1, 13, 11, 6 },
{ 4, 3, 2, 12, 9, 5, 15, 10, 11, 14, 1, 7, 6, 0, 8, 13 }},
{{ 4, 11, 2, 14, 15, 0, 8, 13, 3, 12, 9, 7, 5, 10, 6, 1 },
{ 13, 0, 11, 7, 4, 9, 1, 10, 14, 3, 5, 12, 2, 15, 8, 6 },
{ 1, 4, 11, 13, 12, 3, 7, 14, 10, 15, 6, 8, 0, 5, 9, 2 },
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{ 6, 11, 13, 8, 1, 4, 10, 7, 9, 5, 0, 15, 14, 2, 3, 12 }},
{{ 13, 2, 8, 4, 6, 15, 11, 1, 10, 9, 3, 14, 5, 0, 12, 7 },
{ 1, 15, 13, 8, 10, 3, 7, 4, 12, 5, 6, 11, 0, 14, 9, 2 },
{ 7, 11, 4, 1, 9, 12, 14, 2, 0, 6, 10, 13, 15, 3, 5, 8 },
{ 2, 1, 14, 7, 4, 10, 8, 13, 15, 12, 9, 0, 3, 5, 6, 11 }} };
/*********************************************************
p - Permutation table in the F function applied to the
output from the s boxes.
**********************************************************/
char p[32] = { 16, 7, 20, 21, 29, 12, 28, 17,
1, 15, 23, 26, 5, 18, 31, 10,
2, 8, 24, 14, 32, 27, 3, 9,
19, 13, 30, 6, 22, 11, 4, 25 };
/*********************************************************
pc1 - Permuted Choice 1 table. This permutation is used
on the key to permute 56 bits (after removal of
8 parity bits) in the process of producing subkeys
**********************************************************/
char pc1[56] = { 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9,
1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18,
10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35, 27,
19, 11, 3, 60, 52, 44, 36,
63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15,
7, 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22,
14, 6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29,
21, 13, 5, 28, 20, 12, 4 };
/*********************************************************
pc2 - Permuted Choice 2 table. This permutation is used
in producing the subkeys in each round.
**********************************************************/
char pc2[56] = { 14, 17, 11, 24, 1, 5, 3, 28,
15, 6, 21, 10, 23, 19, 12, 4,
26, 8, 16, 7, 27, 20, 13, 2,
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41, 52, 31, 37, 47, 55, 30, 40,
51, 45, 33, 48, 44, 49, 39, 56,
34, 53, 46, 42, 50, 36, 29, 32 };
/*********************************************************
lrot - This table gives the number of left circular
rotations used for each round in producing
subkeys
**********************************************************/
char lrot[16] = { 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1 };
/* end of tables */
/*********************************************************
getbit - this function is used to extract a particular
bit from "bits" given by the bit position "pos"
**********************************************************/





/* adjust the mask according to position of required bit */
for(i=0;i<(pos%8);i++)
mask = mask >> 1;
return(((mask & bits[(int)(pos/8)]) == mask) ? 1: 0);
}
/*********************************************************
setbit - this function is used to set a particular bit
at position "pos" in "bits" to a particular value
"state". Normally, "state" is either 0 or 1
**********************************************************/
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mask = 0x80;
/* set the mask according to position of required bit */
for(i=0;i<(pos%8);i++)







bitxor - this function is used to perform bit xoring of
"bits1" and "bits2" and store the result in
"bitsx". The number of bits to be xored is given
by "size"
**********************************************************/
void bitxor(const unsigned char *bits1, const unsigned char *bits2,












lrotbit - This function is used to perform the left
cicular rotation of "bits"of size "size". The
number of left rotations is given by "count".
**********************************************************/
void lrotbit(unsigned char *bits, int size, int count)
{
int i,j;
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char fbit, lbit;















bits[j] = bits[j] << 1;
}





permute - This function is used to permute "bits"
according to the function "mapping". "n" gives
the size of "bits".
**********************************************************/




/* initialize "temp" to zero */
memset(temp, 0, (int)ceil(n/8));
/* perform permutation according to "mapping" */
for(i=0;i<n;i++)
setbit(temp, i, getbit(bits, mapping[i] - 1));
/* copy "temp" back to "bits" */
memcpy(bits, temp, (int)ceil(n/8));
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}
/*********************************************************
substitute - This function is the non linear substitution
function in function F
**********************************************************/
void substitute(unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out)
{
int i, j;
unsigned char p, row, col, sblk;
p = 0;
/* in is divided into 8 blocks of 6 bits */
for(i=0;i<8;i++)
{
/* row is formed from the 1st and 6th bits of each of
the 8 blocks of "in"*/
row = (getbit(in, (i*6)+0)*2) + (getbit(in, (i*6)+5)*1);
/* col is formed from the 2nd,3rd,4th and 5th bits of each of
the 8 blocks of "in" */
col = (getbit(in, (i*6)+1)*8) + (getbit(in, (i*6)+2)*4) +




/*p holds the bit position in "in" having bit 1 */
/* the last four bits of "sblk" are the required bits */






f - This is the function which incorporates the
substitution permutation network for DES
**********************************************************/
void f(unsigned char input[4], unsigned char subkey[6],
unsigned char output[4])
{
unsigned char xblk[6], tblk[6];
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/* copy "input" to "tblk" */
memcpy(tblk, input, 4);
/* expand "tblk" using the expansion table "ex" to
48 bits using "permute"*/
permute(tblk, ex, 48);
/* perform bit xoring of the round subkey and "tblk"
and put into "xblk" */
bitxor(tblk, subkey, xblk, 48);
/* copy "xblk" to "tblk" */
memcpy(tblk, xblk, 6);
/*perform the substition function */
substitute(tblk, output);




round1 - This is the round function which incorporates the
F function. The input consists of the left and
right halves (each 32 bits) of the input, namely,
"left" and "right". "nleft" and "nright" are the
input for the next round. "subkey" gives the
subkey used in each round.
**********************************************************/
void round1(unsigned char *left, unsigned char *right,
unsigned char *nleft, unsigned char *nright, unsigned char *subkey)
{
unsigned char temp[4];
/* perform the F function on the right half "right" to produce new
right half "nright" */
f(right, subkey, nright);
/* perform bit xoring of the left half "left" with "nright" and store
it in "temp"*/
bitxor(nright, left, temp, 32);
/* copy "temp" back to "nright" */
memcpy(nright, temp, 4);





keyschedule - This function is used to generate the 48-bit
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subkeys for each round of DES. The
keyschedule is stored in "ks" and generated
from 64-bit "key"
**********************************************************/
void keyschedule(unsigned char key[8], unsigned char ks[16][6])
{
int i,j;
unsigned char temp[8], c1[4], d1[4];
/* copy "key" to "temp" */
memcpy(temp, key, 8);
/* use pc1 table to permute "temp" */
permute(temp, pc1, 56);
/* c1 and d1 are the left and right halves of "temp" */
/* initialize c1 and d1 to zero */
memset(c1, 0, 4);
memset(d1, 0, 4);
/* copy the left half of "temp" to "c1" */
for(i=0;i<28;i++)
setbit(c1, i, getbit(temp, i));
/* copy the right half of "temp" to "d1" */
for(i=0;i<28;i++)
setbit(d1, i, getbit(temp, i+28));
for(i=0;i<16;i++)
{
/* perform left circular rotation according to "lrot" independently
on "c1" and "d1" */
lrotbit(c1, 28, lrot[i]);
lrotbit(d1, 28, lrot[i]);
/* copy the bits from "c1" and "d1" to respective round subkey "ks" */
for(j=0;j<28;j++)
setbit(ks[i], j, getbit(c1, j));
for(j=0;j<28;j++)
setbit(ks[i], j+28, getbit(d1, j));





deseord - This function is used to perform the DES
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encryption or decryption depending on "yn". If
"yn" is 1, we perform encryption and if "yn" is
0 then we perform decryption. "p" is the 64-bit
plaintext, "key" is 64-bit key and "out" is
64-bit output/ciphertext. "rnd" is the number of
rounds for encryption/decryption.
**********************************************************/
void deseord(unsigned char p[8], unsigned char key[8],
unsigned char out[8], int rnd, int yn)
{
int i;
unsigned char temp[8], left[4], right[4], nleft[4], nright[4], work[4];
unsigned char ks[16][6];
/* generate the key schedule first */
keyschedule(key, ks);
/* copy the plaintext "p" to "temp" */
memcpy(temp, p, 8);
/* perform the initial permutation on "temp" */
permute(temp, ip, 64);





/* copy the right half "right" to "work" */
memcpy(work, right, 4);
if (yn == 1)
{
/* perform round function for encryption */




/* perform round function for decryption */
round(left, work, nleft, nright, ks[rnd-1-i]);
}
/* copy "nleft" to "left" and "nright" to "right" to prepare




/* swap "right" with "left" */
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memcpy(&out[0], right, 4);
memcpy(&out[4], left, 4);




deseord1 - This function is the same as the function
deseord above with the removal of initial and
final permutations removed for differential
cryptanalysis
**********************************************************/
void deseord1(unsigned char p[8], unsigned char key[8],
unsigned char out[8], int rnd, int yn)
{
int i;
unsigned char temp[8], left[4], right[4], nleft[4], nright[4], work[4];
unsigned char ks[16][6];
/* generate the key schedule first */
keyschedule(key, ks);
/* copy the plaintext "p" to "temp" */
memcpy(temp, p, 8);





/* copy the right half "right" to "work" */
memcpy(work, right, 4);
if (yn == 1)
{
/* perform round function for encryption */




/* perform round function for decryption */
round(left, work, nleft, nright, ks[rnd-1-i]);
}
/* copy "nleft" to "left" and "nright" to "right" to prepare
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A.3 Timing Comparison of DES Implementations
Figure A.3.1: Timing Comparison 4 DES implementations for 16777216 plaintexts
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Figure B.1: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 1-round































































































Figure B.2: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
DES for 10 trials



























































































Figure B.3: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round





















































































Figure B.4: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
DES for 10 trials







































































































Figure B.5: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 1-round































































































Figure B.6: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)



























































































Figure B.7: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round























































































Figure B.8: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)









































































































Figure B.9: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 2-round



















































































Figure B.10: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
DES for 10 trials















































































Figure B.11: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round



















































































Figure B.12: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
DES for 10 trials








































































































Figure B.13: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 2-round



















































































Figure B.14: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)















































































Figure B.15: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round



















































































Figure B.16: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure B.17: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 3-round



















































































Figure B.18: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
DES for 10 trials
































































































Figure B.19: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round















































































Figure B.20: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
DES for 10 trials











































































































Figure B.21: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 3-round



















































































Figure B.22: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)































































































Figure B.23: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round















































































Figure B.24: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)










































































































Figure B.25: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 4-round























































































Figure B.26: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
DES for 10 trials























































































Figure B.27: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round





















































































Figure B.28: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
DES for 10 trials










































































































Figure B.29: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 4-round























































































Figure B.30: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)























































































Figure B.31: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round





















































































Figure B.32: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.33: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 5-round


























































































Figure B.34: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
DES for 10 trials



















































































Figure B.35: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round



















































































Figure B.36: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.37: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 5-round























































































Figure B.38: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)


























































































Figure B.39: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round





















































































Figure B.40: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.41: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 6-round


























































































Figure B.42: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
DES for 10 trials



















































































Figure B.43: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round




















































































Figure B.44: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.45: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 6-round























































































Figure B.46: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)
















































































Figure B.47: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round


















































































Figure B.48: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure B.49: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 7-round


























































































Figure B.50: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
DES for 10 trials






















































































Figure B.51: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round


















































































Figure B.52: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.53: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 7-round

























































































Figure B.54: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)





















































































Figure B.55: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round

















































































Figure B.56: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.57: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 8-round



























































































Figure B.58: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
DES for 10 trials
























































































Figure B.59: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round






















































































Figure B.60: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.61: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 8-round






















































































Figure B.62: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)




















































































Figure B.63: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round






















































































Figure B.64: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.65: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 9-round

























































































Figure B.66: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
DES for 10 trials






















































































Figure B.67: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round




















































































Figure B.68: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.69: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 9-round




























































































Figure B.70: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)























































































Figure B.71: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round



















































































Figure B.72: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.73: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 10-round






















































































Figure B.74: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
DES for 10 trials
























































































Figure B.75: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round






















































































Figure B.76: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.77: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 10-round



























































































Figure B.78: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)

























































































Figure B.79: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round

















































































Figure B.80: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.81: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 11-round



























































































Figure B.82: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round
DES for 10 trials




















































































Figure B.83: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round



















































































Figure B.84: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round
DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.85: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 11-round




























































































Figure B.86: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)

























































































Figure B.87: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round




















































































Figure B.88: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.89: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 12-round

























































































Figure B.90: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round
DES for 10 trials


























































































Figure B.91: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round


















































































Figure B.92: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round
DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.93: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 12-round






















































































Figure B.94: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)


















































































Figure B.95: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round




















































































Figure B.96: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round
DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.97: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 13-round






















































































Figure B.98: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 13-round
DES for 10 trials
























































































Figure B.99: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 13-round





















































































Figure B.100: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 13-
round DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.101: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 13-





















































































Figure B.102: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 13-
round DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)

















































































Figure B.103: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 13-





















































































Figure B.104: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 13-
round DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.105: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 14-



























































































Figure B.106: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 14-
round DES for 10 trials






























































































Figure B.107: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 14-



















































































Figure B.108: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 14-
round DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.109: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 14-



















































































Figure B.110: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 14-
round DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)





















































































Figure B.111: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 14-



















































































Figure B.112: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 14-
round DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.113: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 15-



























































































Figure B.114: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 15-
round DES for 10 trials

























































































Figure B.115: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 15-


























































































Figure B.116: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 15-
round DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.117: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 15-























































































Figure B.118: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 15-
round DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






















































































Figure B.119: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 15-





















































































Figure B.120: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 15-
round DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure B.121: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 16-



















































































Figure B.122: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 16-
round DES for 10 trials
























































































Figure B.123: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 16-
























































































Figure B.124: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 16-
round DES for 10 trials






































































































Figure B.125: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 16-




















































































Figure B.126: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 16-
round DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)


























































































Figure B.127: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 16-





















































































Figure B.128: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 16-
round DES for 10 trials (Autofeeding)
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Figure C.1: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 1-round























































































Figure C.2: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
RC5 for 10 trials



















































































Figure C.3: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round















































































Figure C.4: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.5: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 1-round



















































































Figure C.6: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)





















































































Figure C.7: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round


























































































Figure C.8: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)














































































































Figure C.9: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 2-round















































































Figure C.10: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
RC5 for 10 trials















































































Figure C.11: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round



























































































Figure C.12: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
RC5 for 10 trials











































































































Figure C.13: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 2-round





























































































Figure C.14: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)


























































































Figure C.15: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round

















































































Figure C.16: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)












































































































Figure C.17: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 3-round
































































































Figure C.18: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
RC5 for 10 trials




























































































Figure C.19: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round















































































Figure C.20: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.21: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 3-round




























































































Figure C.22: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)



















































































Figure C.23: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round



















































































Figure C.24: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure C.25: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 4-round





























































































Figure C.26: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
RC5 for 10 trials
























































































Figure C.27: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round















































































Figure C.28: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.29: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 4-round





















































































Figure C.30: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)























































































Figure C.31: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round




















































































Figure C.32: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure C.33: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 5-round



























































































Figure C.34: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
RC5 for 10 trials























































































Figure C.35: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round


























































































Figure C.36: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.37: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 5-round

























































































Figure C.38: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)



















































































Figure C.39: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round



















































































Figure C.40: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure C.41: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 6-round



























































































Figure C.42: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
RC5 for 10 trials

















































































Figure C.43: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round


















































































Figure C.44: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.45: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 6-round






















































































Figure C.46: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)























































































Figure C.47: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round




















































































Figure C.48: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure C.49: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 7-round
























































































Figure C.50: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
RC5 for 10 trials






















































































Figure C.51: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round



















































































Figure C.52: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.53: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 7-round






















































































Figure C.54: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)



















































































Figure C.55: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round






















































































Figure C.56: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure C.57: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 8-round





















































































Figure C.58: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
RC5 for 10 trials
























































































Figure C.59: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round





















































































Figure C.60: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.61: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 8-round





























































































Figure C.62: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)





















































































Figure C.63: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round



















































































Figure C.64: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure C.65: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 9-round
























































































Figure C.66: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
RC5 for 10 trials























































































Figure C.67: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round


















































































Figure C.68: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
RC5 for 10 trials











































































































Figure C.69: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 9-round

























































































Figure C.70: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)


























































































Figure C.71: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round



















































































Figure C.72: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure C.73: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 10-round


























































































Figure C.74: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
RC5 for 10 trials




















































































Figure C.75: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round




















































































Figure C.76: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.77: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 10-round

























































































Figure C.78: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)



























































































Figure C.79: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round


















































































Figure C.80: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure C.81: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 11-round


















































































Figure C.82: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round
RC5 for 10 trials

















































































Figure C.83: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round



















































































Figure C.84: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.85: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 11-round





















































































Figure C.86: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)




















































































Figure C.87: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round



















































































Figure C.88: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 11-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure C.89: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 12-round
























































































Figure C.90: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round
RC5 for 10 trials























































































Figure C.91: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round






















































































Figure C.92: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round
RC5 for 10 trials






































































































Figure C.93: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 12-round
























































































Figure C.94: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)




























































































Figure C.95: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round




















































































Figure C.96: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 12-round
RC5 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)
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D Experimental Test Results for AES-128





















1 127 0.005 171.796 232.271 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.D.1
2 127 0.005 171.796 232.271 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.D.9
3 127 0.005 171.796 191.456 65536(i .e. 216) Fail Fig.D.17
4 127 0.005 171.796 61.7608 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.25
5 127 0.005 171.796 57.6577 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.33
6 127 0.005 171.796 56.7642 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.41
7 127 0.005 171.796 51.9667 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.49
8 127 0.005 171.796 44.7875 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.57
9 127 0.005 171.796 54.6889 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.65
10 127 0.005 171.796 52.5992 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.73






















1 3 0.005 12.838 21494.5 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.2
2 3 0.005 12.838 13795.3 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.10
3 3 0.005 12.838 14.5775 4096(i .e. 212) Fail Fig.D.18
4 3 0.005 12.838 3.95398 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.26
5 3 0.005 12.838 3.48624 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.34
6 3 0.005 12.838 2.8363 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.42
7 3 0.005 12.838 2.93421 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.50
8 3 0.005 12.838 2.49624 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.58
9 3 0.005 12.838 2.92834 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.66
10 3 0.005 12.838 1.93027 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.74
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 255






















1 15 0.005 32.801 53878.3 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.3
2 15 0.005 32.801 34475.9 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.11
3 15 0.005 32.801 42.7754 4096(i .e. 212) Fail Fig.D.19
4 15 0.005 32.801 15.9943 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.27
5 15 0.005 32.801 16.8487 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.35
6 15 0.005 32.801 14.9346 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.43
7 15 0.005 32.801 15.4279 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.51
8 15 0.005 32.801 14.5539 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.59
9 15 0.005 32.801 15.8909 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.67
10 15 0.005 32.801 14.2374 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.75






















1 255 0.005 316.919 458778 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.4
2 255 0.005 316.919 293060 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.12
3 255 0.005 316.919 333.528 1024(i .e. 210) Fail Fig.D.20
4 255 0.005 316.919 259.646 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.28
5 255 0.005 316.919 257.642 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.36
6 255 0.005 316.919 258.327 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.44
7 255 0.005 316.919 269.851 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.52
8 255 0.005 316.919 257.594 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.60
9 255 0.005 316.919 262.553 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.68
10 255 0.005 316.919 256.164 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.76
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1 127 0.005 171.796 232.271 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.D.5
2 127 0.005 171.796 232.271 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.D.13
3 127 0.005 171.796 174.762 65536(i .e. 216) Fail Fig.D.21
4 127 0.005 171.796 54.6873 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.29
5 127 0.005 171.796 50.8516 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.37
6 127 0.005 171.796 60.4335 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.45
7 127 0.005 171.796 52.7733 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.53
8 127 0.005 171.796 55.4094 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.61
9 127 0.005 171.796 47.6626 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.69
10 127 0.005 171.796 64.2755 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.77






















1 3 0.005 12.838 21520.8 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.6
2 3 0.005 12.838 13815.5 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.14
3 3 0.005 12.838 17.3209 4096(i .e. 212) Fail Fig.D.22
4 3 0.005 12.838 3.41287 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.30
5 3 0.005 12.838 2.88539 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.38
6 3 0.005 12.838 3.16109 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.46
7 3 0.005 12.838 3.99462 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.54
8 3 0.005 12.838 1.82648 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.62
9 3 0.005 12.838 1.97849 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.70
10 3 0.005 12.838 2.46563 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.78
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SOME BLOCK CIPHERS 257






















1 15 0.005 32.801 53896.1 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.7
2 15 0.005 32.801 34492.2 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.15
3 15 0.005 32.801 43.5414 4096(i .e. 212) Fail Fig.D.23
4 15 0.005 32.801 14.9178 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.31
5 15 0.005 32.801 13.4932 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.39
6 15 0.005 32.801 16.3209 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.47
7 15 0.005 32.801 16.5109 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.55
8 15 0.005 32.801 16.2405 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.63
9 15 0.005 32.801 14.5288 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.71
10 15 0.005 32.801 16.112 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.79






















1 255 0.005 316.919 458777 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.8
2 255 0.005 316.919 293055 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.D.16
3 255 0.005 316.919 317.056 1024(i .e. 210) Fail Fig.D.24
4 255 0.005 316.919 252.196 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.32
5 255 0.005 316.919 263.047 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.40
6 255 0.005 316.919 263.553 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.48
7 255 0.005 316.919 259.71 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.56
8 255 0.005 316.919 257.422 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.64
9 255 0.005 316.919 257.288 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.72
10 255 0.005 316.919 261.526 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.D.80









































































































Figure D.1: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 1-round































































































Figure D.2: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
AES-128 for 10 trials































































































Figure D.3: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round































































































Figure D.4: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
AES-128 for 10 trials













































































































Figure D.5: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 1-round































































































Figure D.6: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)































































































Figure D.7: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round































































































Figure D.8: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)








































































































Figure D.9: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 2-round



























































































Figure D.10: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
AES-128 for 10 trials























































































Figure D.11: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round























































































Figure D.12: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
AES-128 for 10 trials








































































































Figure D.13: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 2-round



























































































Figure D.14: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)























































































Figure D.15: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round























































































Figure D.16: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure D.17: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 3-round




























































































Figure D.18: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
AES-128 for 10 trials



























































































Figure D.19: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round






















































































Figure D.20: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
AES-128 for 10 trials











































































































Figure D.21: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 3-round






























































































Figure D.22: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)




























































































Figure D.23: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round






















































































Figure D.24: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure D.25: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 4-round
























































































Figure D.26: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
AES-128 for 10 trials



















































































Figure D.27: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round




























































































Figure D.28: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
AES-128 for 10 trials











































































































Figure D.29: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 4-round

























































































Figure D.30: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)




















































































Figure D.31: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round

























































































Figure D.32: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)










































































































Figure D.33: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 5-round





















































































Figure D.34: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
AES-128 for 10 trials




















































































Figure D.35: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round






















































































Figure D.36: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
AES-128 for 10 trials











































































































Figure D.37: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 5-round


























































































Figure D.38: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)




















































































Figure D.39: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round

























































































Figure D.40: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure D.41: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 6-round




















































































Figure D.42: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
AES-128 for 10 trials

























































































Figure D.43: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round

























































































Figure D.44: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
AES-128 for 10 trials











































































































Figure D.45: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 6-round

























































































Figure D.46: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)





















































































Figure D.47: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round





























































































Figure D.48: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure D.49: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 7-round























































































Figure D.50: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
AES-128 for 10 trials























































































Figure D.51: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round























































































Figure D.52: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
AES-128 for 10 trials











































































































Figure D.53: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 7-round























































































Figure D.54: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)





















































































Figure D.55: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round


























































































Figure D.56: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure D.57: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 8-round



















































































Figure D.58: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
AES-128 for 10 trials





















































































Figure D.59: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round























































































Figure D.60: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
AES-128 for 10 trials











































































































Figure D.61: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 8-round



























































































Figure D.62: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)




















































































Figure D.63: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round

























































































Figure D.64: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure D.65: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 9-round
















































































Figure D.66: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
AES-128 for 10 trials

























































































Figure D.67: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round

























































































Figure D.68: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
AES-128 for 10 trials











































































































Figure D.69: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 9-round

























































































Figure D.70: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)























































































Figure D.71: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round






























































































Figure D.72: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 9-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure D.73: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 10-round






















































































Figure D.74: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
AES-128 for 10 trials

























































































Figure D.75: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round


























































































Figure D.76: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
AES-128 for 10 trials











































































































Figure D.77: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 10-round























































































Figure D.78: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)
























































































Figure D.79: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round























































































Figure D.80: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 10-round
AES-128 for 10 trials (Autofeeding)
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E Experimental Test Results for KASUMI





















1 63 0.005 95.649 133.121 512(i .e. 29) Fail Fig.E.1
2 63 0.005 95.649 132.195 512(i .e. 29) Fail Fig.E.9
3 63 0.005 95.649 38.5322 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.17
4 63 0.005 95.649 39.8434 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.25
5 63 0.005 95.649 35.7763 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.33
6 63 0.005 95.649 38.8697 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.41
7 63 0.005 95.649 38.1706 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.49
8 63 0.005 95.649 35.1613 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.57






















1 3 0.005 12.838 680.203 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.E.2
2 3 0.005 12.838 694.815 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.E.10
3 3 0.005 12.838 1.44081 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.18
4 3 0.005 12.838 3.38654 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.26
5 3 0.005 12.838 2.1743 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.34
6 3 0.005 12.838 3.83326 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.42
7 3 0.005 12.838 3.87644 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.50
8 3 0.005 12.838 2.73519 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.58
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1 15 0.005 32.801 1511.62 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.E.3
2 15 0.005 32.801 1531.89 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.E.11
3 15 0.005 32.801 15.9325 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.19
4 15 0.005 32.801 18.0409 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.27
5 15 0.005 32.801 12.368 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.35
6 15 0.005 32.801 15.7602 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.43
7 15 0.005 32.801 14.3777 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.51
8 15 0.005 32.801 14.5424 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.59






















1 255 0.005 316.919 18976.9 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.E.4
2 255 0.005 316.919 19204.1 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.E.12
3 255 0.005 316.919 270.829 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.20
4 255 0.005 316.919 258.034 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.28
5 255 0.005 316.919 246.686 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.36
6 255 0.005 316.919 250.273 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.44
7 255 0.005 316.919 256.778 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.52
8 255 0.005 316.919 261.773 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.60
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1 63 0.005 95.649 132.992 512(i .e. 29) Fail Fig.E.5
2 63 0.005 95.649 133.965 512(i .e. 29) Pass Fig.E.13
3 63 0.005 95.649 37.9476 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.21
4 63 0.005 95.649 36.2361 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.29
5 63 0.005 95.649 42.0592 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.37
6 63 0.005 95.649 40.7559 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.45
7 63 0.005 95.649 37.052 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.53
8 63 0.005 95.649 35.1955 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.61






















1 3 0.005 12.838 663.666 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.E.6
2 3 0.005 12.838 685.067 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.E.14
3 3 0.005 12.838 2.86048 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.22
4 3 0.005 12.838 2.36669 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.30
5 3 0.005 12.838 2.45476 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.38
6 3 0.005 12.838 4.2658 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.46
7 3 0.005 12.838 2.45983 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.54
8 3 0.005 12.838 2.31681 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.62
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1 15 0.005 32.801 1484.09 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.E.7
2 15 0.005 32.801 1522.55 128(i .e. 27) Fail Fig.E.15
3 15 0.005 32.801 15.3465 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.23
4 15 0.005 32.801 14.3438 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.31
5 15 0.005 32.801 13.4412 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.39
6 15 0.005 32.801 16.2691 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.47
7 15 0.005 32.801 14.6663 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.55
8 15 0.005 32.801 14.3111 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.63






















1 255 0.005 316.919 19073.4 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.E.8
2 255 0.005 316.919 19099.3 256(i .e. 28) Fail Fig.E.16
3 255 0.005 316.919 253.827 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.24
4 255 0.005 316.919 240.434 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.32
5 255 0.005 316.919 246.118 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.40
6 255 0.005 316.919 263.1 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.48
7 255 0.005 316.919 250.015 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.56
8 255 0.005 316.919 247.565 16777216(i .e. 224) Pass Fig.E.64











































































































Figure E.1: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 1-round















































































Figure E.2: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
KASUMI for 10 trials















































































Figure E.3: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round































































































Figure E.4: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
KASUMI for 10 trials











































































































Figure E.5: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 1-round















































































Figure E.6: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)















































































Figure E.7: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round































































































Figure E.8: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 1-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)











































































































Figure E.9: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 2-round















































































Figure E.10: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
KASUMI for 10 trials















































































Figure E.11: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round































































































Figure E.12: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
KASUMI for 10 trials











































































































Figure E.13: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 2-round















































































Figure E.14: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)















































































Figure E.15: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round































































































Figure E.16: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 2-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure E.17: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 3-round






















































































Figure E.18: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
KASUMI for 10 trials


























































































Figure E.19: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
























































































Figure E.20: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
KASUMI for 10 trials






































































































Figure E.21: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 3-round





















































































Figure E.22: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)


























































































Figure E.23: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round


















































































Figure E.24: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 3-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure E.25: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 4-round

























































































Figure E.26: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
KASUMI for 10 trials

























































































Figure E.27: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round




















































































Figure E.28: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
KASUMI for 10 trials











































































































Figure E.29: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 4-round























































































Figure E.30: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)



















































































Figure E.31: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round

















































































Figure E.32: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 4-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure E.33: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 5-round
























































































Figure E.34: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
KASUMI for 10 trials























































































Figure E.35: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round


















































































Figure E.36: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
KASUMI for 10 trials






































































































Figure E.37: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 5-round




























































































Figure E.38: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)























































































Figure E.39: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round




















































































Figure E.40: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 5-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure E.41: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 6-round
























































































Figure E.42: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
KASUMI for 10 trials

















































































Figure E.43: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round




















































































Figure E.44: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
KASUMI for 10 trials






































































































Figure E.45: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 6-round



















































































Figure E.46: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






















































































Figure E.47: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round




















































































Figure E.48: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 6-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure E.49: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 7-round

























































































Figure E.50: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
KASUMI for 10 trials

























































































Figure E.51: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round




















































































Figure E.52: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
KASUMI for 10 trials






































































































Figure E.53: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 7-round





















































































Figure E.54: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)



























































































Figure E.55: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round




















































































Figure E.56: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 7-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






































































































Figure E.57: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 8-round






















































































Figure E.58: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
KASUMI for 10 trials




























































































Figure E.59: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round


















































































Figure E.60: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
KASUMI for 10 trials






































































































Figure E.61: Average Hamming Weight Distribution between ciphertext pairs for 8-round

























































































Figure E.62: Percentage of Occurrence of 2-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)






















































































Figure E.63: Percentage of Occurrence of 4-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round


















































































Figure E.64: Percentage of Occurrence of 8-bit substrings for ciphertext pairs for 8-round
KASUMI for 10 trials (Autofeeding)
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F Snapshots of Experimental Test Results
F.1 Differential Cryptanalysis of 8-round DES snapshots
Figure F.1.1: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential Crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES with 40000 chosen plaintext pairs
Figure F.1.2: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential Crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES with 60000 chosen plaintext pairs
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Figure F.1.3: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential Crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES with 80000 chosen plaintext pairs
Figure F.1.4: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential Crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES with 100000 chosen plaintext pairs
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Figure F.1.5: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential Crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES with 120000 chosen plaintext pairs
Figure F.1.6: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential Crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES with 140000 chosen plaintext pairs
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Figure F.1.7: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential Crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES with 160000 chosen plaintext pairs
Figure F.1.8: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential Crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES with 180000 chosen plaintext pairs
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Figure F.1.9: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential Crypt-
analysis of 8-round DES with 200000 chosen plaintext pairs
Figure F.1.10: Snapshot of No. of Successful Attacks and time taken for Differential
Cryptanalysis of 8-round DES with 220000 chosen plaintext pairs
